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PURSUING CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION
THROUGH MARKET-BASED FOREST CARBON SCHEMES IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO
Forest carbon projects seek to alleviate rural poverty and mitigate global climate change by
facilitating the flow of capital from actors looking to offset CO2 emissions to land managers
willing to engage in offset-oriented reforestation, afforestation, and forest preservation activities.
In Mexico, forest carbon schemes have been pursued within the country’s national Payment for
Ecosystem Services (PES) program, and through REDD+ pilot projects and separate voluntary
initiatives. In this dissertation, I explore one voluntary project, Scolel’ Te, which is managed by
the non-governmental organization (NGO), AMBIO. Focusing on the case of Scolel’ Te, I show
how forest carbon projects undermine social relations in ways that weaken participating
communities and threaten project success. First, I examine how carbon forestry market
integration undermines social relations by pushing risk on participant labor and encouraging the
establishment of disenfranchising labor arrangements.
Second, I analyze how farmer
participation in Scolel’ Te undermines social relations within broader community settings. Such
effects, I argue, are only visible when analyzing the social ramifications of carbon forestry within
the context of intra-community social relations. Finally, drawing on labor studies, I critically reassess the role of participatory methods in carbon forestry, suggesting that they undermine the
social relations of production between farmers and project managers, thereby threatening project
success. This analysis demonstrates how shifting market dynamics, historical factors, and labor
processes converge in the context of carbon forestry, and underscores the implications of such
work for participating farmers and carbon forestry more broadly.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Carbon Forestry and the Undermining of Social Relations

Introduction
In southern Mexico many development programs are designed to expand markets for various
goods and services. They are often initially lauded by funding agencies, governmental ministries
and managing organizations that suggest that the initiatives provide innovative options for
alleviating poverty in the country’s most impoverished region. However, despite the early
fanfare, projects often disappear following a short initial burst of activity, regressing into a
skeleton of unmet goals and broken promises. At times, the causes and effects of project
disintegration are clear as initiatives fall victim to shifting funding priorities, to project
mismanagement by corrupt organizations, and to opposition faced by supposed beneficiaries who
contend that projects do not adequately align with their goals and livelihoods. In such instances,
the implications of projects for participating communities are often clearly negative. At other
times, however, a given project’s inability to successfully achieve its goals of poverty alleviation
and the roots of such failure are less visible. They become obscured by a project’s outward
appearance of success and by the sincere intentions of managing organizations.
In this dissertation, I examine the case of a carbon forestry initiative in Chiapas, Mexico,
Scolel’ Te. I argue that contrary to its outward appearance of success, the project shows how
carbon forestry, like many development projects, undermines the very social relations upon which
development and environmental conservation depend.

I contend that social relations are

undermined in three particular regards: 1) by enrolling farmers in unequal labor arrangements that
disenfranchise participants; 2) by threatening the standing of participating farmers within their
communities; and 3) by altering farmer relationships to their land in a manner that is blind to the
many factors that shape farmer land-use patterns and resource management practices. Social
relations represent a key component of rural community life in Mexico and are, moreover,
essential to the long-term success of Scolel’ Te. Thus, the destruction of social relations in the
program is damaging to farmer livelihoods and is detrimental to carbon forestry initiatives as it
erodes the very foundation upon which project success depends.
As a forest carbon project, Scolel’ Te – which means “Tree that Grows” in the local
Tzeltal language – is designed to alleviate rural poverty and mitigate global climate change by
paying rural farmers to offset CO2 emissions by establishing agroforestry systems. Payments to
farmers are derived from the sale of carbon credits in international voluntary carbon markets, an
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activity that is executed by the program’s managing NGO, AMBIO. Scolel’ Te began in 1994
and 1995, but has experienced its greatest growth under AMBIO since the organization’s
formation in 1998. According to Brown and Corbera (2003) from 1998-2003, under AMBIO’s
management, Scolel’ Te grew from 47 farmers in six communities located in Chiapas’ central
highlands region to over 450 farmers in 20 communities in the central highlands and Lacandón
regions of the state, including some in the neighboring state of Oaxaca. Participation expanded to
over 650 farmers in 23 communities in 2005, and as of 2012, included over 1,100 farmers
representing 77 communities and eight Mayan languages in Chiapas and Oaxaca (see Figure 1.1).
While carbon credit production has expanded into Oaxaca (shown in light grey in Figure 1.1),
primary production is located in Chiapas (shown in dark grey in Figure 1.1). The organizational
structure of Scolel’ Te consists of the managing NGO, AMBIO, the work of participating
communities that are recruited and trained by AMBIO, and the work of regional and community
technicians – técnicos regionales and técnicos comunitarios – who are trained in the technical
aspects of project management, and who serve as liaisons between AMBIO and participating
communities (see Figure 1.2).
Given Scolel’ Te’s successful expansion across Chiapas and into Oaxaca, and given the
fact that AMBIO has managed to sustain project activities over nearly 20 years, the project is
often considered to be a regional success story. On the one hand, AMBIO’s efforts to mitigate
global climate change through agroforestry projects have been recognized by the conferring of
awards such as the National Forestry Merit Award (Premio Nacional al Mérito Forestal) by
Mexican president, Peña Nieto, in 2013. On the other hand, the Plan Vivo Standard – the
framework under which AMBIO’s activities are organized – is widely recognized within the
international carbon offset community to be an iconic participatory approach to environmental
conservation and rural development. The standard, which originated in the Scolel’ Te project,
has garnered international recognition for the project and its managers.

Such recognition

positions Scolel’ Te as a success story within broader international efforts to mitigate global
climate change and alleviate rural poverty, and in a national context where the Mexican federal
government has sought to take the lead internationally in REDD+ preparations (see Shapiro, 2010
and Shapiro-Garza, 2010). Thus, AMBIO provides a visible and influential case for examining
how social relations are undermined in carbon forestry projects.

2

Figure 1.1 General Project Area of Scolel’ Te in Oaxaca and Chiapas
Map Credit: Dick Gilbreath
In this dissertation, I focus on AMBIO’s attempts to combine environmental conservation
with social development within Scolel’ Te, an approach that resonates with Osborne (2011).
Focusing on the Lacandón region of Chiapas, Osborne assesses the manner in which laboring in
Scolel’ Te limits farmers’ ability to produce subsistence and other cash crops, thereby acting as a
form of enclosure. However, this dissertation departs from Osborne in four regards: 1) by
shifting the regional focus from the eastern Lacandón region of Chiapas to the western Sierra
Madre region; 2) by shifting attention from how laboring in Scolel’ Te alters farming practices,
toward how such work undermines participant relationships within their broader communities; 3)
by assessing how farmers are exposed to risk through their participation in projects that are
influenced by the unpredictable and fluctuating supply and demand dynamics within voluntary
carbon markets; and 4) by uncovering the logics and motivations underpinning the labor
arrangements in which participating farmers are enrolled. In doing so, this dissertation provides a
nuanced understanding of how certain logics and broader market forces influence project
management in carbon forestry and undermine social relations between AMBIO and farmers and
among farmers within participating communities.
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Figure 1.2 Organizational Relations in Scolel’ Te
This dissertation draws from and builds upon work within political ecology that critically
assesses the social and environmental effects of development. First, I take my cue political
ecology work that emphasizes the need to contextualize development and shifting social relations
within broader social, political and economic contexts (Peluso, 1992). Looking to Peluso, I argue
that in order to understand how carbon forestry operates in Chiapas, it is necessary to situate it
within the state’s broader historical and contemporary political, social and economic context.
Second, I look to political ecology work that recognizes that as social relations shift in the context
of development practice, so too do peoples’ relationship to one another and to the natural
environment (see Carney and Watts, 1991; Peet and Robbins, 2011; Peet and Watts, 2004 [1996];
Schroeder, 1999). In this vein, I argue that social relations are undermined as a result of multiple
forces – e.g. labor arrangements, market dynamics, management practices and differential power
relations within communities – and that as social relations change so to do farmer relationships to
their communities and the natural environment.

While drawing on several insights within

political ecology, I also build on this work in important ways. Within political ecology, labor
studies are tied to considerations of household labor, particularly in the context of development
programs, shifting gender roles and wage labor (Carney 1996; Carney and Watts, 1991; Jarosz,
1996; Schroeder and Suryanata, 2004; Stonich, 1993). However, I expand on the use of labor
studies in political ecology by looking explicitly at the labor processes of carbon forestry and the
social effects of participation in such work. Moreover, I draw on global commodity chains
literature as a means to situating carbon forestry within a broader carbon credit economy. By
incorporating critical labor studies and global commodity chains perspectives, I am also able to
uncover inequalities in the labor arrangements within the carbon credit commodity chain. In this
4

regard, this dissertation draws from and builds on political ecology work in an effort to create a
diverse approach to analyzing how social relations are undermined in carbon forestry.
Argument 1: Carbon Forestry Market Integration Undermines Social Relations by Pushing Risk
on Participant Labor
Carbon forestry is an extremely labor intensive process, and thus depends on AMBIO’s ability to
enroll farmers to work in Scolel’ Te in an extended division of labor – a division of labor
characterized by uneven power relations and the cheap work of técnicos comunitarios. Técnicos
comunitarios carry out a variety of tasks related to the monitoring of farmer land parcels,
responding to farmer discontent, and disseminating project information shared by AMBIO to
fellow participants.

They are, however, compensated only for the first of these activities,

monitoring farmer land parcels, a component of the labor arrangement that is shaped by
management decisions and external market forces. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how the effects of
shifting supply and demand dynamics within voluntary carbon markets restrict AMBIO’s ability
to meet project costs. Thus, as AMBIO sought to expand Scolel’ Te into Chiapas’ western Sierra
Madre region, it was forced to respond to limited resources by reducing pay to técnicos
comunitarios, who deem salaries insufficient given the work – paid and unpaid – that they are
required to complete. The effects of such labor arrangements disenfranchise técnicos, some of
whom threaten to abandon the project. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how the nature of this labor
arrangement reflects the capacity of those in relative positions of power to shift the consequences
of limited resources and shifting market conditions onto those with no ability to influence
budgeting and management decisions.
Work within political ecology provides critical insights into the effects of integrating
environmental qualities and development initiatives into broader market structures. Examples
have examined how broader market integration influences banana production and trade in St.
Vincent and the Grenadines (Grossman, 1998) and mushroom harvesting in China (Yeh, 2000).
Political ecology work highlights, moreover, the complications tied to commoditizing
environmental resources such as water (Bakker, 2011) and to marketing and selling carbon offsets
(Bakker, 2005; Buck 2007; Bumpus and Liverman 2008). However, despite the utility of this
work for underscoring how broader market influences shape local experiences, it is often
insufficient on its own for elucidating the specific structure of the chain of actors and activities
involved in commodity production. Moreover, it is often silent on how broad market influences
shape specific labor structures. In order to address these issues I respond to Bumpus and
Liverman’s (2011) call to use commodity chain perspectives to examine the interconnected nature
5

of actors and activities in carbon offset production. I do so by turning to commodity chains work,
particularly in certification literature while also incorporating perspectives from critical labor
studies.
Commodity chains literature is diverse, but is unified by a general concern with
inequalities in the global economy, particularly as they emerge through rent-seeking behavior
(see Gereffi, 1994). More specifically, commodity chains approaches examine links in the chain,
noting that activities in one link may alter those in another. Commodity chains analyses within
certification literature demonstrate, for instance, how certification requirements influence local
labor practices such as those related to inspection activities in southern Mexico (Mutersbaugh,
2004).

Such work illustrates, moreover, how certification requirements established by

international certification boards located in the global north constitute a mode of environmental
governance for the global south in which labor relations are re-worked according to the objectives
of a given certification (Klooster, 2006). These perspectives may be usefully combined with
critical labor studies literature, which recognizes the need to analyze the extended nature of
production processes, with a particular focus on pre-production and auxiliary labor (see Sayer
and Walker, 1992). Taken together, this work provides a useful framework for analyzing how
shifting supply and demand dynamics within international voluntary carbon markets influence the
formation of specific labor arrangements that ultimately disenfranchise enrolled farmers on
whose work AMBIO depends.
Argument 2: Carbon Forestry Threatens Farmer Standing Within Participating Communities
Farmers participate in Scolel’ Te for a variety of reasons, one of which revolves around the
opportunity to enhance their standing within their respective communities.

For técnicos

comunitarios, the wish to build on one’s intra-community standing is dashed as they become the
subject of rumors and a source of mistrust in the face of unmet farmer expectations related to late
payments and assumptions of corruption. These effects of carbon forestry on project participants
are often invisible to managing NGOs and development practitioners, and are only observable
when viewing carbon forestry in light of broader social relations within a given community. In
this dissertation, I use the term ‘prestige’ as shorthand for these important respect and status
relations.

Prestige forms an important component of rural community life in Mexico, the

presence of which facilitates one’s access to resources and opportunities within and outside her
community. A loss of prestige, however, alters one’s ability to live a productive life as social
relations deteriorate and mobility and access to resources become constrained.

6

In the Mexican literature, prestige is earned by one’s demonstration of her commitment to
her community through the completion of communal labor (Redfield, 1930; 1941), by her
participation in religious ceremonies and the carrying out of responsibilities through the cargo
system (Cancian, 1965), and may be earned through gendered positions of power within a
community. It is a term that is attached, moreover, to one’s age, and to highly gendered notions
of masculinity such as machismo (see Gutmann, 1996). However, prestige is not strictly confined
to men, as women too may fulfill the requirements of contributing to social life within their
communities that may, in turn, result in the attainment of prestige relative to other community
members (Stephen, 1991). Likewise, in Cambell’s (1997) analysis of traditional healers in The
Gambia she shows how connections to organizations outside one’s community may also result in
the attainment of prestige. However, in her study of the Glebo Liberian ethnic group, Mary
Moran (1990) demonstrates that prestige may also be lost by women if they engage in activities
that run counter to community social ideals. In this community and relational context, engaging
with development projects is inherently risky: if projects fail, the negative reputational effects
may be severe.
As these examples demonstrate, prestige is important to take into consideration because
for many, the consequences of enhancing their standing within their community, or conversely, of
damaging it, may have strong emotional and material effects related to ruined relationships,
reduced mobility within a community, and limited access to resources and opportunities.
Within political ecology concepts of prestige and social standing have been discussed,
albeit to a limited extent. Peet and Watts (2004 [1996]) note, for instance, that analyzing
institutions – what they refer to as the “rules of the game” and the “rules-in-use” – is necessary
for understanding how social actors gain access to and control over resources. Referencing Ribot
(1998), Peet and Watts (2004 [1996], page 24) note that these “rules” constitute “prestige,”
authority and access to opportunities in a given place. While Peet and Watts examine prestige in
the context of institutions and one’s participation within specific institutions, Schroeder (1999,
page 40) links the concept of “prestige” to development. He examines how participation in
agroforestry-based development programs may alter one’s prestige within her household and her
community, at once creating the opportunity to enhance it, while threatening to diminish it. In
this dissertation, it becomes clear that when social standing is damaged in the ways described by
Schroeder, the effect is to undermine one’s status within her community and the trust of her
fellow community members, ultimately weakening Scolel’ Te. These effects, however, are not
limited to técnicos comunitarios, but may extend to Scolel’ Te as well. When a loss of prestige
erodes trust relations, future participant mobilization may be complicated. This is illustrated by
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Breslow (2014) who indicates in her study of salmon recovery projects, the centrality of
community trust in conservation initiatives. Moreover, as illustrated by Horowitz (2010), trust
relations within communities determine, at times, how a community may positively or negatively
perceive outside organizations administering development programs. Thus, an erosion of trust
relations within a community may undermine participant perceptions of Scolel’ Te and the
managing NGO, AMBIO.
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I examine how prestige emerges from the “rules of the
game” of the ejido institution in Chiapas’ western Sierra Madre region. I highlight the fact that
prestige is differentially conferred (or not) upon people depending on a variety of factors,
including one’s access to formal ejidal authority in her community, gender norms, and age.
However, following Schroeder, I suggest that prestige may be earned through participation in
carbon forestry, thereby constituting an important factor for why those with no access to formal
ejidal authority may choose to participate.

However, looking at the case of técnicos

comunitarios, I note that involvement in Scolel’ Te may also threaten a person’s prestige, thereby
undermining their status within the community, an effect that although unseen at times, has
significant implications for project participants. Ultimately, prestige is not the only lens through
which to examine the affective components of work in development programs.

However,

drawing on literature on rural Mexico and political ecology work, I suggest that it is a useful
approach for highlighting the lived experience of doing carbon forestry and for uncovering the
sometimes less visible social outcomes of a project that on the outside would appear to be
beneficial to all who are involved.
Argument 3: Carbon Forestry Reshapes Farmer Relationships to Land and Undercuts their
Relationships to AMBIO and Scolel’ Te
Carbon forestry activities designed to achieve community buy-in in Chiapas are predicated on a
limited understanding of farmers and farmer land-use decision-making. They are designed to
reshape farmer relationships to their land and to development projects more generally. However,
given their narrow frame of reference, participatory activities ultimately reshape farmer land-use
patterns in ways that undermine the social relations of production between farmers and AMBIO.
In Chiapas, farmer land-use practices relate to the production of corn, beans, coffee, and cattle.
For many farmers land is tied to survival through subsistence food production. How land is used,
however, is shaped by the complex interaction of a variety of factors within rural farming
communities. These factors, although known by AMBIO after 17 years working in Chiapas, are
often invisible in the face of development objectives that warrant alternative perspectives on
8

natural resources and resource use. For AMBIO, smallholder land is valuable not only because of
its potential to produce corn, beans, cattle and coffee, but also because of its potential to capture
CO2 and to produce carbon credits. In order to assess these issues, I analyze participatory
activities in Scolel’ Te from two perspectives: 1) as a discourse, and 2) as a labor process.
Drawing on social theory, political ecology and critical development literature, on the one hand, I
argue that the first approach is essential for clarifying how AMBIO thinks about farmer’s
including who they may become through their participation in Scolel’ Te. On the other hand,
looking to critical labor studies, I argue that second optic is necessary for analyzing how farmers
are expected to enact carbon forestry within their communities, and why AMBIO needs to
produce a certain pattern of activity and relationship to the land among farmers.
Farmer buy-in to Scolel’ Te and participatory activities are, according to AMBIO,
necessary for the long-term success of carbon forestry. First, they suggest that farmers must
begin to trust AMBIO in a context where trust for outside organizations and development projects
is not automatic, and to believe that their work will counteract the problem of climate change.
Second, AMBIO notes the importance of mitigating risk to project longevity by inducing farmers
alter land-use practices by limiting fires and cattle grazing. In this sense, the use of participatory
activities is designed, in part, to build trust from the start, and to induce farmers to believe that
their efforts will respond to the problem of climate change. However, as shown in Chapter 5,
participation in Scolel’ Te is also designed to instill among participating farmers a new type of
thinking about and interaction with the natural environment – in essence a new relationship based
in altered practices and beliefs. While such work is important to securing community buy-in and
to securing the buy-in of future project funders, this analysis ultimately demonstrates the limited
ability of participatory activities in Scolel’ Te to achieve community buy-in, and its effects in
undermining the social relations of production.
Contextualizing Scolel’ Te Within Regional Development Practice
In taking the viewpoint of community-based carbon forestry participants, I argue that Scolel’ Te
has much in common with, and indeed, is representative of many market-based development
initiatives in southern Mexico – particularly given the propensity of these initiatives, situated
within a broader development landscape, to destroy social relations. The manner in which such
devastation occurs varies, however, from one project to the next. In what follows, I briefly
examine two market-based development projects that I became familiar with during the course of
my graduate studies. I do so: a) to demonstrate that social relations may be dismantled in a very
visible and dramatic fashion; and b) to draw a contrast between such dramatic examples and
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Scolel’ Te, a project within which the undermining of social relations has been much less visible,
and to a certain extent obscured by the seemingly outward success of the project. As will become
clear through these case studies and over the course of this dissertation, the undermining of social
relations is tied not to outward lies and corruption as seen in the first case study or the
mobilization of paramilitary groups as seen in the second.

Rather, social relations are

undermined in Scolel’ Te through measures that are often deemed to be progressive and
democratic by project leaders, and which are motivated by the good intentions of the managing
organization.
Case 1: Cacao in Southeastern Mexico
Mexico’s largest cacao plantations are located in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco where soils,
climatic conditions and ample government and private funding have permitted commercial cacao
production. However, local politics often present a roadblock to new project development by
groups outside the two states, forcing them to either abandon cacao production altogether or to
take the risk of pioneering new initiatives in other regions.
It was in this context that investors from the U.S. and Mexico enthusiastically decided to
establish a USD $8 million organic cacao project in southeastern Mexico, a region with no history
of commercial cacao production and little other commercial agriculture to speak of.

The

narrative presented by project developers suggested that since Mayan communities had grown
cacao in the region over 500 years ago, this project would present the opportunity to return the
crop to its geographic and cultural roots in a large-scale and sustainable manner. They noted that
farmers from nearby communities would be employed to work on the land, thereby making them
an integral part of sustainable organic cacao production. Project planners spoke of the plantation
in terms of a synergy between indigenous communities and agribusiness, highlighting the
opportunity to improve the livelihoods of the former by integrating them into the latter. For them,
the project was a modernist agricultural dream to engineer the peninsular countryside into the
largest organic cacao plantation in the country.
Government officials in the region were ecstatic, proclaiming the project to be one of the
most important agricultural undertakings in the region, heralding it as a progressive cooperative
model of rural development.1 Officials from the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA)
at the federal level and the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (SEDARI) at
These perspectives were obtained through a series of informal talks with officials from
Mexico’s Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA).

1
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the state level welcomed the project with great fanfare, with the former offering to promote it as a
cornerstone to the Ministry’s regional rural development plan. Many government officials at
federal and state levels understood the initiative to be a catalyst for development in the region,
seeing it as a progressive model of cooperation between local farming communities and private
industry.
However, despite broad support for the initiative, some remained skeptical with regard to
its environmental and commercial viability. Local experts in agriculture and in the ecological
conditions of the region argued, for example, that the soils, forest cover and seasonal threat of
hurricanes in the region would make a commercial cacao plantation economically and
ecologically unviable. Soils in the region stood in sharp contrast to the deep, fertile soils of
Chiapas and Tabasco. Instead, these soils were shallow and overwhelmingly rocky, and their
clay consistency made them prone to flooding during the rainy season (June - October). 2
Additionally, much of the region was forested, and while deforestation was not technically or
legally impossible, it did present the operation with significant financial costs tied to clearing the
land and to ‘compensating’ or ‘offsetting’ the ecological impact of the would-be deforestation of
nearly 300 hectares of primary forest. Finally, the presence of hurricanes in the region threatened
the longevity of the project, as a single hurricane could potentially destroy significant portions of
the plantation. Because of these factors many experts informed project developers that they
found significant risks associated with pursuing the initiative in the region, and urged them to
look elsewhere.
Despite the warnings, project developers went ahead with the plan, signing an usufruct
contract of nearly three decades with a local community, which guaranteed the establishment of
the plantation on hundreds of hectares of ejido land. 3 This was followed by the initiation of plant
propagation activities, the deforestation of large tracts of land to prepare for planting, the digging
of large drainage ditches to relieve the clay soils of excess moisture, and the installation of a
multi-million dollar irrigation system to support the cacao plants during the dry season
(November - May).
I first arrived at the plantation nearly two years after initial activities had begun. I came
in a car full of out-of-state agronomists anxious to see the widely recognized cacao project.
Soils in the region have a depth of only 1 meter. It was suggested by local experts that this was
far less than the 2 meters needed to allow for the full development of a cacao tree taproot.
3
The term ejido refers to a system of communal land tenure developed following the 1910
Mexican Revolution. In this dissertation I conflate the terms community and ejido to keep in
following with the common rhetorical practices of NGOs, government officials and others in
Chiapas.
2
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However, as we turned onto the one-kilometer dirt road leading from the plantation entrance to
the project offices, I saw what looked to be more like an abandoned urban construction zone than
a cacao plantation. Large cement poles stood crookedly in place of what was once primary forest,
supporting power lines designed to supply electricity to 15 wells feeding the irrigation system.
Where the irrigation system was to be installed laid piles of disjointed white PVC tubing, fully
exposed to the open air. Alongside the road were ominous ditches with depths ranging from 510 meters designed to drain the clay soil of all retained moisture. Horror registered on the
agronomists’ faces as we passed the shallow, dry soil that had been haphazardly mixed with
bedrock, making the land resemble a lunar landscape rather than a site of commercial agriculture.
Finally, we passed a nursery full of wilted and dying cacao plants, clear victims of neglect and
mistreatment.
The plantation appeared to reflect all of the worst nightmares of the local experts and
none of the vision held by the initial project developers. All that remained of the original vision
were a series of faded signs near the plantation entrance that read “cooperation,” “co-creation,”
and “sustainability.” The rest spoke to an agricultural initiative gone horribly wrong.
I learned later that day and in the following months that misguided leadership, internal
corruption and a lack of experience plagued the plantation, resulting in a series of decisions and
practices that sent the project spiraling out of control. No soil studies were completed to verify
the opinions of local experts, whose warnings went entirely unheeded. Meanwhile, corrupt
relationships with suppliers and contractors rotted away any sincere intentions to construct a
successful plantation. The irrigation system was left in disarray with only a small percentage of
the wells in functioning order, the drainage system was contracted out to a civil engineering firm
with no experience in agriculture, and the land preparation was left to people who had no
knowledge of local soils and whose work ultimately undid thousands of years of soil formation in
only a few weeks.
In addition to the significant ecological waste associated with the project, I learned that
the relationship with the Mayan community on whose land the project had been initiated had also
fallen into disarray. Discontent with the project quickly grew within the community as farmers
watched the destruction of their lands on the mismanaged plantation and saw the project fall
victim to poor decision-making and corruption.

Additionally, the community accused the

company of having stolen fine wood and other resources from their lands, of having violated the
usufruct contract, and of having reneged on their initial promise to contribute to economic
development in the community. Finally, local governance structures within the community had
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become divided with some leaders seeking to cash-in on the corruption associated with the cacao
project and others looking to expel the project from the ejido.
The cacao project had become a story for the newspapers as once-supportive government
officials began to quietly question its future.

Eventually, after replacing the plantation’s

administrative staff, cleansing the project of its ties to corrupt distributors and contractors, and
trying determine alternative directions for the project, the investors decided to end their
involvement. They had lost nearly USD $8 million to the initiative and no longer found the
project to be economically viable. The community, however, was left with hundreds of hectares
of destroyed land. Their community leadership was divided, and many felt as though they had
been lied to and cheated by the company implementing the project. What is more, farmers who
had been contracted to work on the plantation were left with destroyed land and no employment,
and many were forced to migrate to nearby tourist destinations to find work. In the end the
project was not commercially successful, and it certainly did not comply with the development
objectives or conservation goals that had been tied to it at the start. As a result, many in the
community saw the project as yet another example of an outside organization making significant
promises only to lie in the end.
Case 2: Highway Development in Chiapas

“The ‘bad government’ threatens to strip us of our territory and land so as to plan
its bad neoliberal projects that do not benefit us as indigenous communities”
(Bellinghausen, 2009).4
In spring 2009, construction began on a highway project designed to link the two main tourist
cities in Mexico’s southernmost state, Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas and Palenque – a
project the Mexican government had been publicly promoting for months. The vision? A
modern rural Chiapas defined by sustainable tourism that would be facilitated by efficient
transportation routes and enhanced commerce in the region (Romero, 2009). However, despite
strong government support for the highway, opposition to the project quickly became apparent.
Some indigenous communities in the central highlands region opposed it, arguing that it would
facilitate aggressive resource extraction and environmental destruction, and present a series of
dangers to communities located along the highway’s proposed path.
Statement made by the Zapatista communities of Mitzitón, Jotolá y San Sebastián Bachajón
regarding the San Cristóbal-Palenque Highway project
4
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In the summer of 2009 I first arrived in Mitzitón, a Tzotzil community on the outskirts of
San Cristóbal de las Casas, and the first community to be affected by highway construction (see
Figure 1.3 showing the early construction that led out from San Cristóbal de las Casas to
Mitzitón).5 I met with community leadership to learn about the highway, their perspectives on
the project, and their opposition to it. As we left the community assembly hall and walked
through the ejido toward the land parcels where farmers had planted beans and corn, my guides
indicated areas marked by government officials and contractors where the highway would pass,
bisecting community land used for agricultural production. They noted that the highway would
effectively result in the loss of significant portions of farmland for the community, pollute the
river that passed through the ejido, and present dangers to the community and its animals.

Figure 1.3 Early Highway Construction between San Cristóbal de las Casas and Mitzitón
Photo Credit: Author
In protest of the project Mitzitón organized two roadblocks, joined by indigenous
supporters throughout the state who also worried that their communities would be negatively
affected. Mitzitón also sent community representatives to the state capital of Tuxtla Gutierrez to
speak with planners about the highway project, but were met with silence by government officials
who downplayed the project, suggesting that no concrete plans had been developed.

Tzotziles, principally located in the central highlands region of Chiapas, represent one of many
indigenous groups throughout the state.

5
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The Mexican government responded violently to the protests carried out by Mitzitón and
its fellow supporters, hoping to weaken project opposition. Paramilitary groups funded and
encouraged by the Mexican government entered the ejido at night, threatening the community,
stealing animals, and vandalizing property (Romero, 2009). On July 19th, 2009 members of the
paramilitary group, Ejército de Dios, entered Mitzitón, killing one person, Aurelio Diaz. What
had originally been billed as a development project designed to bring sustainable tourism and
other economic opportunities to Chiapas was now the face of violence in Mexico’s southernmost
state. It started as a modernist dream to transform rural Chiapas into a commercial paradise
marked by flourishing tourism and productive agribusiness, but was transformed into a violent
nightmare where distinguishing the project’s beneficiaries was no longer a simple task. However,
Mitzitón was undeterred by the violence and continued to protest the highway project.
Eventually, the project was suspended in December 2009. The Mexican government justified its
decision by appropriating the democratic language of the Zapatista movement, suggesting that it
was the “pueblo that gives orders and the government’s duty to obey” (El Heraldo de Chiapas,
2009). The project was widely seen by local NGOs, academics and activists to have been a
development failure. In the end, the highway was never constructed and the end result was a
violent divergence from the original plan.6
---------Like these other projects – the highway initiative and the cacao plantation – carbon forestry as
undertaken in the Scolel’ Te model seeks to improve local livelihoods by remaking rural Mexican
space and by integrating the communities in question into broader commercial markets. Yet,
carbon forestry in Chiapas follows the trend of many development projects in the region, falling
short of its promises and leaving social devastation in its wake.

In the case of cacao in

southeastern Mexico, the dream was to establish export markets for organic cacao, and to channel
generated revenue to the participating community in the form of new agricultural infrastructure
and salaries. It was suggested that the livelihoods of the participating community would be
In October 2013 the San Cristóbal-Palenque highway project made a surprising resurgence as
the Chiapas State Government announced that it would re-initiate the project, albeit in a slightly
modified form. The state government has sought to prioritize transparency the second time
around, listing the exact communities through which the highway will pass. What is more, they
announced that the project will no longer pass through Mitzitón, but will instead head north of the
community. What remain unchanged about the highway project are the vision and the goal: to
create a modern Chiapaneco countryside defined by high-speed transportation networks that
would facilitate commerce, tourism and travel between two of the most economically important
cities in the state.
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improved through revenue generated from the sale of organic cacao. In the case of the highway
project in Chiapas, the claim was that the highway would improve commerce and transportation,
thereby supporting the growing tourism industry, and allowing for safer and faster intra-state
transportation. It was argued, moreover, that communities located along the path of the highway
would be able to develop new commercial opportunities by producing and selling artisanal goods,
by transforming natural resources – e.g. forests, waterfalls, and rivers – into ecotourism sites, and
by converting agricultural practices (coffee production, for example) into agro-tourism initiatives.
As with the cacao project, it was assumed that the highway would allow for the integration of
local communities into broader markets, and that this would lead to the improvement of the
livelihoods of all those associated with the initiative. However, both projects, although different
in nature, ended in a similar destructive fashion.
In instances such as those presented by the cacao and highway projects, the effects of
such failure are visible and violent as the supposed beneficiaries face new threats of insecurity, a
loss of valuable natural resources, and the destruction of social cohesion within their
communities. However, the undermining of social relations through development initiatives is
not always conspicuous, and may accompany even those projects that, on the outside, would
appear to comply with their stated objectives and benefit those toward whom project activities are
directed. In such instances, the process of uncovering undermined social relations requires a
close examination of the broad market influences, logics, and power inequalities that accompany
project management strategies and labor relations within a given program. Doing so is the
purpose of this dissertation.
In Chapter 2, I take on three tasks that serve as a necessary prerequisite to my analysis of
how social relations are undermined by the exercise of carbon forestry. First, I examine how one
central aim of carbon forestry, environmental conservation, has come to be defined not by state
regulation but by the commoditization and marketing of environmental qualities. Doing so is
necessary for drawing parallels between market-based development projects such as the two
presented above and carbon forestry. Second, I briefly outline the broader carbon markets in
which carbon credits produced in Scolel’ Te are bought and sold. By clarifying this market
context, I show that carbon forestry is situated not only regionally within Chiapas, but also
internationally, within carbon markets. Moreover, it sets up the discussion in Chapter 3 about the
effects of broader market dynamics on local carbon forestry activities. Finally, I explicate the
regional and historical dimensions of development in Chiapas and the Sierra Madre region more
specifically. This analysis is essential for showing how carbon forestry emerges within the
context of broader development trends within the state. Together, these three points demonstrate
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how carbon forestry is linked to broader international markets and the uneven and destructive
history of market-based development in the state.
In Chapter 3, I build upon this context to examine the first of the three ways in which
Scolel’ Te undercuts social relations, namely, by exposing the project to market dynamics that
necessitate the use of disenfranchising labor arrangements between AMBIO and participating
farmers. Drawing on commodity chains and transaction costs perspectives, I narrow my focus
from the broad contextual analysis presented in Chapter 2.

In this Chapter I suggest that

AMBIO’s efforts to expand Scolel’ Te and to further entrench the program within Chiapas’
development landscape, is limited by its exposure to risk emanating from shifting dynamics
within international voluntary carbon markets. Drawing on a commodity chain perspective and
critical labor studies, I analyze AMBIO’s efforts to overcome the consequences of shifting market
dynamics through the use of an extended division of labor with a variety of actors, including
participating farmers. Looking at the case of técnicos comunitarios, I suggest that such labor
arrangements reflect inequalities in the carbon credit commodity chain, and demonstrate the
capacity of those in relative positions of power such as AMBIO to shift the consequences of
limited resources and market fluctuations onto those with no ability to influence budgeting and
management decisions.
In Chapter 4, I examine the second means by which carbon forestry undercuts social
relations by threatening the prestige of participating farmers within their communities. This
chapter highlights the fact that carbon forestry, like many development projects, stands to
simultaneously improve a person’s prestige within their community or to diminish it, depending
on a variety of factors including project management and broader carbon market influences. I
show, however, that despite the goals of many, including técnicos comunitarios, their social
standing is ultimately diminished as they become the subject of rumors and a source of mistrust.
Looking back to Chapter 2, however, this chapter also demonstrates the extent to which trends
within global carbon markets shape the perceptions and experiences of participating farmers with
regard to Scolel’ Te.
In Chapter 5, I examine the final of the three means through which Scolel’ Te undercuts
farmers in carbon forestry. I examine how attempts to alter farmer relationships to their land
through participatory exercises is blind to the many factors that shape farmer land-use patterns
and resource management practices, and ultimately threatens their long-term commitment to the
project. In this chapter I discuss participatory mapping and member education programs as an
instance of broader efforts by AMBIO to achieve community buy-in to Scolel’ Te – initiatives
that are made necessary by the distrust of farming communities toward development programs
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described in Chapters 2 and 4. I suggest that participation must be seen as both a discourse and a
labor process through which farmer relationships to their land, to capital and to development are
reorganized so as to ensure the long-term success of Scolel’ Te. I argue that while such efforts
make strategic sense for AMBIO, they often occur at the expense of marginalizing farmer asking
farmers to engage in land-use practices that threaten their long-term participation.

Copyright @ Jonathan James Otto 2014
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CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUALIZING CARBON FORESTRY
Situating Scolel’ Te within Carbon Markets and Chiapas’ Social History of Development

“Chiapas loses blood through many veins: Through oil and gas ducts, electric
lines, railways, through bank accounts, trucks, vans, boats and planes, through
clandestine paths, gasps, and forest trails. This land continues to pay tribute to
the imperialists: petroleum, electricity, cattle, money, coffee, banana, honey,
corn, cacao, tobacco, sugar, soy, melon, sorghum, mamey, mango, tamarind,
avocado, and Chiapaneco blood flows as a result of the thousand teeth sunk into
the throat of the Mexican Southeast. These raw materials, thousands of millions
of tons of them, flow to Mexican ports and railroads, air and truck transportation
centers. From there they are sent to different parts of the world: The United
States, Canada, Holland, Germany, Italy, Japan, but with the same fate – to feed
imperialism. The fee that capitalism imposes on the Southeastern part of this
country oozes, as it has since from the beginning, blood and mud” (Marcos,
1994).

Introduction
In the above quote from his essay, The Southeast in Two Winds A Storm and a Prophecy, written
in 1992 on the eve of the Zapatista uprising and published through a variety of sources over the
next few years, Marcos explicates in graphic detail Chiapas’ relationship to the rest of Mexico
and the world. As he indicates, the relationship is one that has, “from the beginning,” and which
continues to be, defined by capitalist processes of natural resource exploitation. The effect, as
Marcos goes on to describe, is impoverishing as blood loss from the bite wound of capitalism
weakens its victim. Marcos’ impassioned perspective resonates with critiques of the cacao
project and highway initiative described in Chapter 1, and gestures toward a general trend among
development in southern Mexico in which the benefits are distributed among the few while the
majority is forced to bear the consequences of environmental destruction, social upheaval and
market risk. In concert with Marcos, I argue that the nature of carbon forestry and similar
development projects is not arbitrary, but rather, develops within established relations of
exploitation and domination, thereby leading to trends in project design and outcomes that are
often predictably destructive. The marketization of carbon credits is like previous forms of
extraction described by Marcos, although this would not appear to be the case at first glance. The
carbon credit is an intangible commodity altogether different than traditionally extracted
commodities such as wood, coffee or corn, and the forms of surplus extraction are less visible.
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However, in this chapter I link carbon credit production and marketization to broader trends
within the state, suggesting that strong similarities persist.
Carbon forestry is a continuation of the trend highlighted by Marcos, albeit in the form of
market-based environmental conservation. It is designed, like other forms of agriculture-based
development projects in Chiapas, to extract value from the land and labor of farming
communities, and to sell produced commodities in international markets. However, in order to
adequately contextualize carbon forestry within Marcos’ narrative and the broader development
landscape of Chiapas, it is important to clarify three points: 1) how environmental conservation,
which is a central aim of carbon forestry, has come to be defined not by state regulation but by
the commoditization and marketing of environmental qualities; 2) the nature of broader carbon
markets in which carbon credits are bought and sold; and 3) The regional and historical
dimensions of development in Chiapas and the Sierra Madre region more specifically. Together,
these three points demonstrate how carbon forestry is linked to broader international markets and
the unequal and destructive history of market-based development in the state. In this chapter I
will address each point in order as a means to providing the historical, political, economic and
environmental context of carbon forestry in Chiapas.
Market-based Environmental Conservation
Environmental conservation through the commodification and marketing of environmental
qualities is often discussed in terms of sustainable development in which capitalist growth and
environmental conservation are linked (see Brundtland, 1987). Sustainable development gained
strong public backing in Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio UN Conference on Environment and
Development. Agenda 21, which focused on poverty alleviation, resource conservation and
empowerment, proved to be an early step in ever-expanding efforts to link both sustainability and
economic development. Since then, payment for ecosystem services (PES) initiatives have
become a popular element of that trend, promising to preserve and promote the natural
environment while contributing to the improved financial well being of local populations. One
arm of PES initiatives includes forest carbon projects, which have proliferated globally over the
past eight years under the Kyoto Protocol and alternative voluntary measures. Forest carbon
initiatives are a form of environmental conservation seeking to alleviate rural poverty and
mitigate global climate change by facilitating the flow of capital from actors needing to offset
CO2 emissions to those willing to engage in offset-oriented reforestation, afforestation, and forest
preservation activities.
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Carbon forestry represents a break from environmental conservation as an outcome of
state-based regulation. It is predicated on the production of carbon credits by sequestering CO2
via forestry activities, and the sale of those credits in global ‘carbon markets.’ While such
schemes have become popular, particularly under the REDD+ umbrella, efforts to conserve the
natural environment through market-incentives are not confined to climate change mitigation.
They have also been mobilized to govern water use (see Bakker 2005; 2011) and to protect
biodiversity (Brockington and Duffy, 2010).

While these trends have encompassed more

traditionally identifiable resources such as water and wood (see also Prudham, 2005), they have
also expanded to include ecosystem services such as the cleansing and biodiversity-promoting
qualities of watersheds (Robertson 2004; 2006; 2007) and the carbon sequestration capacity of
carbon sinks such as forests (see Bumpus and Liverman 2008; 2011).

As market-based

environmental conservation has grown in popularity so too have efforts by governmental and
non-governmental actors to achieve development and climate change goals by producing and
selling carbon credits in global voluntary and compliance carbon markets.
While efforts to achieve environmental conservation and development via market
mechanisms have become widespread, Marcos’ quote reminds us that capitalism has local effects
that must be critically assessed. These effects are both historically situated and regionally
distributed, and must be analyzed along both historical and spatial dimensions. Studies of carbon
forestry take on a regional character, particularly in a state such as Chiapas where a high degree
of cultural, ecological and geographic heterogeneity persists (see Rus and Hernandez Castillo et
al, 2003). In the Sierra Madre region where this analysis is focused, farming communities are
majority mestizo, a marked difference with the central highlands and Lacandón regions.
Moreover, development programs in the north-central portion of the Sierra Madre have been
associated less with parallel counterinsurgency objectives common to the central highland and
Lacandón regions of the state. As a result, the nature of development projects in the Sierra
Madre, and community attitudes toward such projects, differ from other parts of the state. By
narrowing my focus on the Sierra Madre region, I not only address the local specifics of
development programs in Chiapas, but also fill a gap in research on the Sierra Madre region,
created by a tendency among researchers to focus their analyses on the central highlands and
Lacandón regions (see Hernandez Castillo, 2003).
From a historical perspective, carbon forestry forms part of a much broader social history
of development in the state. In this chapter I argue that carbon forestry is tied to Chiapas’ social
history of development in three ways: first, the diverse actors on which project success depends
are intimately connected to broader patterns of social life, including past development initiatives
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within the state. In Chapter 3 I analyze the extent to which AMBIO relies on these actors,
including government institutions that are implicated in development projects past and present in
order to expand Scolel’ Te into the Sierra Madre region. Second, Scolel’ Te exhibits several
elements of past development practice in Chiapas. On one hand, processes of carbon credit
production tied to Scolel’ Te in the Sierra Madre region hint at the longstanding relationship of
the region as defined by the production and export of agriculture-based products such as coffee
for consumption in the global north. On the other hand, fluctuating carbon markets stand to
impact producers in a manner not altogether different than the boom and bust cycles associated
with colonial and post-colonial markets for fine wood and contemporary global markets for corn,
coffee and cacao. These links are especially relevant in Chapter 4 where I examine mistrust
within participating communities toward community-level workers that emerges, in part, from
shifts in the supply and demand dynamics within broader voluntary carbon markets. Finally, the
interactions between AMBIO and participating communities reflect tensions, concerns and
conflicts related to the past experiences of AMBIO and participating communities with
development in the state.

The nature of these interactions is especially apparent in AMBIO’s

attempts to secure community trust and achieve buy-in through the use of participatory
mechanisms tied to Scolel’ Te (see Chapter 5). Given the links between Chiapas’ social history
of development and the various components of Scolel’ Te, understanding this history is essential
for contextualizing the discussions of the program in subsequent chapters.
In addition to highlighting the local historical and social context in which carbon forestry
emerges, it is also necessary to clarify the specific nature of carbon markets – the veins – through
which produced carbon credits flow from Chiapas to international buyers. In order to do so, I
first examine the nature of neoliberal development in Mexico, given its influence as the broad
ideological and institutional framework in which carbon markets have emerged. I emphasize the
fact that neoliberalism is rooted in diverse networks of actors, and that such networks are
essential to the formation of carbon markets. I then outline the broad contours of the voluntary
carbon market to which Scolel’ Te contributes before analyzing Chiapas’ social history of
development. By analyzing the economic, social and political contexts in which carbon forestry
has emerged, we may begin to clarify how social relations are undermined through such projects
in subsequent chapters, and may thus, better contextualize Scolel’ Te within Marcos’ narrative.
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Development as Neoliberalism
Many accounts of marketization begin with an analysis of neoliberalism as an expression of
market expansion and state withdrawal (see Peck and Tickell, 2002). In Mexico, neoliberal
initiatives unfolded only slowly and unevenly, with varying degrees of success, and included the
privatization of some minor state-owned enterprises, attempts to convert communal land into
private property, the production of industrial goods for export, and the implementation of policies
aimed at restricting wage growth so as to attract foreign investment (Middlebrook, 2003; Otero,
1996). Successive technocratic presidents including Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), Carlos
Salinas (1988-1994), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) supported the move toward a neoliberal
model, seeing it as an answer to the 1982 debt crisis (Otero, 1996). For the Mexican countryside
the neoliberal transition meant a withdrawal of federal funding for rural development programs
(Fox and Haight, 2010) and a re-orientation of development practice toward market-based
measures – measures that were presumed by technocrats and multilateral funding agencies such
as the World Bank to be more efficient. 7
The effects of Mexico’s neoliberal transition for Mexican society have been wideranging, although a regional perspective must be taken in order to adequately assess them. In this
regard, Otero (1996, page 3) suggests that “[the] country-level analysis is made more complex by
its [Mexico’s] vast regional heterogeneity, not only geographical and physical but social,
economic and political as well.” He notes, for example, that Mexico’s economic integration with
the U.S. and Canada has been concentrated in Mexico’s northern and central regions, including
Mexico City, far outpacing southern Mexico. It is this regional heterogeneity that complicates
simple conclusions about Mexico’s transition including the development projects that have been
designed within the neoliberal rubric. As Marcos indicates, the benefits of neoliberalism in
Chiapas have been unevenly disbursed as finances and resources are extracted from the state.
However, despite the limited success of many neoliberal initiatives, the continued pursuit
of additional schemes such as the highway project presented in Chapter 1 is motivated by the
The Mexican government, for example, discontinued funding for the state-run agricultural
research institute, the National Institute for Forestry, Agriculture and Fishery Research (INIFAP),
forcing it to either close its doors or obtain its own funding, of which it chose the latter. While it
has been able to generate revenue in northern states that have adopted advanced agricultural
technologies and practices, in southern states the organization has been reduced to a skeleton of
its former existence. Many offices have been abandoned, and where the INIFAP does still
operate, many of its employees are without telephone and Internet. While the INIFAP is just one
example of Mexico’s agricultural de-funding, it is a strikingly accurate symbol for the state of
agriculture in many parts of southern Mexico.

7
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ideological success of neoliberalism’s advocacy of market-based development. This is illustrated
by a recent comment by the sub-Secretary of the Mexican Ministry of Transportation and
Communications (SCT), Carlos Almada Lopez, in relation to Chiapas’ recently re-initiated San
Cristóbal-Palenque highway project. With regard to this project, which is designed to integrate
the state’s impoverished people into tourism markets, he said: “it is a project of great value for the
economic and social development of the state of Chiapas, which will pass through the [state’s]
beautiful and attractive tourist zones” (Vazquez, 2014). However, technocrats and politicians
such as Almada Lopez express a preference for market-based development, while neglecting to
clarify what they mean by ‘the market.’
Orthodox thinking on ‘the market’ presents it as the ideal frame within which human
activity should be organized. ‘The market,’ moreover, is often described by orthodox economists
as infallible and as an a-political arbiter of efficiency and innovation, although its specific nature
is left unexamined (Berndt and Boeckler, 2009; Callon, 2007; Mitchell, 2009).

Heterodox

thinking about ‘the market,’ which stems from literature within political economy, including Karl
Polanyi, and cultural economic viewpoints, provides an alternative means of thinking about
markets. While heterodox perspectives differ in how they view the nature of markets and their
effects, they find common ground in their effort to move beyond the assumptions of orthodox
economics (Berndt and Boeckler, 2009). Heterodox perspectives emphasize the networks of
human actors that bring a market into being. However, this point alone does not sufficiently
differentiate heterodox thinkers from their orthodox counterparts who also appreciate the role of
human interaction in market formation.

Thus, it is necessary to assess how orthodox and

heterodox thinkers view the market as a force for social change.
While orthodox economists tend to view ‘the market’ in a positive light, many political
economists see it in somewhat less complementary terms. On the one hand, political economists
suggest that ‘the market’ is an ideological device that effectively obscures the destructive and
conflictual social relations that define capitalism (Berndt and Boeckler, 2009). Berndt and
Boeckler (2009) point out that political economists focus in particular on capitalist production
processes and the relationship of labor to such work. In doing so they shift their focus from the
realm of exchange privileged by orthodox economists to the realm of production. On the other
hand, political economists understand markets in material terms, focusing on two aspects of the
labor-production relationship: 1) the dialectic relationship between labor and production
processes (see Burawoy, 1979 and Dunn, 2004); and 2) the impacts of capitalism on individuals
and communities through their incorporation into expanding capitalist structures (see Watts,
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1983; 2008). In general, this work examines ‘the market’ in terms of its destructive impact on the
social, marking a forceful break from orthodox perspectives.
In a similar vein, Polanyi (2001) sought to explain markets in terms of the social. His
central departure from orthodox economics stems from the idea that ‘the market’ consists of
economic activity embedded in social networks (see also Berndt and Boeckler’s [2009]
discussion of embeddedness within economic sociology).

In other words, Polanyi (2001)

attempted to place economic activity within its social context, emphasizing the connections
between people, organizations and institutions that make such activity possible. In light of this
work, geographers have drawn on Polanyi’s (2001) notion of fictitious commodities, examining
the manner in which economic activities are embedded in specific ecological contexts. They
have focused, for example, on the contamination of water in Ontario (Prudham, 2004),
agricultural production (Henderson, 1998), and neoliberal environmental policy (Robertson,
2007; Robertson and Wainwright, 2013).

Ultimately, Polanyi’s work runs counter to the

assumptions of orthodox economists, which present ‘the market’ as a positive and omnipresent
force (Ebner and Main, 2010; Gemici, 2008), thus allowing for a geographically and historically
contextualized understanding of economic activity.
Stemming from this work is the perspective provided by cultural economics, which also
attempts to explain markets within the contexts of their operation.

Work within cultural

economics critiques the concept of ‘embeddedness,’ suggesting that it runs the risk of treating
markets as simply networks defined by economic activity. Scholars within this field argue that
markets should not be seen as dissolving into networks, but are, instead, the effects of networks
(Berndt and Boeckler, 2009). Callon (2007, page 319) argues, for example, that markets are “…a
combination of material and technical devices, texts, algorithms, rules and human beings that
shape agency and give meaning to action.” From this perspective, markets are seen as a type of
calculus (Mitchell, 2009) and may be assessed by analyzing their composite networks. Drawing
on this work, I suggest that carbon forestry must be seen as embedded within social networks, and
as emerging from the work of diverse actors who are tied to patterns of development practice,
both past and present. It is with this perspective in mind that I turn to the broader carbon markets
within which AMBIO participates.
Voluntary Carbon Markets
Carbon markets – the veins through which carbon credits flow from Chiapas to international
buyers may be compliance or non-compliance in nature. In this dissertation I am particularly
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concerned with non-compliance – or voluntary – carbon markets in which AMBIO sells carbon
credits. Voluntary markets exist in parallel to compliance markets, and account for a small
percentage of carbon credit purchases, particularly those purchases realized by government
offices and small corporations not associated with the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. those in non-signatory
countries), and by individuals. Voluntary markets are significantly smaller than compliance
markets in terms of the volume of carbon credits traded, having represented only 0.1% of total
carbon credit sales in 2010 (Hamilton and Peters-Stanley et al, 2010).

In non-compliance

contexts, voluntarily produced carbon credits, which are referred to as Verified Emissions
Reductions (VERs), are worth one ton of captured CO2. Voluntary carbon markets differ from
compliance markets in the motivations behind buyer participation and the on-the-ground effects
of buyer participation for carbon credit producers. However, before assessing these differences, I
briefly outline the compliance markets that run parallel to their voluntary counterparts.
Compliance Markets
Carbon markets first emerged out of a need among signatories to the Kyoto Protocol to comply
with CO2 reductions targets. However, despite the popularity of the Protocol, the lead-up to the
adoption of market-based mechanisms for climate change mitigation proved to be a contested
process that involved several developments in environmental science as well as political and
economic influences (Calel, 2011). Calel (2011) notes that these included the 1992 Rio de
Janeiro UN Conference on Environment and Development during which the Framework on
Climate Change prevention was assembled, and the 1995 formation of the Activities
Implemented Jointly (AIJ) program – a pilot carbon market – by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in order to test the waters for a potential international
carbon market.
In addition to these developments, several contentious issues complicated early
negotiations. Boyd and Corbera et al (2008) note that one hotly debated issue revolved around
the treatment and inclusion of emissions sinks (those natural resources recognized for their
capacity to sequester GHG emissions). A second disputed issue included whether to assign
binding emissions reductions targets to developing countries (Hovi and Detlef et al, 2010).
Despite such contention, significant political pressure encouraged an expeditious signing of the
Protocol – what Calel (2011, page 19) describes as “… a hasty marriage [of science, climate
change and economics of emissions trading rather than] a carefully engineered synthesis.”
However, despite the high level of debate within the negotiations, Vlachou and Konstantinidis
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(2010) suggest that the ultimate shared goal was to facilitate capitalism by protecting those
industries and companies that stand to be harmed by global climate change – what Buck (2007)
refers to as the flexibility of capitalism to respond to crisis.
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, went into effect in 2005, and has consisted of
two commitment periods: the first from 2008-2012, and the second from 2013-2020. The first
period featured a pledge by signatories to reduce GHG emissions to an average of five percent of
1990 levels, while the second involved a more aggressive commitment by signatories to reduce
GHG emissions by at least 18 percent below 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 2013). In order to meet
these requirements the Protocol established several mechanisms through which emissions could
be reduced or offset: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI), and
International Emissions Trading (ET). While the first two are centered on projects designed to
reduce GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons,
and sulfur hexafluoride) through the implementation of reductions projects, the third favors a capand-trade approach.8 These mechanisms provide the institutional structure behind compliance
markets in which diverse actors participate in order to meet established emissions reductions
targets within the Protocol.
Differences Between Voluntary and Compliance Markets
In order to understand the voluntary markets within which AMBIO operates, it is necessary to
highlight how they differ with compliance markets. First, given the voluntary nature of noncompliance markets, the motivations for participation among actors who are not compelled by
regulatory oversight to reduce CO2 emissions tend to be much more diverse. On the one hand,
corporations may wish to participate in non-compliance projects in order to construct an image of
corporate social responsibility, or simply to attract investment from lending agencies that require
some degree of corporate sustainability in their lending policies. Additionally, corporations may
choose to purchase VERs if they perceive that their country may join international agreements

The objective of cap-and-trade is to promote emissions reductions by first allocating emissions
allowances to polluters that will permit certain degrees of pollution. The next step is to gradually
decrease the number of allowances available to each polluter, thus forcing them to adopt
technologies and practices that allow them to continue operating while emitting ever-shrinking
permissible levels of GHGs. According to emissions trading logic, as entities reduce their
emissions they may find that they have more allowances than are needed due to their advances in
GHG emissions reductions. Therefore, it permits entities with surplus allowances to sell them to
other entities that may need additional units in the future.
8
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mandating future CO2 reductions. They argue that in doing so they will be able to build the
organizational infrastructure needed to facilitate future compliance.
Although corporations and individuals may purchase VERs directly from carbon credit
producers, the vast majority is traded "over-the-counter" (OTC) wherein buyers and sellers deal
directly with brokers (Peters-Stanley and Yin, 2013). OTC trading is driven by two categories of
buyers: 1) voluntary buyers; and 2) pre-compliance buyers. Whereas voluntary buyers participate
in order to satisfy a personal interest or to fulfill a corporate social responsibility agenda, precompliance buyers do so either: a) to buy credits that can be stored for a perceived future
compliance need; or b) to sell at a higher price to organizations that may face a future compliance
requirement (Peters-Stanly and Yin, 2013). While AMBIO has attempted to facilitate the trading
of carbon credits to individuals via their website, the overwhelming majority of carbon credit
sales are to brokers via OTC markets. AMBIO suggests that selling primarily to brokers is easier
given that under such arrangements they do not have to dedicate limited organizational resources
to locating and establishing relationships with diverse buyers such as individual government
offices or small corporations.
Despite the popularity of voluntary markets among actors within non-signatory countries
of the Kyoto Protocol, the trade of VERs in voluntary markets has proven to be unreliable and
particularly vulnerable to broader trends within the global economy. This has been especially
visible in the reduced overall transactions since the 2008 financial crisis (Peters-Stanley and Yin,
2013). Moreover, as will be illustrated in Chapter 3, the desires of buyers who source carbon
credits through voluntary markets are less predictable given the fact that their participation is
shaped not by compliance requirements but by myriad other factors, the motivations for which
may wax or wane depending on personal and organizational goals. Shifting demand dynamics in
voluntary markets present a certain degree of risk for producers of carbon credits in carbon
forestry programs, including both managing organizations and farmers. As will become clear in
Chapters 3 and 4, however, the manner in which this risk is allocated throughout the carbon credit
commodity chain is uneven, and is often pushed on those with relatively little awareness of such
risk and less power to determine their standing within a carbon forestry project. Moreover, as
will become clear in Chapter 5, efforts designed to encourage farmer participation are often
predicated on convincing farmers that participation in carbon forestry will benefit their
communities, despite the existence of risks that often go unstated. The practice of overstating a
project’s benefits and understating its costs are common in development, particularly when
enthusiasm for a project is high (Sheppard and Porter et al, 2009). However, they must be
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assessed in carbon forestry, particularly as projects are pursued within the rapidly expanding
REDD/REDD+ rubric.
REDD/REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation +
Conservation of Forest Carbon Stocks), has emerged on a global scale as popular payment for
ecosystem services (PES) initiative. REDD/REDD+ is designed to pay local communities to
engage in activities aimed at limiting deforestation, sustainably managing existing forests, and
promoting reforestation. REDD/REDD+, which has received much attention and significant
international funding, particularly from the World Bank REDD Readiness Fund and the World
Bank Forest Carbon Fund (The REDD Desk, 2014), has created new types of environmental work
across the world, and reorganized the relationship of many (e.g. farmers, REDD/REDD+
practitioners, project funders, government actors and legal experts) to their natural environment
as they have become implicated in the development and implementation of the local, social and
institutional infrastructure needed to make REDD/REDD+ a reality. Although REDD+ has
gained much attention in recent years, the institutions required to make REDD+ a fully
operational reality are still incomplete (The REDD Desk, 2014). While “REDD Readiness” plans
have been developed on national levels and pilot projects have been implemented locally, much
work thus far has served as a testing ground of sorts for broader REDD+ adoption in the future
(The REDD Desk, 2014). Regardless, it is clear that the significant sums of money dedicated by
organizations such as the World Bank toward REDD+ pilot projects have led to a detonation of
projects designed to establish REDD+ initiatives in multiple countries.
Despite the popularity of forest carbon projects for mitigating global climate change and
alleviating rural poverty, they have been critiqued for a variety of reasons. First, those who feel
that market-based environmental conservation is ineffective have criticized them for encouraging
what they identify as the problematic commoditization of ecosystems. Such critiques point out
that ecosystem services are problematic commodities given their inability to be fixed as stable
commodities with uniform characteristics (Robertson, 2006). Kosoy and Corbera (2010) argue,
moreover, that the commoditization of ecosystem services such as forest-based carbon sinks leads
to a an abstract mode of thinking about the natural environment in terms of singular abstract
qualities rather than diverse and interdependent ecosystems. As Robertson (2006) notes, such
modes of thinking rely on assessment methods that inevitably produce unstable and questionable
data. Moreover, such methods privilege a single type of valuation mechanism – that of money –
excluding all other methods of valuation for the natural environment.
Finally, echoing Marcos’ quote at the beginning of this chapter, forest carbon projects
have been critically assessed for their role in the formation and extension of certain types of
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environmental governance tied to markets for ecosystem services. Bumpus and Liverman (2011)
and Beymer-Farris and Bassett (2012), for example, examine the CDM, voluntary carbon markets
and REDD/REDD+, suggesting that each has been critiqued for promoting, at least implicitly, the
formation of a “carbon colonialism” wherein people in developing countries are prohibited from
accessing certain natural resources through their involvement in securing carbon offsets. This
“carbon colonialism,” Bumpus and Liverman (2008) note, replicates unequal power relations
common to colonialism, and that assessing such power dynamics within carbon forestry is
necessary. Bumpus and Liverman (2008) suggest that such power inequalities in carbon offset
projects allow for the accumulation of capital by some, while disempowering others within the
context of such work. These critiques uncover the underlying logics and power relations tied to
the establishment and management of PES projects, including carbon forestry. Moreover, they
provide a useful foundation for many discussions within this dissertation.
Carbon Markets: The Mexico Context
Forest carbon initiatives came on the scene in Mexico through the formation of the national PES
program. The idea of a national PES program was first entertained as part of a working group in
the late 1990s, appearing in a proposal as part of Mexico's Strategic Forestry Program 2025,
which was developed with assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the
Finnish government, and members of SEMARNAT (Shapiro, 2010). Shapiro-Garza (2010) notes
that Mexico's national PES program was implemented in 2003, and offered to pay farmers to
conserve forests in order to capture CO2, conserve biodiversity, preserve hydrological services
and diversify agroforestry systems.
Mexico's national PES program began as two separate initiatives: 1) Payment for
Ecosystem Services-Hydrological (PSA-H); and 2) the Program for the Development of Markets
for the Ecosystem Services of Carbon Sequestration, the Derivatives of Biodiversity, and to
Promote the Introduction and Improvement of Agroforestry Systems (PSA-CABSA) (McAfee
and Shapiro, 2010). McAfee and Shapiro (2010) note that in 2006 both initiatives were combined
into one, ProÁrbol. According to McAfee and Shapiro (2010), in 2007 ProÁrbol received more
than US$150 million from the World Bank, the Bank’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and
the Mexican Federal Government, thus allowing it to grow to one of the world's largest national
PES programs. Shapiro-Garza (2010) notes that despite pressures from the World Bank to
maintain strict market-based characteristics and minimize state involvement in the PES program,
much of Mexico's national PES project was in fact articulated through state mechanisms. This,
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they suggest, led to a broader focus of Mexico's PES program beyond only market-based
environmental objectives to include state-led objectives of rural poverty alleviation.
In addition to its national PES program, the Mexican government has expanded its
REDD+ preparations. In doing so the Mexican Federal Government has made changes to key
national environmental laws so that they may better reflect the requirements of REDD+ (GLOBE
International, 2013). In 2009 the Mexican Federal Government created the Special Program on
Climate Change (Programa Especial de Cambio Climático – PECC), under which a series of
programs designed to combat climate change are located, including REDD+ (GLOBE
International, 2013). According to GLOBE International (2013), in 2012 important changes in
two laws, the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección del Ambiente (LGEEPA) and
the Ley General de Desarrollo Forestal Sustentable (LGDFS) were implemented to facilitate
REDD+ advancement. They note that the changes took into account the fact that most of
Mexico’s forests are communally owned, thus implementing safeguards for these communities.
In addition to legal transformations, REDD+ preparation in Mexico has consisted of
implementing REDD+ pilot projects designed to assess the environmental, social and political
contexts in which REDD+ would be implemented, including monitoring and financial
mechanisms (GLOBE International, 2013). While to date these projects are not considered full
REDD+ demonstration projects, they are considered to be important for testing existing
mechanisms/institutions and for highlighting where new ones need to be created (The REDD
Desk, 2014). According to The REDD Desk (2014), the Mexican government identified the
states of Oaxaca, Jalisco, Chiapas, Yucatan, Campeche and Quintana Roo as strategic priorities
for the implementation of ‘early actions’ – i.e. pilot projects.
Funding for these pilot projects has been quite large and stems from a variety of
domestic, bilateral and multilateral sources such as the Government of Norway (US$15.4
million), the French Development Agency (US4165,000), the Spanish Agency for International
Development Cooperation ($55,000), the United States Agency for International Development
(US$30 million), and over US$600 million from the World Bank (The REDD Desk, 2014). As
funding has become available many governmental and non-governmental organizations have
sought to implement pilot projects in rural communities throughout south and southeastern
Mexico.
Finally, Mexico indicated its interest in expanding its REDD+ efforts to an international
scale when in November of 2010 the state of Chiapas signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with the governments of California and Acre (Brazil) securing the dedication of the three
governments to establish a program in which carbon credits produced in Chiapas and Acre could
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be sold in California’s domestic carbon market. As a result of the MoU, the REDD+ Offset
Working Group (ROW) was established in order to determine the legal, institutional, policy and
other mechanisms necessary for allowing the international trade of carbon credits in California’s
domestic carbon market. At the time of the writing of this dissertation the results of the ROW
study had not been released, and the Memorandum continued to be simply that – a memorandum.
Despite the lack of action on the part of the three governments in moving forward with the
Memorandum of Understanding, it is important to recognize that such an agreement was
nonetheless important in providing a pillar of legitimacy to all three governments’ commitments
to establish internationally recognized climate change mitigation policies.
It is within the context of these carbon forestry initiatives that Scolel’ Te must be
analyzed. Scolel’ Te forms part of a much broader global effort to mitigate climate change
through market-based measures. In Mexico, such projects have been articulated through national
efforts to enhance and protect forest resources and to alleviate rural poverty. However, Scolel’
Te, although forming part of relatively new models of development rooted in market
mechanisms, replicates many aspects of Chiapas’ broader social history of development including
its support of Chiapas as a as a region defined by the export of agriculture-based products. In the
following section I turn to the Sierra Madre region where research for this dissertation was
focused. I assess several components of the current socio-political context in the region, focusing
in particular on farming, changing attitudes toward rural life, health and education. I suggest that
these issues cannot be understood outside the context of Chiapas’ social history of development.
However, in examining this broader history, I highlight key points where the experience of the
Sierra Madre region differs from that of other regions in the state.
Development and the Sierra Madre of Chiapas
Marcos’ quote at the beginning of this chapter alludes to the veins through which Chiapas’
natural resources flow, suggesting that that their extractive effects are ecologically and socially
disastrous.

While the last section was focused on the nature of such veins – the voluntary

markets in which carbon credits are sold – this segment focuses on the effects of development in
Chiapas. To this end, I examine the state’s development history, focusing on its political,
economic and historical dimensions – a context in which carbon forestry has emerged in Chiapas.
I begin by outlining several socio-economic and political characteristics of the Sierra Madre
region in which this dissertation is focused. I then expand the analysis, examining Chiapas’
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broader development history and showing several points where the Sierra Madre region diverges
from trends in the rest of the state.
The two communities with whom much of this dissertation is concerned were founded in
the late 1960s and early 1980s, and are located in Chiapas’ central Sierra Madre region near the
natural reserves, Reserva de la Biosfera La Sepultura and the Reserva La Frailescana. At the time
of their founding, settlers from the municipalities of Villaflores and Villa Corzo occupied land,
some of which was, and had historically been, coffee plantations established during the 19th
century. Both communities are relatively young, having been established well after the state’s
accelerated land redistribution in the late-1930s. Nevertheless, the ejido land reform program
provided an important opportunity for campesinos to acquire land and other resources needed to
establish a viable agricultural livelihood. However, as will become clear, life in the rural Sierra
Madre region is complicated by the conditions of poverty common to other regions in the state.
In the Sierra Madre region, motor vehicle transportation is both a curse and a privilege.
For those few people with access to vehicles, car ownership provides key income-earning
opportunities, as the rest remain dependent on their services for a variety of needs. Those who
own vehicles earn money by transporting agricultural crops to nearby cities. These intermediaries
– often referred to cynically as coyotes – charge inflated rates for their services, and benefit from
a lack of viable transportation alternatives for farmers. Collier and Quaratiello (1994) note that
the reduced profit margin stemming from the coyotera provides a significant financial challenge
for many marginalized farmers whose income depends on the sale of corn, beans and coffee.
In the Sierra Madre region, public transportation consists of buses and colectivos that
circulate between rural communities and municipal centers (see Figure 2.1 for the key regions of
Chiapas). Buses and colectivos are typically owned by one driver from a cluster of communities.
Trips are made from communities to the city once every four or five days, usually involving long
trips on poor road and bridge infrastructure (see Appendix A). Public transportation is regulated
by Mexico’s Ministry of Communications and Transportation (SCT), which distributes permits to
authorized transportation service providers. These permits are coveted items, allowing the holder
to work as a bus driver, and thus, to gain regular access to scarce income.

Customers pay an

average of Ps $35 – around US $3 – for a one-way ticket, and take advantage of the trip to the
city to purchase household items such as bread, sugar, eggs and soda that are unavailable within
their community.

Upon returning home, families will sell previously purchased items to

neighbors and relatives. However, income resulting from household sales is limited since many
venders tend to sell the same items, thus creating a fairly inefficient informal market.
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Farming in the Sierra Madre
For most people in the Sierra Madre region, key income-earning and subsistence activities
revolve around agriculture. In Villaflores nearly one half of the municipal territory is dedicated
to agriculture with slightly less in Villa Corzo (Lillo et al, 1999). In rural communities corn, bean
and coffee production predominate (Lillo et al, 1999), while many families also keep cattle that
they rely on for cheese, milk and meat. For those communities not located near the nature
reserves, hunting animals such as wild bore, turkey, armadillo, deer and rodents like tepesquintle,
also supplements household corn and bean consumption.
Land-use and land-use planning in the region is based on several factors including
political influence, the availability of resources needed to plant and grow crops, the type of soil
on a given plot of land, the amount of land available to the farmer, and the farming practices of
each individual producer. Given that these factors may shift from year to year, planting decisions
change annually with regard to which crops are planted, where the crops are planted and how
much of each crop is planted.

There are several political factors that shape how farmers

determine the quantity of crops to be planted in a given year, the first of which revolves around
natural protected areas such as the Biosfera La Sepultura and the Reserva La Frailescana. Since
the creation of the reserves in 2007 and 2010, farmers report having been prohibited from hunting
animals within the protected areas and from harvesting trees so as to clear more land for planting.
Moreover, through their work with the Mexican National Commission for Protected Areas
(CONANP) farmers have been discouraged from using fire to clear and prepare land for annual
planting. Of these changes, the latter has proven to have the largest impact on agricultural
practices. According to local farmers, fire not only clears land, but also kills soil-based plagues
and insects that threaten annual crops. Farmers noted in interviews that by avoiding the use of
fire, they had compromised production by allowing plagues and insects to flourish in the soil.
A second political factor determining the quantity of crops planted in a given year relates
to government-led agricultural support programs relied on by farmers for seeds and fertilizer.
According to local producers in both communities, resources stemming from government
programs such as PROCAMPO are notoriously unpredictable in the sense that resources typically
arrive after planting in April or not at all. The unpredictability of funding from government
programs is often attributed to the corrupt practices of local politicians who present an obstacle to
the efficient distribution of funds. Fox and Haight (2010) note, for example, that PROCAMPO,
which was designed originally to mitigate the predicted impacts of trade liberalization on smallscale agricultural producers, has been marked by inefficiencies, unequal funding distribution and
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fraud that have prevented the provisioning of resources to many poor farmers. They suggest that
this has increased insecurities among poor farmers who depend on government support for their
agricultural activities, thus leading to skepticism among producers toward such projects.
A third element shaping farmer land-use decisions includes land availability – a variable
that is determined by a variety of factors. First, land availability is often influenced by the
standing of individual farmers within their community. Land ownership within a community
tends to be concentrated with those people who have voting rights in the ejido – ejidatarios.
Those who do not have land are often forced to rent from family members or others within their
communities. These farmers often find themselves in a precarious situation defined by a greater
pressure to obtain the income needed to pay rent on their land.

Farmers with more land

ultimately have greater flexibility in determining which crops they are going to plant and where
they are going to plant them, while renters are limited to planting only as many crops as can be
supported by the rented land parcel – generally only enough to support their family and to pay
back the lender.

Figure 2.1 Maps of Chiapas’ Five Key Regions
Map Credit: Jeff Levy

Finally, a fourth factor shaping land-planning decisions involves the type of soil available
to the individual farmer within their plot of land. According to farmers, beans tend to grow better
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in less than fertile soil, due in part to their capacity to fix soil nitrogen. Moreover, farmers note
that beans tend to grow better on slopes given that their short stature does not expose them to
damaging winds during the rainy season.9 Corn, which is planted at the beginning of the rainy
season and harvested just after the beginning of the dry season (December/January), is planted in
more fertile soils. Corn tends to be planted in flatter portions of land parcels where wind during
the rainy season will not damage the large stocks of the corn plant. Some farmers will intercrop
beans and corn, taking advantage of the bean’s ability to fix soil nitrogen and the corn plant’s
ability to support bean plants in order to achieve efficient production of both. Many farmers,
however, do not practice intercropping, arguing that doing so complicates harvesting processes.
Ultimately, land planning decisions are influenced by political factors, land availability,
soil conditions, and seasonality. Given that each of these factors varies from year to year, land
planning decisions change over time and are flexible, shifting in accordance with the changing
availability of land and resources needed to plant crops. Each of these factors shapes how
farmers view their land and its potential to produce the crops that are needed to sustain their
families throughout the year.
Changing Attitudes Toward Rural Life
While farming is a key productive activity in the Sierra Madre’s rural communities, many young
people have become disinterested in continuing an agricultural livelihood. Such attitudes stem, in
part, from the desire to pursue material wealth outside their communities. This is reflected by the
cell phones that many young people acquire despite the fact that most communities do not have
cell phone service. For many people cell phones represent a relatively cheaper alternative to an
MP3 player, which they use exclusively for playing music. However, cell phones have also
become a status symbol among many by which they are able to demonstrate not only their access
to money, but also their ambitions to obtain money.

For some the cell phone is a symbolic link

between the ejido and the city, between poverty and the promise of material wealth.

Beans may be planted and harvested twice in a calendar year. The first planting is at the
beginning of the rainy season, and is harvested in August. Given that the harvest of the first
planting falls in the middle of the rainy season, few beans are planted as wet soil conditions may
complicate the harvest. Although harvests during these months may be small, they are designed
to serve as a backup to the second and larger bean crop, which is harvested in December/January
following the end of the rainy season. Because harvesting is less complicated during this time,
farmers plant significantly greater quantities of beans so as to support the family over the next
year.

9
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The desire for material wealth is fuelled by a variety of sources. For some, it stems from
access to TV within their communities. Many households have televisions, which are able to
acquire local channels with varying success. Additionally, some families choose to purchase
cable television, thus expanding their range of access to programs such as movies (mostly from
the U.S.), telenovelas and athletic events.

Through these sources of media people obtain

alternative ideas about what life could look like outside the ejido. Desires for material wealth are
further stoked by the stories of others within the community who have migrated and returned.
Stories relating the migration experience are often told in masculine, heroic overtones, and deal
with themes of crossing the border, of having been captured by the migra (the word used to
describe the border patrol), and of having had a beautiful gringa girlfriend. “I want to go to the
U.S. de mojado,” confessed one 14 year-old in the municipality of Villa Corzo who was
particularly taken with the idea of migrating.10 “I will leave my daughter and wife if I have to,
and go make money for our family. Then I will return with a truck.” Such sentiments can be
strong, but they are often met with resistance by parents who refuse to give permission to their
kids to do so, or by spouses who refuse to accompany their partner on the journey. Additionally,
despite the dream of migrating, for many, the reality of doing so is frightening, thus motivating
short migration patterns as people search out employment options in nearby cities where they
may live temporarily with family or friends while they work in agroindustry and construction. In
the end, although many dream of migrating to the U.S., the majority settle for a more semipermanent local migration, preferring to work locally during the dry season and return to the
community to work their land during the rainy season.
Health and Education
Another factor motivating children to want to leave their communities is the perception that their
opportunities are limited at home. Many communities in the Sierra Madre region live in extreme
poverty. In the municipalities of Villa Corzo and Villaflores, this is particularly true, a situation
that is made worse by a severe shortage of medical services and educational opportunities. Many
communities lack a clinic, doctor, medicine, or any type of emergency medical transportation. In
the event of a severe medical emergency, some are forced to rent a vehicle in the community for
~US$50 or more and drive the 1.5-2 hours to the nearest clinic. Most cannot afford such an

“De mojado” is a common term used in Mexico to refer to people who migrate to the U.S.
illegally, literally translating into “wet,” with reference to swimming across the border.
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expense, and as a result, many illnesses and accidents go unaddressed (see Table 2.1 for statistics
on various socio-economic indicators in the Sierra Madre region).

Table 2.1 Health Statistics for Sierra Madre Region
Villa Corzo

Villaflores

High

Medium

Extreme Poverty*

42%

30%

Food Poverty*

55%

40%

Minimum Wage Earners of Total Employed 58%

48%

Marginalization

State Average

32.2%

Education
Secundaria (Secondary School)

68%

80%

68%

Bachilleres (High School)

40%

60%

40%

Alphabetization (ages 15-24)

92%
Women: 94%
Men: 93%

95%
Women: 96%
Men: 94%

93%
Women: 92%
Men: 94%

Child Death
Younger than age 5 (out of 100 born)
Younger than age 1 (out of 100 born)

1.5
.75

2.0
1.25

1.1
.75

HIV/AIDS (15-24)/1000 people

.37

2

.37

Running Water

74%

90%

76%

Surface Area w/ Tree Cover (Avg.)

21.5%

21.5%

Data obtained from CEIEG (2012) 11
Another limiting factor for young people includes meager educational opportunities. In
fact, most communities in the region lack educational options beyond the secondary level. In
order for students to continue studying beyond this level they must move to the nearest city to do
so. However, doing so implies a great number of expenses related to food, rent, travel, and
school supplies, many of which most families cannot afford. As a result most children leave
school prior to or after the secondary level, as they do not have the means to continue studying.

Definitions used by the State of Chiapas are drawn from the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
11
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It is in this context that rural communities in the Sierra Madre become enrolled in voluntary
carbon markets through their participation in AMBIO’s Scolel’ Te program.
For many, the project represents the opportunity to earn income – money that is used to
purchase food, pay electric bills, and make needed trips into the nearby city. Moreover, farmers
use the money to purchase necessary agricultural inputs, including tools such as machetes and
rubber boots. Although the financial benefits tied to working in Scolel’ Te are few, farmers
suggest that it provides them with an important source of employment in the face of scarce
alternatives. Moreover, as becomes clear in Chapter 4, access to income and opportunities stands
to improve one’s standing in her community in the absence of other opportunities. However, we
cannot fully understand the Sierra Madre region, nor can we fully appreciate the role of
development in the region without a broader understanding of Chiapas’ relationship to
development over time. More specifically, it is necessary to clarify the state’s status as part of a
region defined by agricultural production for sale in international commodity markets, and to
highlight differences across the state in ethnic diversity, political dynamics, and poverty – each of
which shed light on the Sierra Madre as a unique region within Chiapas.
Chiapas’ Development History
Chiapas is Mexico’s southernmost state, bordering Guatemala to the south and the Mexican states
of Tabasco, Veracruz and Oaxaca to the north. It is a highly rural state, and its chief economic
activity is agriculture. Chiapas is home to the second largest number of indigenous groups in
Mexico (behind only the state of Oaxaca) (CDI, 2012). Moreover, as Mexico’s Institute of
Geography and Statistics (INEGI) (2004) reports, Chiapas has the largest monolingual native
language-speaking population at 36.5% of the total population as compared to the national
average of 16.6%.
Chiapas is a state of contradictions. It is known internationally for its natural wealth, and
its waterfalls, rivers, lakes and mountains have been converted into ecotourism sites visited
annually by tourists from around the world. Within Mexico, this wealth has provided the country
with natural resources, feeding and powering its largest cities. In 1990, with only three percent of
Mexico’s population it produced 54% of the country’s hydroelectric power and over ten percent
of its corn (Collier and Quaratiello, 1999). Despite this wealth, Chiapas’ population is the poorest
in Mexico, with poverty and illiteracy rates at significantly higher levels than the national
average. In 2012 74.4% of the state population (over 3.5 million people) lived in poverty –
32.2% of which (over 1.5 million people) lived in extreme poverty (CEIEG, 2012). These levels

39

are higher than those of the next poorest state, Guerrero, at 69.5%, and significantly higher than
the national average of 45.4% (CONEVAL, 2012). CEIEG (2012) notes, moreover, that as of
2010 Chiapas also accounted for the highest illiteracy rates in the country at 17.8% of the state
population as compared to the national average of 6.9%.
In order to understand Chiapas’ poverty paradox, it is necessary to contextualize
economic development in the southernmost state within broader historical patterns and events. In
this segment I focus on four points of Chiapas’ history, arguing that they are central to clarifying
how market-based development came to exist in Chiapas and its relationship to poverty and
prosperity. Specifically, I examine: 1) historical and contemporary indigenous/non-indigenous
relations; 2) Chiapas’ colonial past; 3) national and local political structures; and 4) Chiapas’
relationship to the rest of Mexico.
Phase 1: Colonial Chiapas and the Post-Colonial 19th Century
Development during Spanish colonialism was highly agricultural, and involved the establishment
of plantations, timber extraction and the exploitation of indigenous labor (Collier and Quaratiello,
1999). Collier and Quaratiello (1999) note that the success of these plantations depended on
forced indigenous labor, which, once weakened by smallpox, measles, yellow fever and malaria,
was replaced through the forced resettlement of Lacandón Indians from the state’s eastern region.
Ultimately, development during the colonial period was designed to enhance the well-being of a
select group of colonial and mestizo actors who saw themselves as superior to indigenous people
– the enslaved labor force undergirding colonial production and trade.
In 1824, following Mexico’s 1821 independence from Spain, Chiapas seceded from
Guatemala and joined the Mexican Federation, becoming the new country’s southernmost state.
Throughout the 19th century Chiapas’ relationship to the rest of Mexico remained marginal. At
just under 1,000 km from Mexico City, the influence of successive weak post-colonial
governments was virtually non-existent. The power vacuum left by the retreating Spanish and the
absent post-colonial Mexican government was filled by local oligarchs who had managed to
amass wealth and power under Spanish colonialism (Womack Jr., 1999). These oligarchs,
however, were not the only people to take advantage of the Spanish colonial withdraw. North
American and European entrepreneurs exploited the trade networks built and previously
monopolized by the Spanish, establishing coffee plantations in the state’s western Sierra Madre
region and timber extraction in the eastern Lacandón region (Collier and Quaratiello, 1999).
Collier and Quaratiello (1999) note that the coffee plantations were initially stimulated by the
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mid-19th century California gold rush, which provided German entrepreneurs with a commercial
outlet for coffee on the Atlantic coast. They suggest, however, that while profits from coffee
sales tended to remain in Chiapas and Mexico, the logging business was largely exploitative with
the profits leaving Mexico for Liverpool and London where mahogany and cedar were sold to
furniture manufacturers.
Toward the end of the 19th century, extractive development practices were invigorated by
the policies of President Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910). During this time, rural development in
Chiapas was oriented around establishing large-scale foreign-owned agricultural plantations,
which were viewed as a central component in establishing an agricultural export economy.
Under the Porfiriato development model Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Chol and Mam indigenous landholders
were dispossessed of their land, which was then sold to German, American, Spanish, French and
English entrepreneurs interested in creating haciendas (Rus and Collier, 2003). Dispossessed
indigenous groups, once again pushed off their land, were forced into a system of migrant labor in
which they moved around the state as sharecroppers, wageworkers, or seasonal contract laborers
working for foreign landholders on plantations in the Soconusco Valley and the Sierra Madre
region (Benjamin, 1996; Harvey, 1998; Rus and Collier, 2003). Harvey (1998) notes that the
movement of indigenous labor was facilitated by the construction of highways, while the export
of agricultural products was enhanced by the development of railroad networks such as the PanAmerican Railroad, and the construction of telephone and telegraph lines that connected all
important towns and most haciendas.
In the end, colonial and post-colonial 19th century Chiapas featured a development model
designed to extract resources at the expense of the natural environment and the state’s indigenous
people. This time period featured a reorganization of rural Chiapaneco social space defined by
the establishment of plantations in western Chiapas, the extraction of valuable tree species in the
eastern Lacandón region, and the relocation of indigenous people forced to work on growing
export-oriented plantations. It was a development model designed to enhance the well being of
mestizo and foreign landholders, and which greatly marginalized the state’s indigenous
population.
Phase 2: Post-Revolutionary Development, 1910 - 1993
The 1910 Mexican Revolution brought to an abrupt end the regime of Porfirio Diaz, and was
followed by several years of infighting and civil war as competing factions sought to instill their
vision for the new Mexico (MacLachlan and Beezley, 2003). The infighting came to a relative
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calm with the establishment of the 1917 Constitution, an extremely nationalist and progressive
document (Womack Jr., 1999). In the new constitution, Article 27 gave the nation ownership of
the country’s land, water and subsoil resources, and paved the way for land reform designed to
assist the nation’s poorest people.

The Revolution and the new progressively nationalist

constitution represented a break from past practices that linked development to foreign interests,
and privileged a more nationalist development stance.
Despite the progressive nature of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, it is commonly
suggested within Mexico that much of Chiapas’ indigenous population was unable to access the
benefits tied to land reform and other aspects of the Revolution. This perspective stems, in part,
from the fact that the effects of the Mexican Revolution reached Chiapas later than other regions
of the country. Up until the mid-1930s, for example, the Mexican government continued to play
a strong role in contracting Chiapas’ indigenous people to work on the state’s coffee plantations
(Rus, 1994).

As Rus (1994) notes, during this time 20,000 Indians from Chiapas’ central

highlands migrated to the southern Sierra Madre and Soconusco regions to work, essentially as
slave labor, in coffee plantations. Rus (1994) notes that chronic poverty following the 1910
Revolution forced many Tzotzil and Tzeltal Indians to continue to work as seasonal migrant
laborers. Of the experience, Rus (1994, page 268) says:
“This [migration] entailed an eight-day walk each way for which not only were
they not paid, but during which they were forced to buy their own food, pay for
the privilege of sleeping as a group on a veranda at night, and satisfy transit taxes
as they passed through towns… in spite of a minimum wage of 1.30 pesos a day
during this period, the prevailing rate for highland migrants on Chiapas’ coffee
plantations was only 30 to 50 centavos – and only if they could finish their
tareas, or daily work quotas.”
Citing the case of the central highlands region, Rus (1994) suggests, however, that the
Revolution eventually arrived in Chiapas in the late 1930s during the presidency of Lázaro
Cardenas (1934-1940). During this time the effects of the new Mexico were felt in the form of
accelerated land reform, and the formation of labor unions such as the Sindicato de Trabajadores
Indígenas (Union of Indigenous Workers – STI), in which coffee workers became enrolled (Rus,
1994). These measures improved the living and working conditions for some Tzeltal and Tzotzil
Indians in the central highlands. For the Mexican government, however, it proved to be a key
mechanism for concentrating previously dispersed settlements into larger communities, and for
enrolling indigenous workers into the state machinery through their participation in the worker’s
union (Rus, 1994). This was essential for beginning to close the political distance between
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Mexico City and what had previously been an outlying state within the federation. As Rus (1994)
notes, it also provided a strong counterbalance to the oligarchs who had solidified their power
within the state throughout the 19th century.
The Revolution eventually reached the Sierra Madre region in much the same way. For
campesinos here, who, unlike in the central highlands were majority mestizo, land reform proved
to be an important method for obtaining previously inaccessible resources.12 However, for many
Mam Indians, the land distributed through the reform program was often located on steep slopes
in the Sierra Madre mountains, making it difficult to establish a viable living from subsistence
farming (Hernández Castillo, 2003).13 Thus, Mam Indians and other campesinos in the region
continued to provide a secure source of labor for the coffee plantations as they sought to
supplement marginal farming with wages earned from migrant labor.
As in the central highlands region, people in the Sierra Madre experienced the presence
of the Mexican state in the form of institutionalized organizations. Such organizations included
the Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation – CNC), and later the
Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas (National Coordinating Committee of Indigenous
Peoples – CNPI), both of which were designed to integrate indigenous groups and campesinos
into the state infrastructure.

In addition to these two organizations, Hernández Castillo (2003)

notes that campesinos organized themselves into alternative non-state groups such as the
indigenous coffee growers’ co-op, Indígenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla (Indians of the
Sierra Madre of Motozintla – ISMAM) and the Nan Choch vegetable cooperative – both serving
as organizations through which specific agricultural objectives could be pursued.
In the end, the Revolution reached Chiapas, albeit slower than in other regions of the
country. However, despite land reform, conditions remained difficult in the state throughout the
mid-20th century. This was due, in large part, to the adoption of agricultural policies at a national
level that included investments in large irrigation projects and subsidies aimed at supporting
large-scale farms in northern Mexico at the expense of smallholders (Fox and Haight, 2010).
Moreover, in-line with the then popular Green Revolution, the Mexican government adopted
policies that privileged irrigated wheat production rather than temporal corn production common
to Chiapaneco smallholders (Fox and Haight, 2010). Additionally, Fox and Haight (2010) note
The Sierra Madre region has a smaller indigenous presence as compared to the central
highlands and Lacandón regions of the state, particularly in the municipalities of Villaflores and
Villa Corzo where this dissertation research took place. Here, as of the late-1990s, only 1,000
indigenous language-speaking inhabitants resided (Lillo et al, 1999).
13
Despite the presence of coffee plantations in the Sierra Madre region throughout the 19th
century, it was not until after the Revolution that the region became populated by poor farming
communities (Lillo et al, 1999).
12
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that despite efforts in the 1970s and 1980s by the Mexican Federal Government to incorporate
smallholders into federal agricultural programs, many remained left out while large-scale
commercial farmers continued to benefit. For many smallholders in Chiapas who had obtained
agricultural land under post-revolutionary land reform, the inequality in access to financial and
other resources resulted in a relative lack of options for developing a viable agricultural
livelihood.
Phase 3: Counterinsurgency and Contemporary Development
At the beginning of the 1990s Mexico found itself in the midst of a neoliberal transition, which
had been instigated by the 1982 debt crisis and marked by the signing and ratifying of the North
American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the U.S. in 1994. It was in the context of this
transition that the Zapatistas – a largely indigenous rebel group based in Chiapas – began a
violent revolt against the Mexican state, capturing several municipal seats in Chiapas and
establishing a series of autonomous communities. The Zapatistas, who had been organizing since
the 1980s, timed the beginning of the uprising to coincide symbolically with the first day of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, which they saw as another element in the long history of
disenfranchising policies toward Mexico’s indigenous people. In their Declaration of War, the
General Command of the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) identified, as a
cornerstone of their movement, the goal of reversing 500 years of oppression toward Mexico’s
indigenous people, first carried out by colonial Spain and continued by the Mexican state. For the
Zapatistas, development in Chiapas had too long been focused on exploiting the state’s wealth so
as to benefit a privileged few while marginalizing the rest. As then Subcomandante Marcos
(1994) of the Zapatistas put it:
“One million Indigenous people live in these lands and share a disorienting
nightmare with mestizos and ladinos: their only option, 500 years after the
"Meeting of Two Worlds," is to die of poverty or repression. The programs to
improve the conditions of poverty, a small bit of social democracy which the
Mexican state throws about and which, under the regime of Salinas de Gortari
carries the name PRONASO, are a joke that brings bloody tears to those who live
under the rain and sun.”
The Mexican government responded to the uprising with a creative mix of repression and cooptation/negotiation – what the Zapatistas have referred to as the política de la doble cara
(Hernández Castillo, 2003). Repression was most visible in the mobilizing of the Mexican
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military immediately following the uprising. The less visible element of repression was tied to
the clandestine mobilization of paramilitary groups by the Mexican government, whose aim was
to divide and weaken Zapatista communities (Aubry and Inda, 1997). Aubry and Inda (1997)
note that this tactic, which was prevalent in the central highlands, Lacandón and southern Sierra
Madre regions of the state, involved arming and deploying poor, non-Zapatista affiliated
indigenous people, to attack Zapatista supporters. They note that for many poor indigenous
farmers with no access to land or other resources, paramilitarism represented their only recourse
to prestige and power in an otherwise bleak situation.
Since the Zapatista uprising, cooptation has been an important component in the
government counterinsurgency strategy – a component driven by state-led development
programs. Following the uprising, the Mexican Federal Government focused largely on the
development of large-scale infrastructure projects such as roadways, schools and health clinics
via the Mexican military. This work, which has been identified by Diez and Nicholls (2006) as
the ‘remilitarization’ of Mexico, has involved the realization of civic action and social projects
aimed at providing assistance to Mexican citizens in cases of national emergency or necessity.
These projects have been largely carried out by military-directed ‘civic action battalions’ whose
assignments in Chiapas were extended from twice a month to a permanent status in 1994 (Camp,
2005). Since the mid-1990s this has resulted in an effective meshing of state-led development
and counterinsurgency objectives in Chiapas. The result has been the rejection of state-led
development programs by Zapatista and pro-Zapatista communities, who view government
assistance as a means to weakening their movement.
While both coercive and oppressive methods are common in the central highlands and
Lacandón regions of the state, they have also been present in the southern Sierra Madre region.
Here, the government responded quickly following the 1994 uprising, fearing that Mam Indians
who had been previously organized under government programs would mobilize in support of the
Zapatistas (Hernández Castillo, 2003). For some Mam Indians, this was certainly the case.
However, Hernández Castillo (2003) notes that those who did mobilize in support of the
Zapatistas, given that they were an indigenous minority in the region, were forced to draw on the
pluriethnic character of the autonomous regions, recruiting mestizo campesinos to join the cause.
She notes, however, that while some mestizos and Mam Indians united in support of the
Zapatistas, others chose to keep a guarded distance from the movement, preferring to avoid being
caught between Zapatista and military/paramilitary aggression.
Following the Zapatista uprising, Chiapas experienced an explosion in the presence of
NGOs interested in supporting the movement, particularly in San Cristóbal de las Casas. The
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work of these organizations has differed from that of the Mexican state, and has been centered
largely on establishing cooperatives through which indigenous people (Zapatista and nonZapatista) may sell artisanal goods, either locally to tourists, or nationally and internationally.
This has been important for Zapatista communities, as it has allowed them to gain access to
revenue in the face of government strategies to isolate them. Additionally, some NGOs have
provided legal and human rights services to the Zapatistas, and produced research regarding
security and other political issues in the state, making it available to Zapatista communities and
the general public.
While the Zapatista uprising affected many regions of Chiapas, not all experienced the
event or its fallout in equal measure. In the Sierra Madre, the effects were largely concentrated in
the southern portion of the mountains with previously organized Mam communities. However,
moving north along the Sierra Madre mountains, campesinos have since tended to show a greater
degree of apathy toward the movement, with some expressing disdain for the use of arms, and
others empathizing with the Zapatista initiative to support the underrepresented. In the central
and northern portions of the Sierra Madre, communities are majority mestizo and tend to work
regularly with government organizations in a variety of development programs. While they do
show skepticism at times toward government-led development, their skepticism is rooted more in
a history of corrupt funding practices, having little to do with questions of counterinsurgency and
cooptation.
It is in this context in which carbon forestry must be placed. It is not extractive like past
development projects, although it does follow familiar patterns of agricultural production for
consumption in northern Mexico and the global north. Moreover, although Scolel’ Te has not
been linked to anti- or even pro-Zapatista sentiments, the NGOs, individuals, communities and
government organizations that make Scolel’ Te possible, and thus facilitate the expansion of
carbon credit production in Chiapas, are intricately enmeshed in Chiapas’ socio-political
dynamics. Carbon forestry is situated historically with respect to past development projects and
geographically with respect to regional variations in political dynamics, ethnic composition and
physical geography. Scolel’ Te, more specifically, is situated within broader voluntary carbon
markets that attempt to achieve environmental conservation and poverty alleviation via market
mechanisms. It is with this in mind that I assess carbon forestry in subsequent chapters.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I take my cue from Marcos, analyzing not only how Chiapas’ wealth is extracted
through various markets, but assessing the local implications of extractive industries as well. I
first look at international voluntary carbon markets in which AMBIO sells carbon credits
produced in Scolel’ Te. Understanding this market context is necessary for Chapter 3 where I
begin to assess the local implications of shifting international market conditions. I then analyze
the broad social, political and historical context of development in Chiapas, noting that Scolel’ Te
is also embedded within long-standing patterns of social life, capital accumulation, and colonial,
neocolonial and state policies. It is, like so many other projects within Chiapas’ development
landscape, designed to generate revenue through the sale of agricultural products in international
markets. Given the interconnected nature of carbon forestry to development in Chiapas, past and
present, a thorough grounding in regional geography and history was essential to facilitating
analyses of this project in subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 3 I build on this analysis, focusing on AMBIO’s attempts to overcome
limitations posed by shifting market dynamics and prohibitive production and transactions costs
in order to expand into Chiapas’ Sierra Madre region. This work depends on a variety of actors,
including government institutions, non-governmental organizations and rural farmers. However,
as will become clear, not all actors enter into Scolel’ Te on the same footing. In Chapter 3 I draw
on a commodity chains perspective designed to show how power inequalities become manifest in
the carbon credit commodity chain, and to illustrate how risk associated with exposing Scolel’ Te
to market dynamics is pushed onto those with relatively little ability to shape the nature of their
work in Scolel’ Te. In this sense, carbon forestry may be seen as replicating many of the relations
of dominance and oppression observed in this chapter. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate how these
factors combine to erode social relations and ultimately undermine farmer standing within their
communities. Such effects are particularly dramatic for técnicos comunitarios on whom the
success of Scolel’ Te depends.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I show how past experiences with

development and current doubts among farmers regarding Scolel’ Te necessitate the pursuit of
community buy-in by AMBIO through the use of participatory exercises. I suggest that such
exercises, however, are ultimately marginalizing to farmers, who find that the conditions of their
participation ultimately diminish the continued personal value of their participation in the
program.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPANDING THE CARBON CREDIT COMMODITY CHAIN
Assessing Risk and Inequality in Carbon Credit Production

Introduction
It was late in the afternoon at AMBIO’s offices in San Cristóbal de las Casas when we finally sat
down to rest after a long meeting with técnicos from around the state. As we ate our lunch and
reflected on the meeting, two members of AMBIO’s senior leadership began to explain the
challenges facing Scolel’ Te – challenges, they suggested, had originated in changes within the
voluntary carbon market in which AMBIO participates. Demand for carbon credits, one woman
noted, had shifted away from Chiapas as global buyers sought credits that had been produced in
other parts of the world. She argued that such shifts restricted AMBIO’s expansionist efforts and
existing activities in many ways, and argued that the NGO would have to respond by figuring out
how to increase the value of the carbon credits produced in Scolel’ Te all the while maintaining
current efforts to expand the program into the Sierra Madre region.
In this chapter I argue that as AMBIO expands Scolel’ Te into the Sierra Madre region, the
project becomes exposed to market risk and rising transactions and production costs, and that the
manner in which AMBIO manages such risk and related costs undermines the social relations of
production between the organization and participating farmers. Risk emerges from exposure to
shifting dynamics within the voluntary market, and is distributed unevenly among a variety of
actors. In order to clarify how and why this occurs, I draw on global commodity chains (GCC),
transactions cost, and political ecology literature. I argue that AMBIO’s efforts to mitigate risk
and overcome prohibitive costs amounts to an extension of the carbon credit commodity chain,
albeit a horizontal swelling of one link (or box as described by Hopkins and Wallerstein [1994])
within the commodity chain rather than its overall vertical lengthening. Taking my cue from
labor studies literature, I suggest that this swelling of the link in the commodity chain occurs
through the creation of a division of labor involving NGOs, governmental ministries, farming
communities and international organizations within which the effects of risk and rising costs are
unevenly distributed. It is a division of labor that rests on the cheap labor of some participants,
and which facilitates project expansion despite challenges to continued growth.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: 1) to clarify the nature of shifting dynamics in
voluntary carbon markets, and to show where and how costs emerge from carbon credit
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production processes; 2) to show how AMBIO relies on an extended division of labor involving
multiple actors in order to respond to risk emanating from exposure to shifting market dynamics
and to overcome transactions costs and production costs; and 3) to clarify how such labor
arrangements undermine the social relations of production between AMBIO and participating
farmers by disenfranchising the latter as they work in Scolel’ Te. This chapter represents an
important pivot from the broad context elucidated in Chapter 2 by providing a first step toward
delivering an on-the-ground analysis of carbon forestry. Moreover, it is essential for setting-up
the discussion of the broader consequences of participating in carbon forestry for farmers as seen
in Chapter 4, and for assessing AMBIO’s efforts to attain community buy-in discussed in Chapter
5. However, before examining the challenges to project expansion in the Sierra Madre and
AMBIO’s response to such limitations, I outline the key theoretical frameworks used to analyze
the relationship between risk and social relations in carbon forestry.
Labor, Chains, Networks and Transactions: Understanding the Carbon Economy
The dual challenges of market risk and rising costs, and the unequal labor relations established in
response to these factors work together to undermine the social relations needed for carbon
forestry projects to succeed.

In order to adequately examine the erosive effect of labor

arrangements in carbon forestry on social relations, it is necessary to understand three points: 1)
the nature of labor arrangements needed for carbon credit production; 2) the inequalities in
commodity chains that permit the unequal distribution of risk among actors within labor
arrangements; and 3) and the nature of interactions in the commodity chain that encourage the
unequal distribution of risk. I assess each of these factors in the next section. However, before
doing so, I use this section to outline the key theoretical pillars upon which this analysis rests. In
this section, I first draw on critical labor studies, outlining the nature of the extended production
processes into which many actors participating carbon forestry become enrolled. I then turn to a
commodity chains perspective for illustrating the fact that relationships within commodity chains
are often hierarchical in nature, leading to inequalities among intra-chain actors. Finally, I look to
work on transactions costs, which provides a useful understanding of the information
asymmetries within the carbon credit commodity chain, and the manner in which such
asymmetries lead to rent-seeking behaviors that cultivate inequality within the commodity chain.
Together, these three perspectives clarify how attempts to respond to emerging risks and rising
costs may be motivated by many factors, and how such risks and costs may, moreover, be
unequally distributed within the carbon credit commodity chain. As will become clear, it is the
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combined effect of these challenges and the manner in which they are managed within the carbon
credit commodity chain that undermines the social relations needed for the successful completion
of carbon forestry projects.
Extended Labor Processes and the Extended Division of Labor
In order to understand how risks and costs are distributed unequally within carbon forestry, it is
necessary to look at the organization of work in the carbon credit commodity chain. In order to
do so I draw on the labor studies of Sayer and Walker (1992). In their book, The New Social
Economy, they highlight the centrality of the division of labor as a concept for clarifying the
organization of actors and activities in production processes. They suggest that despite the
expansion of the so-called service industry, much work continues to be tied to the production of
goods rather than services – work that must be seen as pertaining to an extended production
process. According to Sayer and Walker (1992, page 68), the extended labor process includes:
“…work that takes place before and after products are actually formed by direct,
hands-on labor, as well as work complementary to the immediate labor process.
Extended labor, from R&D to janitorial work to automobile repair, is regularly
mislabeled as services, especially where it is sold in a commodity form, when it
is, in fact, nothing more than work that can be separated in time and space from
the core of direct labor.”
Sayer and Walker (1992) go on to suggest that the extended division of labor may be
organized into four categories: pre-production labor, auxiliary labor, prost-production labor, and
repair and maintenance. Pre-production labor, they suggest, includes product-testing, trial runs,
the clearing of a field for planting, hybrid plant propagation, and other pre-production measures –
i.e. labor not associated with that which accompanies normal production processes. Sayer and
Walker (1992, page 69) define auxiliary labor, on the other hand, as that which “take[s] place on
a regular basis during actual production, but which back[s] up or compliment[s] direct labor
without ever coming into contact with materials or products.” Finally, they suggest that postproduction activities involve inspection and labeling, while repair and maintenance work may
continue for years following production. In this chapter I focus particularly on pre-production,
production, and auxiliary labor, and their role in facilitating Scolel’ Te’s expansion.
AMBIO’s expansionist activities facilitate the program’s further entrenchment within
Chiapas’ development landscape, but require pre-production and auxiliary labor arrangements
designed to overcome challenges to project expansion. These challenges include responding to
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the shifting interests of buyers who begin to source their carbon credits from other producers –
i.e. ‘buyer flight’ – and overcoming high costs associated with project expansion and with
responding to information asymmetries emerging from transaction costs. However, how this risk
is distributed among actors within the extended division of labor is highly uneven. In order to
better clarify these inequalities, I turn to commodity chains perspectives to examine the nature of
unequal relations within the global economy.
Chains Framework
‘Chains’ framework proponents suggest that the global economy is organized into chains through
which the actors and processes involved in the production of goods and services are connected.
The global chains perspective – a term used by Bair (2009) to refer to the composite ‘chains’
framework literature – refers to three connected chains perspectives that have had strong purchase
power within economic geography: commodity chains, global commodity chains (GCCs), and
global value chains (GVCs). These perspectives are essential for understanding inequality in
commodity chains. In this segment I draw from Bair and others to trace the three chains
perspectives, including their potential for analyzing carbon forestry.
According to Bair (2009), the commodity chains optic is rooted in world-systems theory,
and examines the manner in which raw materials are converted into final products. Bair (2009)
quotes Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977, page 128) as defining commodity chains in the following
manner:
“What we mean by such chains is the following: take an ultimate consumable
item and trace back the set of inputs that culminated in this item—the prior
transformations, the raw materials, the transportation mechanisms, the labor input
into each of the material processes, the food inputs into the labor. This linked set
of processes we call a commodity chain.”
Thus, for Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977), commodity chains signal the processes through which
various labor and material inputs enhance a given commodity’s value. However, Bair (2009)
suggests that, while defined in a similar fashion, global commodity chains and global value
chains perspectives abandon many of the world-systems theory influences of commodity chains
approaches. This is particularly visible in studies of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)
certification of Alaskan fisheries (see Foley and Hebert, 2013). In this work, Foley and Hebert
(2013) explore how various actors become embedded in the commodity chain through
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certification work, examining the chain as a process understood in its own terms rather than as
part of a broader world-systems framework.
Despite their differences, literature on the three ‘chains’ perspectives finds common
ground in its focus on inequality within the global economy.

Gereffi (1994), for instance,

suggests that multiple types of rent-seeking behavior exist within commodity chains – behaviors
that are governed largely by lead firms within the chain. Such behaviors differ, he argues, within
buyer-driven commodity chains (BDCCs) and producer-driven commodity chains (PDCCs), and
reflect the hierarchical nature of all relationships within the global economy. Within global
commodity chains literature, discussions of inequalities among actors revolve around questions of
governance (Bair, 2009). One arena in which this perspective has been applied is that of
certification studies, which highlight the ability of lead firms to shape how commodity chains
operate and how value is distributed along the chain (see Dolan, 2010). Work within this field
also highlights the manner in which certification processes act as modes of governance whereby
human-human and human-environment relationships are reworked through certification processes
(Arora and Koshti et al, 2013; Foley and Hebert, 2013; Mutersbaugh, 2005). In the end, such
perspectives are central for clarifying the dynamic relationships among groups and individuals
within the global economy.
The ‘chain’s’ framework literature resembles work within political ecology that favors a
‘chains of explanation’ approach – an approach that recognizes the connected nature of actors,
policies, and actions at multiple scales, particularly as they relate to issues of poverty, resource
management and environmental degradation (see Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and Watts,
2004; Robbins, 2004). This approach has been adopted, for instance, to connect development
policy and food importation strategies with extreme poverty in Nigeria (Watts, 1983), to trace the
effects of markets for bananas on local production in the Caribbean (Grossman, 1998), and to
examine the role of global garbage politics in reshaping local ecologies in countries that receive
global trash such as the Ivory Coast (Moore, 2011). In short, like the ‘chains’ framework
literature, this work emphasizes the interconnectedness of actors across space and the unequal
power relations among these actors, albeit with a greater emphasis on human-environment
relations.
In short, these approaches draw on the ‘chain’ metaphor to illustrate how multiple actors
are linked through trade and production processes. They highlight the hierarchical nature of the
relationships that link intra-chain actors, and the fact that markets are often not as ‘free’ as
orthodox economists might suggest.

In such a context, agency – defined as agencement by

Callon (2007) – is not only shaped by an actor’s position in relation to other actors, but by the
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ability of some actors to exert influence over others (Arora and Koshti et al, 2013). Such a
perspective is important for analyzing AMBIO’s expansion of Scolel’ Te into the Sierra Madre
region. As the program expands, additional actors become enrolled and new relationships are
formed. However, these relationships are rooted in Mexico’s social history of development, and
therefore, are not based in equal exchange. The ‘chains’ framework adds an important analytical
component to this chapter, opening the door for critical studies of the complex social nature of
carbon market expansion in Chiapas.
Despite the broad use of the ‘chains’ framework for studying the world economy, it has
been critiqued. On the one hand, the use of the term commodity, which is traditionally used to
refer to low-value-added products, has been seen as misleading, while Gereffi’s (1994) distinction
between buyer-driven commodity chains and producer-driven commodity chains has been
critiqued for providing a narrow approach to viewing commodity chains (Bair, 2009). On the
other hand, Mutersbaugh (2005) suggests that commodity chains do not exist in isolation, as
many studies seem to imply, but often contribute to the formation of multiple chains. Finally,
citing Cook and Crang (1996), Bair (2009) notes that commodity chains have been critiqued for
their linearity, and thus, their limited ability to account for the complexities that define
relationships within a given network. Such critiques are germane to this study given its analysis
of the horizontal swelling of a single link within the carbon credit commodity chain. In an effort
to work around the linear tendencies of the ‘chains’ framework, I draw from the work of labor
studies in analyzing the division of labor within commodity chains. However, by focusing on the
themes of the extended labor process and the extended division of labor discussed above, I
suggest that one may begin to examine the relationships among actors that extend horizontally
within a single link in commodity chains.
Inequalities among actors in commodity chains permit risks originating from exposure to
shifting market conditions to be unequally distributed among actors with varying degrees of
power within the commodity chain. However, risk is not the only factor that shapes unequal
relationships within commodity chains. An additional factor that must be assessed is that of
costs, particularly transactions costs and production costs. Such costs may motivate the pursuit of
rent-seeking behavior that, as Gereffi (1994) notes, also engenders inequality within commodity
chains. Commodity chain scholars have, for instance, examined rent-seeking behavior in relation
to transactions costs, suggesting that such costs may lead to the adoption of opportunistic
behaviors by firms (see Gereffi and Humphrey et al, 2005). In the next segment I examine these
costs as an expensive effect of information asymmetries that AMBIO attempts to overcome
through unequal labor arrangements with participating farmers.
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Transactions Costs
Transactions costs must be assessed in this analysis, in part, due to their embrace within studies of
carbon forestry, and because they facilitate an understanding of how some actors interact within
the carbon market space. Transactions costs may be defined as those costs associated with
determining, establishing, maintaining and transferring property rights (McCann and Colby et al,
2005). Chadwick (2006) contends, however, that despite the plethora of transactions cost
analyses, there is not a universally accepted definition of the term. 14 These costs stem from
information asymmetries among actors involved in an exchange who have unequal access to and
knowledge of the commodities being traded, thereby requiring assurances in the form of
contracts, monitoring and certification.

As Stiglitz (2000; 2002) notes, such information

asymmetries have effects that shape economic activity. These effects, he notes, are seen in firm
behaviors, which are organized so as to overcome information asymmetries tied to the buying and
selling of goods.

As noted above, such behavioral shifts may involve the adoption of

opportunistic activities motivated by rent-seeking goals.
The transactions cost perspective has been broadly applied to a variety of contexts, both
within and outside business (Macher and Richman, 2006). Macher and Richman (2006) note that
such applications have included the arenas of law, health economics, agricultural economics, and
public policy to varying degrees. Importantly, the transactions cost optic has also been applied to
the study of payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs, including carbon forestry
initiatives. The adoption of transactions cost perspectives in carbon forestry tends to correspond
with concerns among practitioners regarding equity in participation among smallholders (Cacho
and Marshall et al, 2005; McCann and Easter, 1999; Thompson, 1999). They note that projects
with smallholders generally complicate monitoring and verification processes, thereby making
them more expensive from a transactions cost perspective as compared to work with large
landholders.

Additionally, transactions cost perspectives are generally considered among

practitioners to be a vital measure in predicting a project’s long-term viability. This position is
Chadwick (2006) suggests that as a result, definitions may vary, ranging from narrow
considerations of only exchange costs to much broader interpretations. Holden (2004), for
example, includes within the transactions cost framework those costs associated with the
administrative labor needed to respond to conflict and uncertainty. Additionally, he includes
those costs associated with the monitoring and maintenance of projects, suggesting that doing so
makes sense given their centrality to ensuring the commercial viability of a given product. Cacho
and Marshall et al (2005) stretch the term even further, arguing that costs associated with the
search by investors and project developers for mutually advantageous projects should be
classified as transaction costs. Under this rubric transactions and their associated costs become
broadly defined, and encompass the participation of many actors.
14

54

shared by AMBIO as considerations of transactions costs – particularly administration costs,
monitoring costs and opportunity costs (see de Jong and Gaona et al, [2004]) – are used as a
measure of Scolel’ Te’s long-term viability. Furthermore, as Chadwick (2006, page 259) says in
relation to the transactions costs associated with the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM):
“Nearly all economic activities have transaction costs, but CDM transaction costs
are especially important because the financial sustainability of CDM projects is
so closely linked to the size of the CER revenue stream. Any factor that increases
the cost of generating a CER or reduces its market price can have powerful
effects on the number of CDM projects that are economically feasible and, by
extension, how much GHG will be removed via the CDM.”
From this perspective, forest carbon projects are considered to be sustainable when transactions
costs are low. This is important to consider in a setting where transactions costs are a normal part
of business. However, how they are accounted for within a project varies. I argue that in carbon
forestry such costs may be dealt with by managing organizations by pushing them off onto
relatively powerless farmers who have little say in budgeting decisions.
Despite the broad use of the transactions cost approach, it has been critiqued for what has
been identified as an inattention to the social nature of markets (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).
Granovetter (1985), for example, suggests that the transactions cost optic fails to examine the
broad-ranging social factors that shape interactions in the market. Drawing from these critiques I
argue that although the transactions cost approach may be useful for highlighting the interactions
of actors within a constrained market space, it does not, on its own, adequately capture the social
nature of markets. Instead, it may be combined with ‘chains’ framework studies and critical labor
approaches discussed above so as to work around the undersocialized nature of the transactions
cost perspective. In doing so, this combined approach provides a useful lens with which to
analyze the expansion of carbon credit production in Chiapas, and for assessing the interactions
of multiple actors within such work.
In this chapter I draw on these theoretical strands to analyze AMBIO’s efforts to
overcome emerging market risk and rising transactions costs and production costs. I argue that
AMBIO relies on an extended division of labor involving farming communities, NGOs,
governmental ministries and international organizations that carry out pre-production, production,
and auxiliary labor. However, I note that not all actors enter into the program on equal footing
and that some inequalities persist. In the next section I chart the challenges facing AMBIO since
2008 with regard market risk and rising costs. I then analyze the auxiliary labor carried out with
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international organizations such as Conservation International, NGOs and farmers designed to
increase the value of carbon credits produced through Scolel’ Te within voluntary carbon markets
and to capture market share. By clarifying this context, it is possible to then examine exactly how
and why risk is unevenly distributed within the carbon credit commodity chain, and how unequal
labor arrangements disenfranchise farmers.

Ultimately, this approach provides a unique

‘socialized production’ optic for clarifying the issue of risk and its implications for carbon
forestry.
Market Risks: The Great Recession, and the Twin Challenges of Too Much Biodiversity
and of Not Being Poor Enough

“Companies are very excited to buy carbon credits from African producers
because then they can turn to their client base or their board of directors and
make the argument that they are supporting the poorest of people. Those same
companies look to buy carbon credits from Brazil as doing so allows them to
argue that they are protecting the Brazilian Amazon” (AMBIO employee).

In 2012 AMBIO indicated in interviews that its ability to sell carbon credits had declined since
2008, due in part to shifting interests among traditional buyers of carbon credits produced under
Scolel’ Te. This shift, they suggested, consisted of ‘buyer flight’ in which buyers began to source
carbon credits from other parts of the world such as South America and Sub-Saharan Africa
rather than Chiapas. For AMBIO, this shift threatened its ability to generate much needed
revenue from the sale of carbon credits, and challenged its ability to expand into the Sierra Madre
region. In order to understand this shift, it is important to look at two components of the
voluntary carbon markets where AMBIO’s Plan Vivo Certificates are sold: 1) the value of carbon
credits to potential buyers; and 2) the nature of buyers of carbon credits produced under Scolel’
Te. In this segment I address each of these points in turn.
In 2012, one AMBIO employee noted in interviews that the majority of carbon credits
sold by AMBIO are to private sector buyers who purchase carbon credits in order to fulfill their
organization’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) objectives. CSR goals, she pointed out, have
historically centered on the buyer’s ability to demonstrate a set of green credentials to consumers
– that is, to prove to clients that they are dedicated to ensuring that their operations do not detract
from the well being of the natural environment. Past efforts to do so have involved simply
illustrating a commitment to both environmental and social concerns, both of which were
facilitated by purchasing carbon credits that seek to alleviate rural poverty and mitigate global
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climate change. Traditionally, carbon credits produced in Chiapas have tended to provide private
sector clients with the ability to respond to these CSR needs, particularly given the aim of Plan
Vivo Certificates to contribute to climate change mitigation through CO2 offsets. Moreover,
AMBIO leadership noted that clients have been attracted to the social implications of Scolel’ Te,
particularly given the concerns of the Plan Vivo Standard with smallholders who have historically
been excluded from participation in carbon offset projects (see Cacho and Marshall et al, 2005;
McCann and Easter, 1999; Thompson, 1999). This, AMBIO notes, has allowed them to maintain
the interest of potential buyers over time – a trend that began to change in 2008.
In 2012, one senior manager in AMBIO noted that since 2008 companies have sought to
purchase carbon credits that are increasingly green in nature – that is to say, carbon credits that
respond to more iconic environmental and social issues. They include, for instance, protecting
biodiversity in the Brazilian Amazon or alleviating poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. These issues,
buyers suggest, are more marketable to their clientele. It is assumed by these buyers that carbon
credits should be worth more in relation to CSR objectives if they are protecting widely
recognized biodiversity hotspots such as the Brazilian Amazon, rather than the less-recognized
rainforests of Chiapas. According to the same logic, carbon credits designed to alleviate poverty
in Sub-Saharan Africa should be worth more than those produced in countries where poverty is
less extreme. The shifts in CSR objectives and the corresponding ‘buyer flight’ have left AMBIO
with the challenge of responding to a fleeing clientele. Frustrated, one AMBIO employee argued,
“What they [carbon offset purchasers] don’t realize is that we have jungles, and we have
poverty.” According to her, the sourcing decisions made by clients were not justified in terms of
protecting the natural environment or alleviating poverty, when both goals could be reasonable
met by purchasing carbon credits from Chiapas. They were, instead, rooted in marketing CSR
objectives to corporate clients.
AMBIO leadership noted that shifting market conditions limited their ability to generate
revenue from the sale of carbon credits – credits needed to justify Scolel’ Te’s expansion into the
Sierra Madre region. Without revenue from the sale of carbon credits, AMBIO faced the threat of
leaving administrative costs unmet and of having to postpone compensation to farmers for their
work in establishing and caring for agroforestry systems. However, AMBIO’s ability to respond
was limited by two factors: 1) by the fact that the majority of buyers in voluntary carbon markets
are the very private sector clients that had begun to source carbon credits from other projects; and
2) the overall number of carbon credits transacted voluntarily since 2008 had begun to decline,
falling victim to the global recession. Given the homogeneity of voluntary carbon market buyers,
AMBIO’s options for responding to ‘buyer flight’ were limited to courting those buyers back to
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Scolel’ Te. However, doing so would be difficult in a market context where overall transactions
had declined. Before analyzing AMBIO’s response to ‘buyer flight’ I examine the nature of
voluntary market buyers and the overall nature of activity in voluntary markets.
In 2012, 90% of contracted volumes in voluntary carbon markets were realized by the
private sector for which corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a primary concern (PetersStanley and Yin, 2013). Peters-Stanley and Yin (2013) noted, for instance, that in 2012 CSR
concerns ranked at the top of the list of motivating factors behind private sector purchases of
carbon credits (at 34%), reflecting similar patterns as in 2011. These trends are reflected in
AMBIO’s work, having sold the majority of the Plan Vivo Certificates produced in Scolel’ Te
since 1997 to private companies (Vargas Guillen and Velazquez et al, 2011). The majority of
AMBIO’s transactions occur “over the counter” (OTC) with brokers, while additional sales are
arranged with individuals.15

Retailer,
28%

Companies,
72%

Figure 3.1 Market Sectors of Scolel’ Te
Data obtained from Vargas Guillen and Velazquez et al (2011)
AMBIO’s private sector clients have tended to purchase carbon credits for one of two reasons: 1)
either out of voluntary interest (particularly relating to CSR objectives); or 2) for pre-compliance
15

“Over the Counter” (OTC) refers to those transactions realized outside of a formal exchange.
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purposes (i.e. in anticipation of perceived future regulations regarding carbon emissions). While
both concerns have motivated participation among the private sector, it is the former that, as
noted above, has most shaped their clients’ sourcing decisions.

Voluntary carbon market

purchases are thus driven by private sector participation, while the motivations for such
participation are shaped largely by CSR considerations. As CSR concerns shift among buyers,
managing organizations such as AMBIO must respond in order to capture market share.
However, efforts to do so are further complicated by overall reduced sales in voluntary carbon
markets since the beginning of the global recession in 2008.
In 2012 AMBIO indicated in interviews that its ability to sell carbon credits had declined,
in part, due to shifting priorities among corporate and individual actors following the 2008
financial crisis. They suggested that since this time corporate actors, whose purchases AMBIO
depended on for revenue, had become less concerned with climate change mitigation in the face
of potential economic catastrophe.

Table 3.1 AMBIO Carbon Offset Transactions (MtCO2e), 2008-2011
Year

Total volume Carbon Offsets (MtCO2e)

2008

40,604

2009

6,069

2010

12,900

2011

1,380

Data obtained from Cooperativa AMBIO (2012) 16
Globally, such shifts are reflected in the fact that in 2008 the total volume of offsets transacted in
voluntary markets totaled a record MtCO2e 135 million, only to fall to MtCO2e 107 million in
2009 (Peters-Stanley and Yin, 2013). While 2010 showed a strong rebounding in the voluntary
carbon markets, total sales have stayed low, falling back to MtCO2e 97 million and MtCO2e 101
million in 2011 and 2012 respectively (Peters-Stanley and Yin, 2013). For AMBIO, these trends
are further mirrored by their total carbon offsets sold from 2008-2011. In 2008 AMBIO sold
MtCO2e 40,604, only to see the totals decrease to MtCO2e 6,069 in 2009, MtCO2e 12,900 in 2010
and MtCO2e 1,380 in 2011 (Cooperativa AMBIO, 2012).
AMBIO had not published its 2012 Annual Report at the time of the writing of this dissertation

16
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This scenario is further complicated by the fact that among co-benefit standards – i.e.
those standards that claim to account for social factors in addition to carbon capture – the Plan
Vivo Standard ranks as one of the least influential, holding only 1% of the market share in 2012
(Peters-Stanley and Yin, 2013). While the reasons behind the small market share held by the Plan
Vivo Standard could be many, one possible explanation includes the fact that although projects
within the standard tend to command higher prices, their work with smallholders means that they
are only able to contract a relatively small volume of carbon credits as compared to other projects
with a higher production capacity. This complicates AMBIO’s hopes of developing timely
solutions for responding to reduced transactions under the Plan Vivo Standard.

1%
2%
CCB + VCS
5%

46%

10%

The Gold Standard
Fair Trade + VCS
SOCIALCARBON + VCS
CCB + Other

36%

Plan Vivo

Figure 3.2 Market Share by Co-benefits Standard in 2012
Data obtained from Peters-Stanley and Yin (2013)
In the end, both scenarios – ‘buyer flight’ and decreased overall sales in the voluntary
market – challenged AMBIO’s ability to generate revenue through the sale of Plan Vivo
Certificates produced within Scolel’ Te, and proved prohibitive to AMBIO’s ability to expand
into the Sierra Madre region. Thus, overcoming these challenges became a central component of
the process of producing carbon credits in the Sierra Madre region. This is the focus of the
following segment.
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Increasing Value through Biodiversity and Social Indicators
During spring 2012 (3 years after first beginning work in the Sierra Madre region), AMBIO
invited consultants from Conservation International (CI) to assist them in resolving one of its
most urgent issues: re-capturing market share within voluntary carbon markets. The strategy was
to demonstrate the value of Plan Vivo Certificates to potential buyers by showing improvements
in various social and biodiversity indicators in relation to established baseline measures. This,
AMBIO hoped, would make carbon credits produced through Scolel’ Te more marketable to
private sector buyers that had fled the program in search of carbon credits that did not simply
capture CO2, but which also alleviated the world’s most extreme poverty and improved
biodiversity in the world’s iconic hotspots. The work represented an additional component to the
production process, what Sayer and Walker (1992) refer to as the extended labor process.
Drawing from Sayer and Walker (1992), I suggest that efforts to enhance the value of carbon
credits produced within Scolel’ Te forms part of the production process, albeit a complementary
element to the hands-on labor carried out in participating communities. It is, more specifically, a
type of auxiliary labor that does not actually come into contact with the produced product
(carbon credits), but which exists in parallel to the product as a means to enhancing its value in
the carbon market.
The work laid out by AMBIO and Conservation International involved three steps: 1)
identifying the key social and biodiversity indicators to be measured; 2) identifying baseline
measures for each of the chosen indicators (i.e. the pre-project state of the social and biodiversity
indicators within each participating community); and 3) measuring the improvement in each
indicator over time since the beginning of the project. This work reflected for AMBIO the fact
that it was no longer sufficient to simply reduce atmospheric carbon levels, while suggesting that
other social and biodiversity-oriented benefits might result from project implementation. Instead,
it showed a recognition on their behalf that they now needed to demonstrate to buyers exactly
how much poverty had been reduced in participating communities through Scolel’ Te and by how
much biodiversity had been enhanced.
AMBIO’s efforts to increase the value of carbon credits follow trends within broader
payment for ecosystem services (PES) projects, including forest carbon initiatives, toward
pursuing co-benefits through bundling and stacking. Both represent attempts to achieve multiple
environmental objectives while bringing additional market value to the project in question.
Bundling refers the uniting of several ecosystem service values from a single property within a
single credit (Deal and Cochran et al, 2012; Larocco and Deal 2011). For example, a single
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project may protect watersheds, restore wetlands and capture CO2, and then may be sold under a
single credit with a higher market value. Stacking, on the other hand, refers to the generation of
multiple credits – such as water quality credits and carbon credits – from activities on a single
piece of land (Deal and Cochran et al, 2012). Both have been adopted by organizations around
the world so as to innovate within the market for ecosystem services framework and to make their
carbon credits and their organizations more competitive. However, as Robertson (2006) notes,
they are also problematic given that they rely on ecosystem assessments that are too simplistic in
their understanding of ecosystems as abstract and singular environmental units.
While AMBIO’s efforts to increase sales of its carbon credits reflect bundling and
stacking trends, their work does not fit neatly within either category. AMBIO’s focus, instead,
was on measuring the implications of Scolel’ Te on biodiversity protection and improvement, and
the socioeconomic realities for participants. However, in order to measure such biodiversity and
social benefits AMBIO needed to determine the baseline biodiversity and socioeconomic levels
of the communities where they were working. This, however, was a problematic task given that
it would involve having to go back in time to determine baseline measurements for biodiversity
and socioeconomic scenarios in participating communities.

Ultimately, the issue was not

resolved during the time of this dissertation research, but it demonstrates many of the challenges
faced by AMBIO as it attempts to increase sales of carbon offsets in a context of ‘buyer flight’
and declining carbon credit sales.
In the end, this work, although problematic and complex, was not altogether surprising
for the AMBIO’s leadership. “This is the nature of working in the [voluntary] carbon market,”
suggested one AMBIO employee. “Our work is a constant balancing act between on-the-ground
realities and the work of responding to market demand.” While AMBIO was able to easily
rationalize the labor required to overcome buyer flight and reduced sales within voluntary carbon
markets, the extent to which these market characteristics re-shaped the carbon credit commodity
chain cannot be underestimated. AMBIO was forced to respond to these dynamics by expanding
the labor process through an extension of the division of labor needed to produce carbon credits.
Its work with Conservation International amounted to the swelling of a link in the commodity
chain defined not only by the expansion of Scolel’ Te across space, but also of the production
process. The swelling of the commodity chain is not only caused, however, by the addition of
auxiliary labor to the carbon credit production process. Instead, the swelling of the commodity
chain must also be seen as an outcome of pre-production and production labor, both of which
were necessary for the expansion of Scolel’ Te into the Sierra Madre region. This work, as will
become clear, depends on the cheap labor of farmers who are forced to bear the effects of reduced

62

carbon credit sales and prohibitive production costs and transactions costs. This is the focus of
the following section.
Extended Labor Processes, Unequal Cost and Risk Distribution and the Expansion of
Scolel’ Te in the Sierra Madre
As AMBIO sought to court its fleeing clientele, it continued to implement new projects in the
Sierra Madre region, incorporating additional farmers and communities into Scolel’ Te. This
work, however, was expensive, both in terms of production costs and transactions costs. In this
section I analyze the transactions and production costs confronted by AMBIO in the face of
project expansion, but argue that AMBIO was able to draw on a division of labor involving
NGOs, farming communities, governmental ministries and international organizations in order to
overcome resource limitations. Drawing on Sayer and Walker (1992), I suggest that the work
carried out represents an extension of the carbon credit production process and may be
categorized as pre-production and production labor. I argue, however, that while the network of
actors drawn into Scolel’ Te through the extended production processes was extensive, it was the
farming communities who experienced the greatest degree of marginalization through labor
arrangements that disenfranchised them as minority actors within the organization. The effect of
such labor arrangements was to undermine the social relations of production between AMBIO
and farming communities. In this section, I analyze the labor process required to extend Scolel’
Te into the Sierra Madre region, and the erosive effects of such work. I do so by highlighting the
specific activities, actors and labor arrangements needed to carry out research and networking and
project implementation phases of Scolel’ Te expansion.
Preliminary Phases of Project Expansion: Research and Networking Costs
The early phases of expansion into the Sierra Madre region involved significant pre-production
work associated with research and networking. In this segment, I show how AMBIO enrolled
NGOs, international organizations and governmental ministries into pre-production labor
activities that were essential to overcoming research and networking costs. Before agroforestry
systems could be established, it was essential for AMBIO to obtain a strong understanding of the
area in which it was going to work. This involved gathering information regarding the region’s
socio-political dynamics, environmental characteristics and agricultural practices. Additionally,
AMBIO needed to identify potential communities to participate in Scolel’ Te. These tasks,
although seemingly uncomplicated for an organization that had, at the time of initial expansion,
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worked in Chiapas for 11 years (1997-2008), are made more difficult by the state’s sociopolitical, cultural and geographic heterogeneity. Given the complex nature of this work, these
tasks can be quite expensive in terms of the personnel, time and money required to collect and
analyze data on the region and to make connections with farming communities. However, the
labor arrangements designed to overcome such costs were defined as much by traditional
employee-employer relationships as by alternative cooperative relations.
One way in which AMBIO sought to reduce the research costs tied to expanding into the
Sierra Madre region was by piggybacking on its relationships to organizations with superior
knowledge of and experience working in the region.17 Since its foundation, AMBIO established
connections with many organizations – relationships that proved beneficial to project expansion.
One such organization included the Mexican National Commission for Protected Areas
(CONANP). Given the presence of three protected areas in the Sierra Madre region – the
Reserva de la Biosfera La Sepultura, the Reserva de la Biosfera el Triunfo, and the Reserva La
Frailescana – the CONANP is highly active in the region. Specifically, they have worked with
farming communities and other organizations such as Conservation International to promote
sustainable coffee production, fire management and ecotourism projects (Vargas Guillen and
Velazquez et al, 2011). Drawing on this regional experience, they assisted AMBIO in building
contacts with communities of interest, in providing buildings and other infrastructure for
meetings and workshops, and in providing information regarding key data on the region.
While CONANP proved to be an important resource, it was not the only organization on
which AMBIO relied for research and networking labor. Conservation International (CI) also
proved to be a strong ally for AMBIO, providing funding for Scolel’ Te, support for training
workshops, and important contacts with other collaborators in the region (Vargas Guillen and
Velazquez et al, 2011). In a similar fashion, the National Institute for Forestry, Agriculture and
Fishery Research (INIFAP) provided AMBIO with information about the region and contacts
with whom they had worked in the area. Finally, Vargas Guillen and Velazquez et al (2011) note
that AMBIO drew on its relationship with three organizations – Biodiversity: Conservation and
Restoration (BIOCARES), the Conservation El Triunfo Fund (FONCET) and Integrated
Consultants for Sustainable Rural Development (CONIDER) – to tie early carbon credit
production through Scolel’ Te into existing projects in communities in the Reserva de la Biosfera
La Sepultura and the Reserva de la Biosfera el Triunfo.
By piggybacking I am referring to the use of one organization’s existing projects, networks and
connections by another so as to facilitate their own activates. For information on how this is used
in transaction cost frameworks see Bosselmann and Lund (2013).
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Piggybacking on intermediary organizations greatly facilitated the work of building
contacts in the region, making connections with potential communities, and gathering and
analyzing data about the area, thereby reducing AMBIO’s research and networking costs. 18
However, the consequences of these network relations could potentially have negative
consequences as well.

For instance, the fact that AMBIO relied on organizations such as

CONANP and CI who are already working in the region in order to establish connections with
communities, meant that it would necessarily be drawn toward those communities who already
have access to projects. In the Sierra Madre region significant inter-community inequality exists
with regard to project access. By relying on outside organizations, AMBIO risked repeating
existing patterns of access and exclusion between farming communities in the region.
Additionally, given the fact that government agencies are seen with skepticism and fear by some
rural communities in Chiapas, the collaboration between AMBIO and CONANP in building
contacts in the region could potentially restrict AMBIO’s access to those communities who prefer
not to work with government agencies. In this way, piggybacking practices by AMBIO, although
beneficial, may potentially limit future expansionist efforts.
AMBIO’s work with intermediary organizations represents an important element in the
division of labor associated with pre-production work tied to the expansion of Scolel’ Te. It is a
division of labor, however, that was born as much out of cooperation as traditional employeeemployer relationships. In the context of project expansion in Scolel’ Te, piggybacking must be
seen as a type of cooperative labor tied to pre-production work. In his discussion of cooperative
relationships within capitalist production Bowles (1985) argues that such arrangements depend on
the ability of all parties in the cooperative relationship to benefit. Mutersbaugh (2002, page 758)
suggests, moreover, that cooperation must be seen as emergent within a specific social context
and from practices that are “historically and geographically-embedded.” In the case of Scolel’
Te, cooperation occurs within the specific context of project expansion and presents a scenario
wherein all parties stand to benefit. AMBIO benefits from cooperative arrangements in the sense
that it is able to carry out important research and networking tasks needed to expand Scolel’ Te
while reducing production costs. Intermediary organizations, in turn, benefit from their work
with AMBIO by connecting with a project and an organization that have received positive
national and international recognition.

Moreover, AMBIO assists organizations such as

CONANP in stakeholder engagement work, using its participatory mapping methodologies to
By intermediary organizations I am referring to those organizations that serve as important
facilitators in new project development. I borrow the term from Bosselmann and Lund (2013)
who use it in the context of transaction cost analyses.
18
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supplement CONANP activities. In this manner, both AMBIO and cooperating organizations
benefit from one another’s strengths, thereby responding to the challenges presented by the
specific socio-political context of their projects. Thus, AMBIO was able to overcome research
and networking costs associated by establishing an extended division of labor involving
governmental ministries, NGOs, and international organizations.
Project Implementation/Project Permanence: Cheap Técnico Labor and the Management of
Market Risk and Project Costs
The extended division of labor needed for Scolel’ Te’s expansion into the Sierra Madre region
required more than its work with the organizations mentioned above. In order to overcome
project costs, AMBIO also depended on the cheap labor of trained farmers – técnicos
comunitarios and técnicos regionales. I show however, that while such labor arrangement may
have been attractive from a price perspective, they ultimately undermined social relations of
production between AMBIO and técnicos, thereby destabilizing future expansion.

Once all

necessary information had been gathered regarding a region and potential communities had been
identified, AMBIO could begin with project implementation. Unlike pre-production work, this
involved a predictable sequence of activities that has been replicated throughout Scolel’ Te
projects across the state and into Oaxaca. The costs associated with this work were significant,
and could be classified as production costs and transactions costs. In this segment, I analyze the
activities through which these costs emerged, and highlight AMBIO’s reliance on the cheap labor
of técnicos regionales and técnicos comunitarios to overcome these costs. It is here that the
inequalities in the carbon credit commodity chain become visible, especially in AMBIO’s attempt
to establish disenfranchising labor arrangements with técnicos - arrangements designed to
overcome prohibitive costs and the ‘buyer flight’ discussed above. Such labor arrangements, I
argue, are rent-seeking behaviors that undermine the social relations of production between
técnicos and AMBIO, and threaten the very social relations upon which the success of Scolel’ Te
depends.
From 2008-2012, AMBIO carried out a variety of activities tied to project expansion into
the Sierra Madre region and to managing existing agroforestry systems across the state. These
activities included project promotion and early project development activities such as the
completion of community-level training programs with participants and the elaboration of
participatory maps of farmer land parcels known as Plan Vivo maps. Moreover, they included
project management activities such as the monitoring of land parcels enrolled in Scolel’ Te,
providing payments to farmers participating in the program, the dissemination of information to
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farmers about the project and climate change more generally, and the sale of carbon credits.
However, with over 1,100 farmers registered across Chiapas and Oaxaca and less than 30
employees in AMBIO, project promotion and project management activities were difficult to
complete. Thus, AMBIO relied on the cheap labor of trained técnicos regionales and técnicos
comunitarios to whom certain activities could be delegated – particularly those which required
significant time in the field. Técnicos comunitarios and regionales were elected from within
participating communities, although the labor requirements of each were distinct. Moreover, both
spent significant time living and working in their communities.

Thus, they provided an

opportunity for AMBIO to reduce the time, personnel and other resources needed to carry out
essential field activities. Here, I focus on técnicos comunitarios for whom the work with AMBIO
is particularly disenfranchising.
Técnico comunitario labor is central to overcoming the production costs and transactions
costs associated with Scolel’ Te, and consists of several activities. Técnicos comunitarios act in
two key capacities: 1) by carrying out land parcel monitoring within their communities, and 2) by
serving as liaisons between AMBIO and their communities. Each type of work is challenging in
its own regard, and consists of various physical and emotional dimensions that are not
compensated monetarily nor are they recognized by AMBIO. Thus, as will become clear in
Chapter 4, and to a lesser extent in this chapter, such work proves challenging for técnicos
comunitarios as they are forced to reconcile their goals for participating in Scolel’ Te with the
challenges posed by the reality of such work. However, while the reality of their participation
may be difficult for técnicos comunitarios, it represents, for AMBIO, a key opportunity to
achieve multiple goals at a minimal cost.
Monitoring activities are a key component of carbon forestry, and incur transactions costs
associated with the need to insert transparency into the production and sale of carbon credits (i.e.
to overcome information asymmetries in market exchanges). In other words, monitoring ensures
that CO2 has actually been captured in the agroforestry systems. Monitoring is completed in
every land parcel registered in Scolel’ Te during years 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the project, and
provides the foundation upon which farmer payments are justified (also occurring in the same
years). According to AMBIO, the realization of monitoring activities over an 8-year period
allows for long-term follow-up on agroforestry systems, thereby ensuring project permanence
(Vargas Guillen and Velazquez et al 2011). Once monitoring activities have been completed, a
separate verification process is realized by técnicos regionales or by AMBIO. During project
verification, 10% of the monitored land parcels must be assessed, and when necessary, all 100%
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of monitored land parcels are reviewed. This work is essential to allowing for the sale of Plan
Vivo Certificates, an activity that persists throughout the year.
Land parcel monitoring is a labor-intensive process for the técnico comunitario, and is the
only activity for which the técnico comunitario is paid. The time required to monitor a given plot
of land varies, depending on its distance from the técnico’s home, the nature of the terrain, and
the size of the parcel. However, the average labor time required of a técnico comunitario in the
Sierra Madre region to monitor every plot within their community is 13 days per year.
Monitoring activities involve hiking through mountainous land to locate each tree planted in
established agroforestry systems. Thus, this work implies significant physical labor on the part of
técnicos comunitarios, who must divert time from work in their own fields to monitor land
parcels.

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, this work is often emotionally difficult for

técnicos who must negotiate AMBIO’s expectations with regard to the monitoring of land parcels
with those of their fellow community members. Thus, some técnicos report monitoring work to
be relatively undesirable from an emotional standpoint – an effect that is partially mitigated by
payments for such labor.
While monitoring activities have a more or less predictable schedule, técnico comunitario
work as liaisons between their communities is ongoing, and is, moreover, unpaid – a key
indicator of the inequalities present in the carbon credit commodity chain.

This work is

recognized only nominally by AMBIO at training meetings where farmers are reminded that they
are the ‘eyes and ears’ of the organization, but involves several physical and emotional
dimensions that are not insignificant for técnicos. Técnico comunitario liaison labor involves
several components: attending two meetings annually – reuniones semestrales – in San Cristobal
de las Casas, disseminating project information to fellow participants, and receiving the
complaints of fellow participants to share with AMBIO. The first involves a significant time
commitment on the part of técnicos comunitarios – a commitment that is largely recognized by
AMBIO. However, técnico work as the ‘eyes and ears’ of AMBIO is often unseen by the
organization, or is only partially visible. Thus, it is assumed to consist of only simple or passive
activities. The effects of this work are described in detail in Chapter 4, although I briefly outline
the contours of the labor here.
Técnicos are trained every six months in an on-going training process. AMBIO holds a
two-day meeting biannually with the técnicos comunitarios and técnicos regionales in order to
discuss project progress and to address issues that may have arisen in participating communities.
The meetings are long and require the participation of the técnicos and many members of
AMBIO (see Appendix A). While AMBIO is able to provide food and shelter for the visiting

68

técnicos, and is able to offset some of their transportation costs, much of the burden of time
associated with travel is shifted by AMBIO onto the shoulders of the técnicos comunitarios and
regionales who must travel from their respective communities to AMBIO’s offices (see Appendix
A for a description). Some técnicos comunitarios, for whom access to public transportation is
sparse, must walk several hours in the early morning prior to meetings, and then hitchhike to the
nearest town where they can catch a bus to San Cristóbal de las Casas. This can be frustrating for
técnicos comunitarios who have expressed a disliking for having to make such a sacrifice.
In addition to the reuniones semestrales, técnicos fulfill several functions as liaisons; 1)
técnicos are asked to receive the complaints and questions of project participants in their
communities, which are then relayed to AMBIO at the reuniones semestrales; 2) técnicos are also
asked to share information and resources provided by AMBIO (see the discussion about
pamphlets and DVDs in Chapter 5) with fellow participants in their respective communities. Of
these functions, the first proves to be especially taxing for técnicos, a point that is made especially
clear in Chapter 4 (see also Appendix A, Table 10A). It is especially taxing because such
complaints and questions are often accompanied by the técnico’s deteriorating standing within
their community, but also extends into several components of a técnico’s life, including social
functions and leisure time when family and neighbors will ask questions about payment statuses,
monitoring outcomes and other aspects associated with project participation.

For many

participants in Scolel’ Te, técnicos are their only source of information, and thus, turn to the
técnico when questions or issues arise.
Inequalities in the carbon credit commodity chain emerge in both the liaison and
monitoring capacities of the técnico comunitario. As liaisons, técnicos comunitarios experience
several emotional effects that extend into various facets of the técnico’s life – effects that are
assessed in detail in Chapter 4. In the latter instance, inequalities emerge in the pay structures
tied to técnico monitoring labor. Técnicos comunitarios are paid around Ps $90 (US $7) per day
to fulfill monitoring activities. However, as became clear in interviews, this pay was reduced
from original payments of Ps $100 (US $8) per day beginning in 2011. This was verified by
AMBIO who, when questioned, admitted that while the entire Scolel’ Te project had felt the
impact of reduced carbon credit sales, those who experienced the impact to the greatest extent
were the técnicos comunitarios whose pay had been reduced. Thus, while costs had been cut
across the board, it was the most disadvantaged participants – those farmers with no opportunity
to influence budgeting decisions – who felt the greatest impact. However, both the payment
reductions and the extent to which técnicos are asked to work without compensation illustrate
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how inequalities in the carbon credit commodity chain become manifest in labor arrangements
and compensation procedures.
Some técnicos comunitarios admitted that in the face of no other employment
opportunities they would have to continue to work with AMBIO despite reduced payments. As
one técnico comunitario from the Sierra Madre region, Sergio, put it: “I work with AMBIO, and
it does not make sense why they lowered the payments. Maybe they pay us less than other
people. Who knows?” He went on to suggest, however, that given limited opportunities he
would continue to work with AMBIO. However, he noted that other técnicos had threatened to
leave, arguing that a pay rate of Ps $90 per day was cheap labor. As one técnico explained, “We
are cheap labor. Next year, if AMBIO pays the same, we will leave the project.” While a
reduction in payment of Ps $10 may appear inconsequential, for farmers who have limited access
to income earning opportunities, and for whom Ps $100 could buy food or clothing for a family,
or fund a trip to the nearby city, any reduction in payments would be felt economically.
Moreover, the reduction in payments was often combined with the additional emotional aspects
of their work as liaisons described in Chapter 4, further exacerbating técnico dissatisfaction, and
further stoking resentment among técnicos comunitarios in the Sierra Madre region.
Non-Técnico Work and the Implementation of Scolel’ Te
The work of project implementation involves labor inputs that extend beyond técnicos
comunitarios, however, and involves the hands-on work of AMBIO. While técnico labor is
central to the implementation and management of Scolel’ Te, AMBIO also carries out work in
participating communities, although this work is often limited to the initial stages of project
development. Each year Scolel’ Te activities begin with project promotion within new and
participating communities, the completion of training programs with participants, and the
elaboration of participatory maps of farmer land parcels known as Plan Vivo maps. Initial project
promotion is carried out by AMBIO, and is central to generating interest among uninvolved
farmers and communities and to maintaining the interest of already participating producers. Once
farmers have been recruited to join Scolel’ Te, they receive in-community training regarding
issues of climate change and carbon forestry, and work with AMBIO to establish a participatory
map of their land parcel.

In each case, AMBIO employees must travel to participating

communities to carryout project promotion, farmer training, and the elaboration of maps, thus
generating production costs. Each activity requires several meetings with community leadership
and newly enrolled participants, and is seen as central to the long-term success of Scolel’ Te.
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Once Plan Vivo maps have been created by participating farmers, AMBIO reviews them,
ensuring the viability of each farmer’s plan to participate in Scolel’ Te.
Once farmers have been enrolled in Scolel’ Te AMBIO provides a training session for
participants during which Plan Vivo maps are produced and farmers elect which agroforestry
systems they will utilize Farmers who have been incorporated into Scolel’ Te in the Sierra Madre
region tend to utilize one or more of four agroforestry systems: Cerco Vivo (Living Fence),
Cafetal Mejorado (Improved Coffee Plot), Acahual Mejorado (Improved Fallow Plot), and
Taungya. Cerco Vivo refers to the planting of trees along pastures or corn and bean crops. Cerco
Vivo agroforestry systems (which represent 92% of all planted agroforestry systems planted in
the region) are popular among farmers in this region because they require less work than other
plantations with greater tree densities, because they control erosion, and because they allow
farmers to continue productive activities without competition from agroforestry plantings.
Acahual Mejorado (which represents 6% of all agroforestry systems planted in the region)
involves the management of fallow plots of land for the production of lumber, firewood and other
products (Vargas Guillen and Velazquez et al, 2011). This is done through the planting of trees
in fallow areas, and is especially recommended to those farmers who have sufficient additional
land to produce basic crops such as beans and corn. The Cafetal Mejorado (which represents 2%
of all agroforestry systems planted in the region) involves planting trees among coffee plantations
with the goal of converting existing coffee production into shade coffee. The goal behind Cafetal
Mejorado systems is to allow farmers to benefit from tree species with commercial value while
taking advantage of the price premium associated with shade coffee. Finally, Taungya (which
represents .30% of all agroforestry systems established in the region) refers to those agroforestry
systems wherein farmers are able to plant basic crops among planted tree species during the early
years of the plantation as a means to continue existing productive activities while controlling
weeds and other plants that compete for necessary nutrients.
Each of the agroforestry systems involves planting a variety of tree species that are native
to the region. However, it became clear in meetings with AMBIO that one of the key challenges
to expanding to a new region involved gaining access to the trees needed for establishing
agroforestry systems. AMBIO noted that doing so in a way that would be both cost effective and
logistically viable was necessary to the long-term success of Scolel’ Te in the Sierra Madre
region. In response to this challenge, AMBIO was able to piggyback on the existing work of
organizations and ejidos in the region, benefiting in particular from the nursery established and
managed by one ejido, Ricardo Flores Magón (Vargas Guillen and Velázquez et al, 2011). As of
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2011 the nursery had a capacity of producing up to 100,000 plants, consisting of twelve species. 19
In addition to its work with Ricardo Flores Magón, AMBIO has historically collaborated with
CONANP to co-finance the building of nurseries in the central highlands region (see Brown and
Corbera, 2003), and has continued to do so in the Sierra Madre, particularly in the municipality of
Villaflores.
For AMBIO, the cost of expanding into the Sierra Madre region and the costs associated
with establishing and maintaining agroforestry projects are high. They may be classified as
transactions costs and production costs, the former including those costs tied to project
verification, monitoring and carbon credit sales, and the latter involving costs associated with
farmer training, tree planting and plot maintenance. These costs, although prohibitive to AMBIO,
are reduced through the division of labor with participating communities, international
organizations, governmental ministries and NGOs, each of which facilitate the expansion and
establishment of the Scolel’ Te program. In each instance, AMBIO acts as the lead organization,
shaping the nature of the relationships within this division of labor. This is particularly important
in the context of AMBIO’s relationship with participating communities where it is able use the
cheap labor of técnicos comunitarios.
Conclusion
Scolel’ Te is a market-based development project that forms part of a broader development
landscape in southern Mexico. Since its formation in 1997 AMBIO has consistently and
effectively sought to expand Scolel’ Te across Chiapas and into Oaxaca, thereby further
entrenching the program within this landscape. AMBIO’s efforts to extend Scolel’ Te throughout
southern Mexico were most recently visible in Chiapas’ western Sierra Madre region as they
sought to recruit the participation of new farming communities – an undertaking that began in
2008 and stretched into 2012.

While expansionist practices are normal in the context of

AMBIO’s management of Scolel’ Te, and efforts to push into the Sierra Madre followed a
positive trial period in the region, efforts to do so were met by a series of challenges. First,
beginning in 2008, revenue generated from the sale of carbon credits produced under Scolel’ Te
began to dwindle – a reflection of shifting supply and demand dynamics in global voluntary
markets and overall lower sales. Additionally, as a small NGO AMBIO faced shortages in
The trees planted through Scolel’ Te in the Sierra Madre region include: Tabebuia rosea,
Cedrela odorata, Brosimum alicastrum, Ceiba pentandra, Cordia alliodora, Swietenia humilis,
Tabebuia donnell-smithii, Hymenaea courbaril, Diphysa robinioides, Lysiloma sp., Tapirira
Mexicana, Enterolobium cyclocarpum.
19
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personnel, capital and other resources such as trucks needed to manage existing Scolel’ Te
projects while simultaneously facilitating expansion.
In this chapter I draw on transactions cost, global commodity chains, and political
ecology perspectives, along with critical labor studies to examine AMBIO’s efforts to overcome
these challenges and to continue with expansion into the Sierra Madre region. I argue that
AMBIO’s efforts to do so resulted in a horizontal swelling of the carbon credit commodity chain
that included the incorporation of pre-production and auxiliary labor into existing practices –
work that was carried out by actors who were deeply implicated in Chiapas’ broader development
landscape and its social history of development (see Chapter 2). These labor arrangements,
however, were disenfranchising for farmers who felt exploited by the extent to which they are
asked to complete significant work in Scolel’ Te, some of which went unnoticed by AMBIO.
While the undermining of social relations in the context of carbon credit production threaten the
success of the project, the market challenges ultimately proved too difficult for AMBIO. In 2012
AMBIO was forced to discontinue expansion of Scolel’ Te in the Sierra Madre region, both
within participating communities and to new communities, until all held offsets had been sold and
new sale orders had ben received (Cooperativa AMBIO, 2012). This outcome demonstrates the
extent to which the carbon credit commodity chain may extend horizontally within a given link,
but that such growth is influenced by market dynamics that force project managers to shift
production strategies and processes unexpectedly.
Despite limitations to growth, by 2012 several farming communities had been enrolled in
Scolel’ Te, with many farmers having committed up to four years to the project. For these
farmers, project costs in Scolel’ Te were analyzed in dramatically alternative terms than those
used by AMBIO. For many participating farmers the costs were assessed in terms of labor time
requirements (Osborne, 2011), while others measured costs in terms of the implications of
participation for their relationships to their communities more broadly. In the following chapter I
will address the latter issue, focusing on the implications of participation for farmer standing
within their communities. In doing so, the various dimensions of técnico comunitario work that
are unseen by AMBIO will become clear, particularly as they relate to the broader intracommunity relations in which técnicos comunitarios are enmeshed. s
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CHAPTER 4: CARBON FORESTRY AND THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION
Community Experiences of Carbon Forestry in Chiapas, Mexico

Introduction
The full spectrum of técnico comunitario labor in Scolel’ Te, including its emotional and physical
dimensions, is only partially visible to AMBIO, a fact that is made clear in the preceding chapter.
In order to fully grasp the implications of working in Scolel’ Te for técnicos comunitarios, it is
necessary to contextualize both técnicos and their carbon forestry labor within broader intracommunity social relations. I do so by first turning to two cases that are illustrative of how
people relate to development projects within rural farming communities in the Sierra Madre
region. Together, they set the scene for examining why people choose to participate in Scolel’ Te
and the implications of such work for their standing within their communities.
Case #1
It was early evening and Roberto, Rosalba and their 3 children were teaching me the art of eating
mango agrio con sal (sour mango with salt), a local snack favorite. As we sat biting into green
mangos my hosts began to answer my question regarding the large quantity of development
projects within the community. In a hushed voice Roberto said:
“Look, there are several projects, but we do not have access to them. Really only
ejidatarios are considered in those projects. But according to me, I see it as
discrimination against us pobladores. They [ejidatarios] have access to
everything and get all the projects, while we [pobladores] are denied the rest and
are only offered the opportunity to work with AMBIO.”
We continued through the evening sitting under the mango tree talking about the nature of
inequality with regard to access to participation in development projects. I learned that this was a
common practice in communities in the Sierra Madre region, although not necessarily always the
case in every community. Roberto admitted that as a poblador he had limited rights within the
ejido, and that although his wife was an avecindado (term to be explained below), she did not
receive much assistance from her father who was an ejidatario. It was a situation that made a
resource-scarce existence even more difficult, and one in which Scolel’ Te proved to be a rare
income-earning opportunity within the community.
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Case #2
We sat in Ismael’s house listening to the music emanating from the community-wide dance just
down the road. It was 7:00pm and we were relaxing after a long day of harvesting, depulping,
cleaning, and drying coffee. “Let’s go,” I suggested to Ismael, “even for just a few minutes.” He
simply shook his head, silently signaling his disinterest. “Why not?” I questioned. No answer. I
continued encouraging Ismael to join me, and eventually left with his mother and brother,
determined to join the celebration and learn something new about the community.
The music and dancing had started around two hours earlier as part of the community
celebration, an annual event during which the entire community gathered to honor its past and to
reaffirm its shared identity through the consumption of traditional foods, music and dance. In
line with traditional norms, men gathered throughout the day of the party to attend cockfights
while children played and women prepared tamales and tacos to share with their families and to
sell in the evening. In the afternoon, after the cockfights had ended, a visiting band, contracted
from the nearest city began to play, thereby signaling the beginning of the community dance on
the nearby basketball court. Children and adults alike participated in the dance, while some chose
to sit around the perimeter of the basketball court, eating tamales and tacos, and drinking soda
and beer. People came and went throughout the dance, with some staying late into the night. It
was from the basketball court that I eventually saw Ismael standing with his uncle and watching
from a distance. They stayed for a few minutes and then Ismael left, returning to the house
without joining the party.
A few months later, in an unrelated conversation, Ismael confided in me:

“The

[development] project has not gone well. We have not received the money we are owed. When I
leave the house, people ask me ‘where is our money?’ and ‘what have you done with our
money?’ Some accuse me of having stolen it, and they won’t stop asking about it. I prefer not to
leave my house because I do not want to answer their questions anymore. It is easier to stay
home.”
---------These scenarios present two family’s distinct experiences of development within their
communities – experiences that were shaped both by their social position relative to other
community members and by their relationship to development more broadly. The first case
illustrates the frustrations held by one family with regard to their social position within the
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community, and its limiting effects on their ability to participate in many development programs.
For this family, the frustration was tied to the manner in which their status as pobladores and
avecindados justified their exclusion by ejidatarios from participation in many development
programs that they deemed central to improving their livelihoods and their standing within the
community. The second scenario represents the social outcomes faced by one participant in a
development project within his community. In particular, it demonstrates the isolation resulting
from his leadership position within a project that, in the eyes of his community, had not complied
with their expectations.
In this chapter I draw on the above cases to argue that in the absence of access to formal
ejidal authority, some farmers in the Sierra Madre region of Chiapas enter into Scolel’ Te in order
to build upon their standing within their community, but that their participation is ultimately
destructive to such standing as trust and reputation among other community members are
undermined.

These effects of carbon forestry are often invisible to managing NGOs and

development practitioners, and are only observable when viewing carbon forestry in light of
broader social relations within a given community. They are, however, nonetheless dramatic for
carbon foresters who become the subject of damaging rumors within the community, and whose
broader social life is damaged.
I begin this chapter by contrasting NGO perspectives regarding the social implications of
carbon forestry with an alternative relational approach necessary for highlighting the obstacles
faced by some farmers to participate in development projects and to build on one’s standing
within her community.

In doing so, I show that the effects of carbon forestry for local

participants must be assessed within the context of intra-community social relations in order to
uncover the sometimes less visible effects of carbon forestry projects. Doing so is necessary for
two reasons. First, within carbon forestry and development more generally, NGO discussions
about the impacts of participation for local people are often limited to considerations of social
capital wherein the social implications of a project are assessed only in relation to the potential of
certain actors to contribute to a given project. Second, in the case of Scolel’ Te, these narrow
perspectives are exacerbated by the limited awareness of AMBIO with regard to the social
impacts of the program. “We do not know the impacts of our project for the [participating]
communities” noted one senior member of AMBIO who ascribed the analytical blind spot to the
NGO’s limited resources and personnel.

In light of these perspectives, viewing farmer

participation in Scolel’ Te in the context of broader intra-community social relations is essential
for providing a more nuanced analysis of the social effects of carbon forestry by demonstrating
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why farmers choose to participate in the first place, and how such participation undermines their
standing within their communities.
After contrasting these dual perspectives, I outline one aspect of the relational nature of
community life in rural Mexico, showing how authority is distributed within formal ejidal
governance structures. I show that ejidal authority figures both determine which development
projects may operate within a community, and in some cases, who may or may not participate in
a given program. In this analysis it becomes clear how access to formal authority – either direct
or indirect – or a lack thereof may facilitate or restrict one’s access to resources, including the
opportunity to participate in development projects. In such a context where those with formal
ejidal authority govern access to resources, opportunities to participate in development projects
and to improve upon one’s standing within the community are limited. In the case of Scolel’ Te,
however, AMBIO has strongly and successfully petitioned ejidal authority figures in the Sierra
Madre region to allow broad community participation, thereby permitting participation among
some who would otherwise be denied access. 20 With this in mind, I demonstrate: 1) why some
people such as Roberto and Rosalba may be denied access to participation in development
projects more generally; 2) how they and others without formal ejidal authority may gain access
to participation in carbon forestry through their connections to authority figures; and 3) why those
with little-to-no formal authority such as Ismael may choose to participate in carbon forestry as a
means to enhancing their status within their community - a social status that is based in enhanced
access to income and employment opportunities and from proximity to outside organizations.
Finally, looking at the case of one group of workers in Scolel’ Te, técnicos comunitarios,
I examine how, despite the hope of people like Ismael that participating in carbon forestry will
enhance their standing within their community in the absence of access to formal ejidal authority,
such participation ultimately undermines the relationships upon which such standing rests. As
liaisons between AMBIO and their communities, técnicos comunitarios are uniquely exposed to
praise when projects go well and to criticism when projects do not go as planned. Técnicos
comunitarios are provided with unique opportunities to travel and attend classes, and are elevated
as relative authorities within the context of Scolel’ Te. However, as monitors of farmer work
within their communities, they are forced to navigate the contradictory expectations of friends
and family who anticipate privileged treatment within the program and those of AMBIO who
AMBIO emphasizes that all farmers with land and titles to that land (i.e. land registered
through PROCEDE) may participate in Scolel’ Te regardless of their status within the
community. According to project participants, this approach differs from other projects,
particularly those presented by government organizations, which they suggest do not give such
emphasis to broad ranging project participation.
20
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holds técnicos accountable to carryout monitoring activities. Moreover, when projects do not
meet community expectations técnicos become the subject of negative rumors by those who
perceive the project to be functioning poorly or to be corrupt – perceptions that are shaped, in
part, by farmers’ past experiences with development programs more generally.

In such

circumstances, participation in carbon forestry becomes a social liability rather than an asset as
técnico relationships within their community are weakened and undermined.
This analysis builds on existing research of the social impact of carbon forestry – and
other development projects – both regionally and theoretically. From a regional perspective, this
analysis shifts the analytical focus from the heavily researched central highlands and Lacandón
regions of the state to the Sierra Madre (see Hernandez Castillo, 2003). As noted in Chapter 2,
the Sierra Madre region, although sharing many similarities with other regions of the state, is
distinct in important ways. First, despite the state’s significant indigenous population, rural
communities in the Sierra Madre tend to be largely mestizo. Moreover, while the Zapatista
uprising and subsequent state efforts to pursue development-based counterinsurgency projects
directly or indirectly affected many communities across Chiapas, this has not been the case in the
north-central portion of the Sierra Madre region. Thus, since 1994, the nature of rural life in the
Sierra Madre region, particularly as it relates to development projects, has tended to be less
conflictive, and the social effects of projects tend to be less visible. Thus, given the relative lack
of existing research on development in the Sierra Madre region and the socio-economic, ethnic
and political differences with other regions of the state, it is necessary to assess the less visible
social effects of carbon forestry in this state and development more generally.
This chapter draws on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in two communities in the Sierra
Madre region and with workers in Scolel’ Te across Chiapas to assess the nature of social
relations in rural farming communities and the impacts of participation in carbon forestry on
those relationships.

By assessing the on-the-ground effects of the labor process in carbon

forestry, I provide additional insights into the social nature of such work by moving beyond the
narrow social capital perspectives of many NGOs and development practitioners and the
undersocialized nature of transactions costs approaches discussed in Chapter 3. In doing so, I
also complicate the notion of local participation as a means to empowerment, suggesting that
empowerment does not originate only via participation in a project, but is also diversely
influenced by a variety of other historical and economic factors, and is shaped, moreover, by local
power relations within participating communities. In what follows, I assess common NGO
perspectives, particularly as they relate to the concept of social capital, and then outline the
relational approach to assessing carbon forestry in the Sierra Madre region.
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NGO Approaches to Mobilizing Project Labor
Studies of the social effects of carbon forestry and development more generally among
mainstream practitioners are limited in scope. This is especially visible in perspectives of social
capital, but also holds true for a variety of other optics used to assess Scolel’ Te. Studies
conducted by advisors to and early researchers of Scolel’ Te commonly assess the implications of
participation for local farmers, focusing in particular on questions of project viability, equity in
access to participation (as determined by AMBIO) and institution-building. De Jong and Gaona
et al (2004), for example, examine the transactions costs related to Scolel’ Te’s implementation
and management in an effort to determine its economic viability as a means to achieving rural
development and mitigating global climate change. Additionally, Scolel’ Te has been analyzed in
terms of its recruitment of and engagement with community labor, and the capacity for local
participation to contribute to the strengthening of carbon markets (Tipper, 2002). In a related
manner, Scolel’ Te, and carbon forestry more generally, have been analyzed in terms of equity to
participation among ‘stakeholders’ within member communities (Brown and Corbera, 2003;
Corbera, 2005; Corbera and Brown et al, 2007; Corbera and Kosoy et al, 2007), and in terms of
their viability as mechanisms for sustainable development (Brown and Adger et al, 2004;
Montoya and Tipper, 1995). This work, although useful, often relies on limited frames of
reference for assessing the social implications of Scolel’ Te.

As discussed in Chapter 3,

transactions cost perspectives may provide insights into the financial components of project
viability, but ultimately allow for a narrow and undersocialized awareness of how actors operate
in the production and sale of carbon credits. Moreover, ‘stakeholder’ analyses often only assess
the implications of farmer participation within the space of the project in question, neglecting to
examine how such work shapes broader community life. ‘Stakeholder’ analyses form part of
broader theories of social capital common within carbon forestry and among development
practitioners more generally.

However, as will become clear, social capital is similarly

constrained in its ability to conceptualize the social effects of carbon forestry.
The relationship of social capital to climate change has been discussed with regard to
climate change mitigation as well as to adaptation to climate change and its effects (see
especially, Adger, 2001; Pelling and High, 2005; Wolf and Adger et al, 2010). However, in order
to assess the shortcomings of social capital optics, it is necessary to first briefly outline the
intellectual history of the term. Social capital is a term brought into public view by Bourdieu
(1985), followed by Coleman (1988) and Loury (1987), and which became in the 1990s a means
for indicating the value of social networks to network members such as development agencies,
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governments and local communities. The World Bank mobilized the term, arguing that social
capital is valuable because it could be created through strategic investments “in the organizational
capacity of the poor” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 242). Thus, social capital was seen as a
form of value tied to social networks – a value that could be intentionally produced by engaging
stakeholders so as to rearrange social relations in a manner beneficial to a given development
program. According to Coleman (1988), social capital is formed when social relations are altered
in such a way that action may be pursued. Thus social capital became a means for reorganizing
social relations in ways that benefit both development and its supposed beneficiaries by changing
how people relate to one another in the context of a given project.
Following Bourdieu (1985), social capital was taken-up by a series of social scientists
who have sought to better define it, and to mobilize it as a theoretical tool and metric for
understanding and analyzing development practice. Social capital found its place in development
through attempts to emphasize the connected nature of physical capital – roads, irrigation
systems, wells, etc. – and social organizations – farming cooperatives, water quality associations,
etc. The term was mobilized in large part by the World Bank (Fine, 2007), which sought not only
to define the term, but also to insert it into development practice. Woolcock and Narayan (2000),
for example, made the case for the intentional investment in producing social capital – an asset
with the potential to facilitate action. In sum, social capital came to be seen as an asset that is of
value to both individuals and organizations, which may be produced through the intentional
engagement of stakeholders in development projects, and which may be drawn upon as a means
to ensuring the success of development initiatives.
Within carbon forestry, discussions of social capital are tied to questions about the ability
of protected and generated forests to serve as long-term carbon sinks. It is noted within this
literature that community participation and empowerment within processes of project
implementation and management must be achieved in order for projects to succeed in the longterm (Gong and Bull et al, 2010; Olhoff, 2002; Saunders and Hanbury-Tenison et al, 2002).
AMBIO has sought to activate social capital through the formation of a corps of workers
discussed in Chapter 3, técnicos comunitarios. As was shown in Chapter 3, these workers are
central to AMBIO’s ability to manage Scolel’ Te and to expand the program across Chiapas
despite restrictions faced by shifting carbon market dynamics and prohibitive production and
transactions costs. Their work, however, is not discussed by AMBIO in these terms, but is rather
justified in terms of fomenting local participation and empowering community actors – in short,
in terms of activating social capital. This reflects, in part, the concerns of some individuals
within the organization to make climate change mitigation a democratic and all-inclusive
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endeavor. “What we want to know,” suggested on senior member in AMBIO “is how to increase
spaces of participation among the producers [farmers].” “We are different than the [Mexican]
government and we want people to participate and to be involved,” he continued. This question
of how to create ‘spaces of participation’ in which farming communities could learn about
climate change and develop ideas in addition to Scolel’ Te for mitigating its effects emerged in
interviews as a key organizational concern. Moreover, senior leaders within the organization,
often sought advice from me, asking for input on how to enhance community participation in the
project.
Efforts to facilitate action against climate change by altering the social relations among
people through local empowerment and inclusivity have become popular among organizations
such as AMBIO. However, the outcomes of activating social capital are not always as positive or
as visible as one might expect. In this chapter I suggest that the empowerment of farmers to act
as técnicos comunitarios in Scolel’ Te, although stemming from a progressive and wellintentioned effort to mitigate climate change and to enhance the well-being of farmers who have
been politically and economically marginalized across the state, affects técnicos comunitarios in
ways that are less than positive. These effects stem, in part, from the inequalities in the carbon
credit commodity chain analyzed in Chapter 3, but are also an outcome of broader intracommunity relations. More specifically, I argue that técnicos comunitarios, through their work,
become unevenly exposed to the negative effects of project failure, particularly in instances
where management practices and external carbon market influences limit AMBIO’s ability to
deliver on promised goals, thereby undermining their social standing within their communities.
In the following segment I outline the issue of social relations within rural Mexican communities
and make special reference to the concept of prestige – an important component of intracommunity social relations – as it is discussed within literature on rural Mexico and in political
ecology.
Interdependence and the Relational Nature of Social Life in Mexico
Social capital approaches to assessing the social impacts of development focus narrowly on the
ability of participants to contribute to the success of a project. However, the social implications
of carbon forestry, like other development projects, extend beyond those considered within such
limited perspectives. In order to assess the broad social implications of carbon forestry it is
necessary to enlarge the sphere of analysis by taking into consideration the relational nature of
life in rural Mexico and the role of social interdependence as a key component of farmer
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livelihood strategies. In this segment I draw on literature on rural Mexico, critical development
studies and political ecology to amplify the realm of social analysis by highlighting several
approaches to understanding the relational nature of social life in Mexico. First, looking to
studies of community life in rural Mexico, I examine social standing as it relates to the concept of
prestige – a relational notion connoting deference and respect relative to others. Then, drawing
on this work I assess the multiple means through which prestige may be attained in rural Mexico
thereby enhancing one’s standing in her community. Here, I highlight the gendered nature of
social relations in Mexico, showing that one’s opportunity to enhance her social standing within
her community and how she does so is often shaped by gender inequalities as well as genderdefined roles within a community. Finally, I conclude this segment by briefly outlining the role
of social relations as a key component of rural livelihood strategies, highlighting why it matters
that someone may or may not have a positive social standing within her community.
Social standing is an important motivating factor behind why some farmers choose to
participate in carbon forestry, and may be assessed from the perspective of prestige common in
studies of community life in rural Mexico. In his book, Economics and Prestige in a Maya
Community, Cancian (1965, page 87) defines prestige as the “deference and respect” a person
receives because of something – “the variable on which” one can compare oneself to others
within a community. He demonstrates how in Zinacantán, Chiapas prestige is attached to specific
duties – service to one’s community – which are carried out by individuals. Similarly, in his
study of the community of Tepoztlán in the state of Morelos, Robert Redfield (1930; 1941)
describes a different type of commitment to community found in rural cooperative labor that has
been conceived of as a type of obligation rooted in moral duty. While Redfield does not
explicitly link such work to questions of prestige, he does note its centrality in one’s ability to
maintain a positive image in the community. This positive image, which I argue is a reflection of
one’s prestige – is maintained and influenced by a person’s adherence to social norms, including
her contribution to the well being of her community. Ultimately, the role played by cooperative
work, community tasks and festival participation is central to the building of prestige.
Cancian’s treatment of prestige as a relational concept – one that can only be understood
in terms of the interaction between people – is instructive. After all, a person or a group of
people can only be considered prestigious relative to a less prestigious person or group of people.
Additionally, as Cancian shows, it is in the context of social interaction that prestige is made
visible. In rural Mexico, community life revolves around social interaction in the form of events
such as weddings, religious celebrations (e.g. Easter and patron saint days) and annual
community celebrations (Cancian, 1965), and in terms of informal networks within and between
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households (Cohen, 1999; Nader, 1990). It is in these interactions that prestige becomes visible,
both in a non-corporeal sense (e.g. the provision of presents at a wedding, the cooking of a meal
for researchers from out of town, or the possession of goods to sell to neighbors and family
members) and in a corporeal sense (e.g. a person’s participation in social events, and the
interaction with family members and neighbors during the evening). Finally, as Mutersbaugh and
Martin (2012, page 734) note, prestige may also be seen in one’s “ability to command respect and
have one's opinion considered during community assemblies” – what is termed the mando. The
mando, they note is attained through years of leadership within the community, particularly with
regard to collective labor institutions.
This work, however instructive, is at times misleading in its conceptualization of who is
able to enhance their social status within a given community. Cancian and Redfield, for example,
tend to discuss one’s duty to their community as a largely male concern, thereby limiting the
status-enhancing potential to men. Moreover, they limit public life to male activities, while
implicitly consigning women’s roles within the community to the domestic sphere. In a critique
of this perspective, more recent literature on community life in rural Mexico argues that gender
relations must be understood outside this public/private dichotomy, such that women may be
recognized for their role in shaping public community life (Stephen, 1991). This, Hernandez
Castillo (2006) notes, allows for viewing the various roles played by women within community
life, and allows for viewing the dynamic relationship of these roles to standing within a
community (see Kovic and Eber, 2003). In this vein, Stephen (1991) argues that prestige – as a
marker of social standing – must be seen as something that may be obtained by women through a
variety of institutions within a community. The include kinship (i.e. through the sponsorship of
godchildren), ritual-based authority (i.e. through participation in and the organization of
community festivals and religious events), and the reciprocal exchange of goods for labor.
Importantly, Stephen (1991, page 233) notes that while women may receive prestige
through their participation in various institutions in public community life – what she refers to as
“prestige systems” - the effects of prestige are often stratified along gender lines. Thus, she
notes that for men, while prestige may be used to justify participation in municipal political
structures, this does not hold true for women who continue to be excluded from participation in
municipal governance. Moreover, Stephen notes that as many institutions through which women
have historically obtained prestige within communities have declined in importance, women have
been forced to make claims on prestige through alternative measures such as age. In such
scenarios, age has come to represent a means through which older women may gain respect as
elders within the community. Thus, while both men and women may access prestige through a
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variety of means, prestige remains a highly gendered concept that provides differential access to
opportunities among men and women.
Also discussing the gendered nature of social relations in Mexico is Gutmann (1996;
1997) who shows that not only are the effects of prestige stratified along gender lines, but so to is
the concept of prestige. He does so by linking prestige to the concept of machismo. Machismo, a
term referring to a stereotypical male personality type in Mexico, describes a way of being for
men – both physically and emotionally (Gutmann, 1996). Gutmann (1996) notes that machismo
is relational in the sense that it is defined by a male’s relationship to female bodies – as
dominating, controlling and conquering. In line with machista perspectives is the idea that men
are more socially valuable when they are macho – i.e. exhibiting machista traits of strength,
confidence, and control. The notion of machismo has, however, also been extended to women
through the use of parallel labels such as marimacha (or marimacho), referring to women with
machista qualities as well as to homosexual women (Gutmann, 1997).21 However, machismo is
broadly associated with patriarchal norms in Mexico (Gutmann, 1996) in which men are assumed
to be more capable leaders and decision-makers. In rural communities in Mexico, machismo is
most visible in the patriarchal and patrilineal norms that govern structures of authority and
resource access.
While social standing may be built through one’s demonstration of her commitment to
her community, through various institutions within rural Mexican communities, and through age,
it may also be enhanced through migration – particularly through the material wealth attained
through migratory work. In many cases, the respect garnered as a result of migration is tied to the
enhanced material wealth of the migrant upon returning to her community (Cohen and Rodriguez,
2004) as well as her access to ‘prestige goods’ – those goods that are considered to reflect a
certain degree of privilege (Arizpe, 1981).22 Cohen and Rodriguez (2004) note that status is tied
not to commitment to community, but rather to the enhanced material wealth of a migrant relative
to that of her neighbors and family members as a result of her migration. This enhanced social
standing, they note, is visible in the building of larger houses, the driving of cars and the
consumption of goods that come to be recognized as markers of financial success such as the
possession of cell phones. Thus, prestige as a marker of social standing cannot be considered
apart from class.

The terms machorra and machona have also been used in a largely derogatory fashion to refer
to women exhibiting stereotypical machista characteristics as well as to homosexual women.
22
During my fieldwork I learned that Coca Cola has acquired the status of being a ‘prestige good’
as consuming it tends to convey an image of relative financial success.
21
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While prestige is variously assessed in literature on rural life in Mexico, it often ignores
the question of how participation in development projects may affect one’s standing in her
community.

Here, political ecology work is instructive.

Schroeder (1999), for instance,

examines how participation in agroforestry-based development programs may alter one’s prestige
within her household and her community, at once creating the opportunity to enhance it, while
threatening to diminish it.

On the one hand, he suggests that women were able to use “the

strategic deployment of garden incomes [earned in agroforestry programs] to win for themselves
significant autonomy and new measures of power and prestige…” (Schroeder 1999, page 40).
However, while illustrating how prestige may be gained through participation in development, he
also demonstrates the effects of lost prestige through development programs: “With little yet to
show for all the effort, the women's absence was simply viewed as a loss of control, and by
extension a loss of male prestige” (Schroeder 1999, page 41). Ultimately, for Schroeder, prestige
is a fluid concept, and is something that may be gained, lost and even regained in the context of
development work. The implications of prestige, gained and lost, are thus, important to consider
in the context of carbon forestry.
In many of the aforementioned discussions social life in rural Mexico, the implications of
social standing – positive or negative – for its subject are notable. Cancian (1965) illustrates how
with prestige one is able to acquire greater access to resources, including land needed for
agricultural production. This, he notes, allows those with prestige to rent land to relatively less
influential and resource-rich community members who have not attained such status nor amassed
material wealth. In a similar vein, Schroeder (1996) highlights the manner in which social
standing defined as prestige corresponds with greater mobility for women who are able to attain
access to income and decision-making power regarding how that income is allocated within the
household. Alternatively, Stephen (1991) notes the diverse scenarios in which social standing as
measured by prestige may be attained, noting that the benefits of such social standing may range
from the opportunity to participate in community politics to the receipt of respect by younger
generations. In each instance, positive social standing allowed individuals and groups of people
to determine various facets of their life, including how they operate within their household, their
ability to influence community politics, and the opportunity to obtain the resources needed for
themselves and their families.
In rural settings poor farmers depend on a variety of factors for survival in the face of
scarce resources.

Scott (1976, page 13), for example, illustrates how the “struggle for a

subsistence minimum” in the context of shortages of land, capital and employment opportunities
force farmers to rely on a variety of factors for survival. In the Sierra Madre region of Chiapas,
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one such factor is intra-community social relations. In a context where resources are limited,
trade and borrowing practices between neighbors and within extended families are essential to
completing daily tasks. Ismael’s mother, Maria, for instance, would walk daily to her daughter’s
in-law’s house to grind corn to make tortillas. Maria would use the ground maza to make tortillas
and tamales, often returning the favor in-kind to her daughter’s family the form of warm tortillas
and tamales de elote (corn tamales). Such interdependence was also visible on a communitywide basis, as farmers with few options to transport crops to sell in nearby cities would
coordinate with neighbor’s who had acquired trucks through income earned from migration so as
to transport corn, beans and coffee harvests to market. In this context, maintaining a positive
social standing, and indeed improving upon social standing, becomes as much a survival strategy
as a point of pride. Moreover, a loss of social standing through participation in carbon forestry
may have implications that outweigh continued participation in a project that has not complied
with community expectations.
It is clear that social status may be improved in a variety of ways among individuals and
groups of people, and that it is dependent on a large set of values, norms and practices. Thus,
where and how development projects affect participant standing within their communities must
be understood to be variously dependent on the degree to which certain individuals or groups of
people possess (or do not possess) prestige, and how the prestige is (or is not) conferred. Thus,
for those who hold authority positions within a community that oblige them to contribute to their
community, for women, migrants, men, and others, the experience of Scolel’ Te as it relates to
prestige is felt differently. That said, a comprehensive analysis of each of the ways in which
Scolel’ Te undermines social relations in its manifold contexts would be impossible in the space
of this chapter. Instead, I wish to focus on how Scolel’ Te alters the social standing of one group
of community workers in Scolel’ Te: técnicos comunitarios – a group whose work is central to
the success of the forest carbon project.
By drawing on the relational approaches to assess the social effects of carbon forestry,
questions of why farmers choose to participate and the social implications of their participation
become clear. As I show in the following segments, one factor motivating participation in carbon
forestry among farmers with limited access to formal ejidal authority is the desire to improve
their social standing among fellow community members – social standing that may be augmented
through enhanced access to income and employment opportunities, and through increased
proximity to outside organizations with political and economic influence. In the following
section I analyze the nature of formal ejidal authority in rural Mexico, illustrating: a) how some
people such as Roberto and Rosalba are excluded from formal positions of authority within rural
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ejidos; b) how connections (both direct and indirect) may provide some with otherwise elusive
access to participation in development projects; and c) why some with no access to formal ejidal
authority may choose to participate in projects such as Scolel’ Te in the hopes of improving their
social standing within their communities. As mentioned above, Scolel’ Te provides a unique
opportunity for those with no formal ejidal authority to participate in a development project. This
exception stems from the fact that AMBIO has strongly and successfully petitioned ejidal
authority figures in the Sierra Madre region to allow broad community participation, thereby
permitting participation among some who would otherwise be denied access. However, in the
third section I show how despite the hopes of some técnicos such as Ismael to build on their
social standing, participation in carbon forestry ultimately undermines social relations as técnicos
comunitarios become the subject of rumors and a source of mistrust.
Ejidos, Ejidatarios and Prestige in Community Development
Social status in rural Mexican ejidos is determined by a variety of factors, including age, access to
income earned from skilled labor and migration, commitment to community in religious festivals
and other events, and from the possession of formal authority as an ejidatario. In this section I
examine the latter case, showing how formal ejido authority is distributed among various actors
within the ejido institution. Doing so is necessary for two reasons. First, as was shown in the
vignettes presented at the beginning of this chapter, those with formal authority within ejidos
have significant influence, and are able to determine which development projects may operate
within a community and whether or not people such as Roberto and Rosalba may participate.
Thus, participation in development projects by non-ejidatarios as a means to gaining material
wealth, and thus enhancing their social standing within their community, is limited. Second, even
in projects such as Scolel’ Te where broad participation is permitted by ejidal authorities, many
avecindados and pobladores still depend on their connections to ejidatarios to acquire the land
needed to participate. Thus, those with formal ejidal authority determine either formally or
informally who may have access to participation in a given project. Clarifying these points is
necessary because it highlights the challenges faced by non-ejidatarios in enhancing their social
status relative to ejidatarios, particularly through development projects. However, as becomes
clear in the next section, despite the window of opportunity provided by Scolel’ Te for many nonejidatarios such as Ismael to participate in carbon forestry, such work undermines their status
within the community rather than leading to its improvement. I begin this section by first
outlining the institutional nature of the Mexican ejido and how authority is distributed among
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various actors. I then assess the implications of these power relations for development in the
region.
The Mexican ejido is a land tenure system based in the principle of the cooperative
management of local landowning. Born out of the 1910 Mexican Revolution, it was designed to
facilitate the redistribution of land to the rural populace, which had been marginalized throughout
the 19th century.

Under the ejido system – a hybrid of Spanish and Aztec land tenure

arrangements (Wilson and Thompson, 1993) – groups of 20 or more people could petition the
Mexican government for a land grant. Assuming the availability of land and the approval of the
application, petitioners would be granted usufruct rights to small plots of land for farming
(parcelas) within the ejido as well as usufruct rights to land for housing (USAID, 2011; Wilson
and Thompson, 1993). Additionally, common areas to be shared for grazing and other activities
would be delineated. Wilson and Thompson (1993) note that the redistribution of land to farmers
as ejidos was concentrated in two general time periods: first in the 1930s during the presidency of
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), and later on during the 1960s and 1970s. In total, more than 100
million hectares of land – nearly 50% of Mexico’s arable land – were organized into ejidos from
the beginning of the land reform program in 1917 to its end in 1992 (USAID, 2011). The
significant redistribution of rural land through land reform is visible in the fact that despite its
termination in 1992 and the introduction of neoliberal reforms, ejidos continue to be the principal
land tenure arrangement in the Mexican countryside.

Importantly, the ejido provides an

important backdrop to Mexican farmer livelihoods, and has provided many with access to land
and resources that, prior to the land reform program, had been scarce.
Ejidos are predominantly rural, although some encompass urban spaces (USAID, 2011).
In rural ejidos subsistence agricultural production – beans, corn, cattle grazing, coffee and squash
– comprises the core productive activities of farmers.

While other activities such as fruit

production and greenhouse-based agriculture have been introduced to ejidos through various
government programs, projects tend to be unsustainable over time, generally falling victim to
corrupted funding channels (Fox and Haight, 2010) and frequent election cycles.
Farmers who acquire land-use rights within an ejido are known as ejidatarios. They have
voting rights in the ejido and form part of a General Assembly (Asamblea), which meets on a
monthly basis, and whose function is to determine internal rules within the ejido (Cámara de
Diputados, 2012). Participation in the monthly meetings is generally mandatory, and provides a
space for discussing and voting on issues related to the ejido. The General Assembly elects one
ejidatario to serve an unsalaried 3-year term as an Ejidal Commissariat (Comisariado Ejidal).
The Comisariado’s key function is to represent all ejidatarios within the ejido, to respond to daily
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administrative issues, and to travel into the nearest city to solicit new development projects for
the community. In addition to the Comisariado the Asamblea will elect additional ejidatarios to
serve in other positions such as a Secretary (Secretario), a Justice of the Peace (Juez Civil) and
Council Workers (Vocales) (Wilson and Thompson, 1993). Finally, the Asamblea commonly
convenes committees to administer specific projects, including development initiatives, and to
respond to specific issues within the community. Taken together, these authority figures and
committees provide an internal governance system through which many issues internal to the
ejido are addressed. Moreover, it elevates the capacity of ejidatarios to exert direct political and
social influence on their community, particularly given the fact that they are legally entitled to the
ability to choose their successor as ejidatario. 23 Importantly, the fact that ejidatarios are generally
men means that such power is often concentrated in male hands.
In addition to ejidatarios, two other groups of people are often identified within ejidos,
but do not have the same rights and privileges as ejidatarios in the Sierra Madre region of
Chiapas: avecindados and pobladores. In contrast to ejidatarios, avecindados – the root word
avecindar meaning to acquire rights and privileges – are legally defined as Mexican nationals
over 18 years of age who have been living in an ejido for one year or longer, and who have been
recognized by the Asamblea as such, regardless of whether or not they have usufruct rights to
land for housing or farming (Cámara de Diputados, 2012).

Furthermore, according to the

Mexican Agrarian Law, avecindados are capable of acquiring the status of ejidatario, depending
on the internal regulations of the ejido in question (Cámara de Diputados, 2012). While the legal
definition of an avecindado is broad, in the Sierra Madre, it is often used much more narrowly to
refer to the children of an ejidatario – who could someday acquire the status of ejidatario and/or
acquire land within the ejido.
In contrast to ejidatarios and avecindados, the Mexican Agrarian Law does not treat
pobladores as a distinct category of people within an ejido, but rather, uses the word to refer to all
the inhabitants of an ejido. That said, in the Sierra Madre region of Chiapas, the word poblador –
meaning settler in Spanish – is used to refer to any person who comes to live in an ejido from
another location, and who is neither an ejidatario nor the child of an ejidatario (avecindado). For
pobladores, the acquisition of land and other rights within an ejido is quite difficult given that
such resources and opportunities tend to be left to the privileged sons and grandsons of ejidatarios
and land is usually inherited by avecindados. Such inequalities are further exacerbated by the fact
Although the Mexican Agrarian Law currently defines ejidatarios as both men and women,
women had been historically excluded from this privilege until 1971 (Monterde and Yolanda,
2012).
23
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that while the number of avecindados and pobladores tends to grow, the number of ejidatarios
tends to stay relatively even. This is due to the fact that the pace of population growth due to
birth and migration tends to far outpace the transfer and exchange of ejidatario title rights (Artis,
2000).
Given the three groups of people in an ejido and the centrality of land to survival in rural
communities, it is important to understand how land is transferred from one person to the next. In
general, land circulation occurs via two primary mechanisms: one being non-commercial and the
other commercial.

Non-commercial means include inheritance (herencia) and donation

(donación), with the former resulting from the death of the title-holding ejidatario and the latter
being the free gift of land from a title-holding ejidatario (Monterde and Yolanda, 2012). Landtransfers by non-commercial means tend to be largely tied to patrilineal norms related to machista
cultural practices, and almost entirely exclude women (de Barbieri, 2004; Monterde and Yolanda,
2012; Plaza, 2000; Robichaux, 2005; Vazquez, 2001). Monterde and Yolanda (2012) note, for
example, that sons and grandsons are the strong preference in inheritance- and donation-based
land transfers, as farm work tends to be associated with a male division of labor.
Commercial land transfers, once constitutionally prohibited within ejidos, have only
recently begun to figure into the circulation of ejido land. Given that ejidatarios were granted use
rights over a plot of land (Artis, 2000) rather than ownership, the sale of parcels was not legally
possible. This changed, however, when in 1992 the Mexican Federal Government amended
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution to allow for the certification of land rights under the
Program for the Certification of Ejidal Rights (PROCEDE), which allowed for ejidatarios to gain
land titles for to up to three parcels of land – one for their farming plot, one for their house plot,
and one for a percentage of communally owned resources, depending on the allocation decisions
of the Asamblea within the ejido (USAID, 2011). Once individual parcels had been delineated
and land titles awarded, farmers could then sell their plots of land.
In the end, the distinctions between ejidatarios, avecindados and pobladores are
established within de jure and de facto mechanisms. On the one hand, ejidatarios are ensured
voting power and access to land through legal definitions of the ejido institution. Moreover,
given the restricted means through which avecindados and pobladores may achieve the status of
ejidatario, ejidatario social status is relatively preserved and concentrated within the hands of an
unchanging group of people. On the other hand, the designation of groups of people such as
pobladores who have a relatively undefined status within Mexican Agrarian Law effectively
creates a third class of people for whom access to positive social standing is even more elusive
than for avecindados. Given these social distinctions and the limited opportunities for farmers to
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become ejidatarios, many look to other opportunities such as Scolel’ Te to enhance their social
status by obtaining work experiences, acquiring work skills, and enhancing their access to scarce
income-earning opportunities. However, as becomes clear in the next segment, one’s access to
these opportunities depends on the decisions of ejidatarios and the person’s relationship to
ejidatarios more generally.
Ejidal Authority, Social Standing and Access to Development Projects
Given their disproportionate access to resources and political influence within their communities,
ejidatarios are able to shape the nature of development projects within their communities. Given
this influence, ejidatario interests tend to drive decision-making within the ejido about which
development projects should be permitted to operate, and which people can and/or should be
allowed to participate. In conversations with ejidatarios in the Sierra Madre region, it became
clear that such privilege was not only legally determined but culturally expected as well. As one
ejidatario put it:
“We were the first to arrive on the land. It was a risk. We came and occupied
the land, hoping the owners of the coffee plantation would not push us away or
kill us. But we stayed, and it is here where we established the ejido. We are
ejidatarios, and we deserve the rights we have because we sacrificed for this
community.”
The stories are significant because they not only justify the standing of an ejidatario, but they also
legitimize the actions taken by the ejidatarios as members of the Asamblea.
For many ejidatarios, the prestige rooted in their sacrifice to the community serves as
justification for excluding the participation of non-ejidatarios in development projects. Their
social standing, however, not only permits them to decide which projects should operate in a
community, but also to use their decision-making capabilities to allow some avecindados to
participate in a given project, particularly their sons. When new projects come into a community,
ejidatarios have greater access to information about the incoming project, as well as voting rights
regarding whether or not the project can proceed. This allows them to position their sons and
grandsons such that they may obtain key roles in a given project. Such opportunities provide the
sons and grandsons of ejidatarios with the opportunity to associate themselves with outside
organizations, travelling to new cities, and gaining otherwise scarce job experience. In doing so,
they are able to potentially begin to build on their own standing within their communities
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resulting from the opportunity to improve material wealth through seasonal migration and new
job opportunities.
In conclusion, social status for avecindados and pobladores excludes them from
participation in many development projects. However, some avecindados, particularly the male
children of ejidatarios, are at times able to capitalize on their relationship to ejidatarios in order to
gain access to participation. In cases such as Scolel’ Te, the scenario is a bit different given that
broad participation among ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios was secured by AMBIO who petitioned
ejidatarios for such flexibility. However, many non-ejidatarios continue to be dependent on their
relationship to ejidatarios for access to the land needed to participate. Thus, participation in
development as a means to improving one’s social status proves to be challenging for nonejidatarios for whom access to such opportunities is dependent on ejidatarios in multiple regards.
However, despite such limitations, non-ejidatarios do become involved in Scolel’ Te, at times
taking leadership positions within the project as técnicos comunitarios. For them, this work
represents the opportunity to build on their standing within their community relative to
ejidatarios.

However, as will become clear, their participation ultimately undermines their

attempts to build their standing within their communities as they become the subject of rumors
and trust is undermined.
Viewing Scolel’ Te from the Prestige Angle
For non-ejidatarios, working as a técnico comunitario in Scolel’ Te provides them with a unique
opportunity to enhance their social standing within their communities. On the one hand, they are
trained to do technical work, thereby learning skills that may be employable in the future. On the
other hand, they gain access to scarce income, and increase their proximity to AMBIO, a
successful outside organization with a strong network of actors across Chiapas and Mexico more
broadly. However, as monitors of farmer work within their communities, técnicos comunitarios
are forced to navigate the contradictory expectations of friends and family and those of AMBIO –
a process that creates tension between técnicos and fellow participants. Additionally, when
projects fall short of community expectations técnicos become the subject of rumors and negative
community perceptions regarding the project – impressions that are shaped, in part, by farmers’
past experiences with development programs more generally.

In such circumstances,

participation in carbon forestry becomes a social liability rather than an asset as técnico
relationships within their community are weakened and undermined. In this section, I first show
how tension between farmers and técnicos emerge in the context of monitoring work.
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As

discussed in Chapter 3, these emotional dimensions are largely unseen by AMBIO. I then assess
the manner in which farmers become the subject of community rumors about corruption, rumors
that undermine the trust upon which farmer relationships are built. However, before doing so, I
build on the discussion in Chapter 3 by reiterating the role of técnicos comunitarios within the
carbon forestry program.
With over 1,100 farmers in 77 communities, Scolel’ Te has become a large and wellrecognized carbon forestry program in southern Mexico. However, despite its size, AMBIO has
less than 30 regular employees, which complicates management of the geographically dispersed
project. In an effort to overcome these challenges, AMBIO employs técnicos comunitarios who
are expected to ensure that carbon credit production continues unabated in the communities they
represent, work that involves responding to any doubts or concerns that may arise among local
participants throughout the duration of their involvement. Community technicians are elected by
fellow participants from within their community, and are paid on a project-based rate. Given that
they work with AMBIO, but continue to live in their communities, técnicos comunitarios are
uniquely exposed to praise when projects go well and to criticism when projects do not go as
planned. For técnicos comunitarios, this emotional component of their service work is at times
challenging, particularly in the context of monitoring work through which participant
compensation is determined. In this segment I analyze the work carried out by the técnicos
comunitarios, highlighting the implications of this service work for their standing within their
communities.
Monitoring
For técnicos comunitarios, monitoring work provides the opportunity to acquire skills that may be
transferable to future employment opportunities with governmental ministries such as the
Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT). As such, may serve as a
mechanism through which farmers may improve their social standing in their community through
increased access to employment opportunities and material gain. However, for many, monitoring
work has the opposite effect as they become exposed to tensions arising from the expectations of
fellow participants in Scolel’ Te whose land parcels they are monitoring and those of AMBIO
who pays técnicos to carry out such work.
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Figure 4.1 Monitoring Tree Plantings in the Sierra Madre
Photo Credit: Author

Figure 4.2 Monitoring Tree Plantings in the Sierra Madre
Photo Credit: Author
As técnicos engage in monitoring work, they are asked to work intimately with fellow
participants in Scolel’ Te in implementing monitoring procedures taught to them by AMBIO.
This, however, is not straightforward, and often involves navigating the complex and often
contradictory expectations of community members and AMBIO. Monitoring work serves two
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functions within Scolel’ Te: 1) to ensure that farmers are establishing new plantings and caring
for existing plantings in an effective manner; and 2) to monitor the progress of plant development
so as to confirm the CO2 reductions and the commercial integrity of the carbon credits.
Importantly, monitoring also provides the foundation on which payments to farmers are justified
and legitimated.

Figure 4.3 Unclean Tree Planting
Photo Credit: Author
Land parcel monitoring typically begins in the early morning – around 5:00am – so as to
accommodate typical farming schedules and to complete the bulk of the work prior to the peak
heat of the day in the early-to-mid-afternoon. The goal of the community technician is to
accompany participating farmers through their plots of land to locate each planted tree, to note the
species of each tree, and to and confirm its status as either alive or dead. In addition to locating
and identifying each planted tree under Scolel’ Te, the community technician will measure the
tallest and shortest trees of each species so as to collect a representative height and weight of each
one. Using this data with the number of living and dead trees, they can begin to approximate the
CO2 captured across each farmer’s land parcel, and thus the payments due to each farmer for their
role in Scolel’ Te.

In some instances where tree plantings have been carefully cleared of

competing vegetation, trees can be easy to locate, thereby facilitating the monitoring process (see
Figure 4.4).

However, in other instances where tree plantings have not been cleaned, the
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monitoring process can become very difficult when identifying young trees among competing
vegetation is difficult (see Figure 4.3). While monitoring work is clearly stated to the técnicos
comunitarios by AMBIO, the reality of monitoring work is often messy, given the fact that it
creates uncomfortable dynamics among técnicos comunitarios whose work factors into payment
processes, and producers who want, and in many cases depend on, payments stemming from their
work in Scolel. Te.

Figure 4.4 Clean Tree Planting
Photo Credit: Author
Payments as a Source of Tension
Monitoring activities are central to determining farmer compensation, which is tied to the survival
rate of the planted trees. While for AMBIO the monitoring process and the corresponding
payment dispersal are relatively straightforward, for técnicos the payments are often a point of
tension with fellow community members, particularly when participating farmers perceive them
to have been delivered behind schedule. The exact manner in which payments are estimated by
AMBIO is rooted in a Plan Vivo map in which farmers identify the location, type and quantity of
trees they would like to plant in their land parcels (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5). Once
a Plan Vivo map has been established, AMBIO estimates the quantity of CO2 to be captured in
the given land parcel over the next 20-30 years – a time frame that is dependent on the variables
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identified in the Plan Vivo as well as the local ecological conditions of the project (Corbera,
2005). From the total estimated accrued carbon, only 90% is considered for sale by AMBIO,
with the remaining amount being designated for a contingency fund.

The purpose of the

contingency fund is to keep a store of captured carbon in the event of an unforeseen challenge to
carbon credit production such as fires, plagues or unexpected participant withdrawal from the
project. Of the remaining 90% considered for sale, only 80% is actually traded, meaning that
72% of the total estimated accrued carbon is actually traded. This is done in order to account for
potential leakages associated with project implementation and management (Corbera, 2005).24
Farmers receive an upfront payment of 18% of the total 72% of carbon traded as a form
of initial working capital (Corbera, 2005). This money is important to farmers in terms of
encouraging initial dedication to the heavy work of planting trees, cleaning plots of land where
trees have been planted, and protecting new plantings from grazing cattle and other threats. The
remaining four payments, also of 18% of the total 72% of carbon traded, are disbursed to farmers
in the second, third, fifth and eighth years of the project, meaning that farmers receive a total of
90% of the money resulting from traded carbon.25 The remaining 10% goes toward funding all of
AMBIO’s administrative and capacity-building work associated with Scolel’ Te. In 2011 total
disbursements to participating communities varied dramatically, ranging from a high of USD
$8,809.92 in one community to a low of USD $18.30 in another community (Cooperativa
AMBIO, 2012).26
The purpose behind the spacing of the payments is to incentivize a long-term
commitment by farmers to the well being of the trees identified in their Plan Vivos and planted in
their land parcels. AMBIO notes that the payments made in years 1, 2, and 3 are associated with
the consistent completion of tasks tied to maintaining the well being of tree plantings – the
clearing of competitive vegetation, the watering of young trees during the dry season, and the
Leakages refer to unanticipated CO2 emissions in the designated area of a forest carbon project.
AMBIO wishes to account for leakages so as to ensure that the carbon captured is “additional” to
that which would have otherwise been captured. However, the leakages taken into account only
include those leakages that AMBIO is aware of. Other sources of leakages that may not be
considered by AMBIO could include covert logging activities carried out by farmers who are
simultaneously planting trees as part of their work in Scolel’ Te.
25
Initially farmers were paid over the average 25-year course of a project. However, farmers
tended to lose interest over time and abandon the project as they felt that the payments arrived too
slowly. Thus, AMBIO decided to shrink the payment period to 8 years, noting that after year 8
trees tend to be developed to the extent that they can continue to survive over the long-term with
minimal work on the part of participating farmers.
26
Average disbursement to individual farmers was not published or provided informally by
AMBIO. Regardless, de Jong and Gaona et al (2004) note that the maximum earnings per hectare
were ~US $700.
24
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pruning of more mature trees – whereas payments made during years 5 and 8 of the project are
designed more toward ensuring the long-term permanence of mature tree plantings.
Within participating communities farmers may have varying statuses within Scolel’ Te,
although each is asked to carryout the same tasks. The variation in farmer status results from
staggered entry years among participants. For instance, while some farmers decide to participate
in the first year of the project, others who may at first be skeptical of Scolel’ Te or who may not
have the resources needed to participate in the first year, may decide to enter into the project in
subsequent years. In such a scenario, farmers are paid according to their respective funding
schedule corresponding with their entry date. Given the shifting demand since 2008 for carbon
credits produced in Mexico, AMBIO was forced to conditionally welcome new farmers. In this
case, farmers were welcomed to join Scolel’ Te so long as they understood that their carbon
credits would be designated to the contingency fund rather than sold to the ever-diminishing pool
of buyers. The produced carbon credits would be held in the fund and the farmer would not be
paid for their work until a buyer could be located. This practice continued until 2012 when
AMBIO decided to completely suspend project expansion until buyers could be ensured and sales
increased.
Each of the five payments disbursed to farmers are determined by the results of the
monitoring carried with the community technician and the participating farmers.

Farmer

payments directly reflect the number of trees that are living and capturing CO2 on participant
land. If trees die, the payment to the farmer will be reduced proportionally according to the
number of dead trees, unless the farmer is able compensate the loss through replanting. By
linking monitoring to payments, the técnico comunitario becomes directly linked, in the eyes of
participants, to whether or not they receive their payments. Because monitoring is closely tied to
the payments received by farmers in Scolel’ Te, many will exert pressure on the técnico
comunitario to submit false monitoring reports to AMBIO which dishonestly represent the
farmer’s work in their favor. In such cases, the service work associated with carbon forestry
comes into conflict with the expectations of service to community and family as produced
through community life, an issue discussed by Mutersbaugh (2004) in the context of certification
work. While community technicians have admitted to feeling pressured to acquiesce to the
requests of fellow participants, they note that ultimately it is not worth it to do so given the
oversight provided through subsequent verification processes.
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Threat to Prestige: Late Payments, No Payments
For técnicos comunitarios, the tension that emerges in their monitoring work is tied to monetary
compensation for work within the project. The effects of this tension are experienced both
emotionally and physically by the técnico comunitario, and may strain relations between the
técnico comunitario and other project participants. This became clear in several contexts: 1) in
the complaints shared by técnicos in meetings at AMBIO’s offices in San Cristóbal de las Casas;
2) in the stories told by one técnico comunitario while traveling outside the community; 3) in the
interactions between técnicos comunitarios and fellow participants during monitoring activities;
and 4) in the rumors and stories told among families and neighbors while socializing; and 5) in
how técnicos comunitarios move within their communities, as was illustrated by the second
vignette at the beginning of this chapter. In the remaining pages of this chapter I discuss each of
the instances in which the tension described above emerged in Chiapas. I then conclude by
suggesting that prestige concerns are not only related to the work of técnicos comunitarios, but
may also relate to non-técnico participants within farming communities.
Each year AMBIO holds a series of meetings - reuniones semestrales – attended by both
técnicos regionales and técnicos comunitarios, during which tensions experienced by técnicos
comunitarios emerge (see Figure 4.5). The purpose of the meetings (also discussed in Appendix
A) is to provide training for the técnicos with regard to various aspects of project management,
including land parcel monitoring.

The meetings are attended by técnicos from throughout

Chiapas, including the state’s Lacandón, central highlands and Sierra Madre region.

For

AMBIO, these meetings represent an opportunity to get a sense of community attitudes toward
the project, and to provide técnicos comunitarios with recommendations for improving project
management. Such advice includes asking técnicos to remind farmers to clean their plots of land
so as to protect young saplings, refreshing técnicos on the method for monitoring land parcels,
and reminding técnicos to work with fellow participants to protect planted trees from grazing
cattle. For técnicos, however, the meetings represent a key opportunity for communicating
discontent – both their own and that of their respective communities – to AMBIO.
Over the course of two reuniones semestrales, técnicos shared questions and doubts
regarding Scolel’ Te, many of which related to payment procedures and perceived late payments
(see Appendix A, Table 10A). However, communication was complicated by the fact that many
farmers did not speak Spanish as their first language, but instead, represented a diversity of
languages spoken throughout Chiapas. Thus, many attendees were initially unwilling engage in
conversation with AMBIO (an effect that was further enhanced by the fatigue felt by attending
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farmers who had travelled to San Cristóbal for the meetings – see Appendix A). However, over
the course of the nine-hour meetings, farmers would begin to contribute their concerns, with
many standing to participate, and describing scenarios as they occurred in their respective
communities. One técnico from Chiapas’ eastern Lacandón region, for instance, stood and
presented issues faced within his community as a result of farmer discontent regarding delayed
payments:
“Some have abandoned the project and others threaten to do so if they do not
receive their money. The payments are late, and we do not want to return to
monitor land parcels because the people are upset.”
Complaints and comments were often repeated by several técnicos, as those provided by one may
not have been clearly understood by the rest of the group. Such was the case when a second
técnico, also from the Lacandón region, stood and echoed his counterpart: “The people are upset
about the payments and they do not want to clean their land parcels. They want their payments.”
He was followed by another técnico from the central highlands region who suggested that
tensions had arisen between he and his father-in-law who was upset for having not been
compensated for his work in Scolel’ Te. “They always ask about the payments,” the person
followed earnestly.

These comments were met by suggestions from one senior AMBIO

employee to remind farmers that it had become difficult for AMBIO to sell carbon credits due to
the shifting geography of supply and demand for carbon credits (see chapter 3). However, such
explanations were often long and convoluted, falling largely on the unsatisfied ears of técnicos
who kept searching for an adequate answer to share with their fellow community members.
These exchanges continued for several hours in each meeting as farmers explained the
complaints of their fellow carbon foresters. From the perspective of an outside observer, the
repetitive nature of the complaints, and the manner in which farmers persistently sought answers
to share with fellow participants in the program felt unnecessary, particularly as the meetings
stretched into eight or nine hours. However, such persistence, particularly following long travel
days and given participant fatigue, is significant. The persistence speaks to the fact that issues of
community discontent toward Scolel’ Te, and the técnicos more specifically, which resulted from
frustrations with payment processes, are significant for técnicos across Chiapas. It demonstrates,
moreover, the insistence of técnicos to resolve the tensions emerging in their communities around
payment schedules – issues that, for them, were affecting their relationships with fellow
participants in Scolel’ Te.
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Figure 4.5 Meeting with Técnicos at AMBIO’s Offices in San Cristóbal de las Casas
Photo Credit: Author
While the tensions emerging between técnicos comunitarios and their fellow community
members became clear in meetings at AMBIO’s offices in San Cristóbal, the specific implications
of these tensions for técnicos in their everyday lived experience became especially clear in my
interactions with one técnico comunitario, Ismael:
It was 3:00am and Ismael and I were just beginning a 3-hour hike to the nearest community.
Ismael had received a call the night before from AMBIO alerting him to the fact that a meeting
had been called for all the técnicos comunitarios and regionales the next day. Our goal was to
make it to the community by 6:00am where we would find the only bus leaving for the municipal
seat, thereby connecting us to San Cristóbal de las Casas where project managers would be
waiting at AMBIO’s offices. We walked silently in the dark following the dirt road for about an
hour before Ismael spoke:
“I am afraid to leave my home. People are upset with me. They constantly ask,
‘where is my money?’ What do I tell them? Some people accuse me of having
stolen their money. I did not steal any money. Why would I do that?”
As we walked he continued talking, explaining the motivations behind farmers’ decisions to
participate in Scolel’ Te. He noted that while many farmers cite abstract benefits to the project
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such as carbon capture or more immediate benefits such as access to firewood or erosion control
as a motivation for their participation, the key incentive is the opportunity to earn money.
Ismael’s comments resonated with conversations I had held with other farmers in the region.
“We work with AMBIO because there are no other jobs,” suggested one farmer. “If we take care
of the trees, AMBIO gives us, more than anything, a job… and we need to get our kids ahead.”
Farmer’s often identified Scolel’ Te as an employment opportunity in the face of scarce
alternatives, and framed their relationship with AMBIO within an employer-employee dynamic.27
While the money earned by participating farmers is not much, many noted that the pequeño
apoyo (small support) allowed them to purchase certain items that would otherwise be difficult to
come by, including luxury items such as sugar or meat. Others noted that the money was useful
for purchasing light bulbs, machetes, boots, and other items needed for work around the house
and in the fields. For others it was a source of money from which one could draw to finance trips
into the city to purchase groceries, visit family, go to the doctor or tend to legal issues. In
essence, participation in the project provided families with discretionary income that is a rare
luxury in poor farming communities.
As Ismael and I continued hiking down the mountain toward the nearby community I learned that
people within the community had recently become upset due to uncertainty surrounding the
payments tied to Scolel’ Te. It was this uncertainty that worried Ismael, and it was a theme that
would continuously dominate my conversations with farmers over the coming months.
While farmers tended to discuss the payments tied to Scolel’ Te in positive terms, they were
quick to point out the uncertainty tied to their disbursement, citing two particular apprehensions:
1) the dependence of payments on tree survival; and 2) late payments. Regarding the former, one
farmer noted that “the payments are not fixed,” pointing out that his annual payments shift
according to tree survival rates on his land parcel. “If 80 trees die this year, then my pay will be
less than it was last year,” he suggested. While this source of uncertainty was generally accepted
by farmers to accompany participation in Scolel’ Te, it was the latter that was seen as particularly
unjust, and which received the greatest emphasis in conversations.
Of 25 farmers surveyed across two communities, 19 mentioned monetary motivations as the
key reason for their participation in Scolel’ Te. The remaining six also mentioned monetary gain
in addition to other benefits such as carbon capture and firewood access. Still others, noted that
they were able to use Scolel’ Te to engage in activities that would allow them to comply with the
requirements tied to other development projects in the community.

27
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Late payments tended to be either perceived (i.e. farmers did not clearly understand the
circumstances of their participation in Scolel’ Te and expected payments that they were not
actually owed) or actual (i.e. AMBIO did not disburse payments in a manner consistent with past
payment schedules), and proved damaging to farmer trust in AMBIO. The first scenario was
particularly common among farmers who entered into Scolel’ Te on a conditional basis prior to
2012, and who were not owed payments given the fact that their carbon credits entered a
contingency fund. Although AMBIO assured that farmers had been explained this scenario,
many comprehended their status in the project in alternative terms. “This is my first year and I
began with bad luck,” said one farmer in the region as we sat in his small home. “I don’t have
any land, and our opportunities are few. We are not happy about this. Maybe AMBIO took the
money. Maybe the money never existed. We do not know where the money comes from, after
all,” guessed one farmer operating in Scolel’ Te on a conditional basis. Thus, the carbon market
dynamics discussed in the previous chapter have significant on-the-ground implications for
farmer experiences and perceptions of Scolel’ Te.
With regard to actual late payments, farmers tended to base their expectations on
disbursement schedules from previous years. “Last year we were paid in December. Now it is
March and we do not know when or if we will get paid,” complained several farmers. “The
people here become sad,” suggested another participant. “When you do the work and you do not
get paid… do you know what it is like to be a poor campesino?” Here, farmers did not simply
question AMBIO’s commitment to the project, but also began to doubt the status of Scolel’ Te in
general. “Some farmers are wondering what happened to the project, and have given up cleaning
their tree plantings. Maybe AMBIO left us.” Such uncertainty weakened farmer commitment to
the project, and undermined the very trust on which Scolel’ Te’s long-term success depends.
However, the impact of this unpredictability was especially felt by the técnicos comunitarios,
who were uniquely exposed to community dissatisfaction.
“They always ask about the money,” said Ismael as we neared the waiting bus. “Every time I
leave the house someone wants to know where their money is and why the payments are late. It is
hard because I do not know, and I do not have an answer for them.”
For Ismael, the effects of this uncertainty were visible in the daily seclusion that came to define
his life. For many farmers, work in the fields comes to an end in the mid-to-late-afternoon, at
which point they begin to complete chores around the house or to socialize with one another.
After returning from Ismael’s coffee, corn and bean fields I would often eat lunch, bathe, and
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then walk out into the community for the rest of the afternoon and into the evening to socialize
with other friends. This socializing provided an important opportunity to gossip about news,
politics and family affairs. However, Ismael often stayed home, rarely leaving to socialize.
As we sat on the bus headed for the municipal seat, Ismael admitted, “It is difficult to be accused
of something you have not done. It is difficult to answer questions for things that I am expected
to know, but do not have answers for. Sometimes it is easier just to stay home.”
For farmers, participation in Scolel’ Te represented an employment opportunity that promised to
provide them with some disposable income needed to purchase a variety of items. However, late
payments – either perceived or actual – undermined farmer commitment to the project and
fomented distrust among participants toward AMBIO.

The impact of this distrust fell

disproportionately on the shoulders of the técnicos comunitarios, whose proximity to their
communities exposed them to the frustrations felt by participants who had come to assume that
they had been abandoned by AMBIO. Ismael’s experience provides a useful case for viewing the
tension between his desire to fulfill the expectations tied to his work with Scolel’ Te while
responding to those of his family and friends who were participating in the program.
The challenges expressed by Ismael were shared by another técnico comunitario in the
Sierra Madre region, Sergio, who expressed his concern that fellow participants in Scolel’ Te
within his community were reacting negatively to the late payments.
“The people become impatient and upset when the payments are late. Before I
left for the last meeting in San Cristóbal, they [fellow participants in Scolel’ Te]
requested me to ask AMBIO about the payments. When I returned, they asked
‘so what?’. I explain to them that AMBIO must find new buyers. The situation
is difficult. They want to abandon the project, and some have already neglected
their parcels.”
Sergio’s concerns reflect those expressed by técnicos from the Lacandón and central highlands
regions in meetings at AMBIO’s offices, but also indicate the challenges faced by the young
técnico comunitario in ameliorating the concerns of his fellow participants in Scolel’ Te. As the
above quote indicates, the fact that payments had been postponed for those contributing to
AMBIO’s contingency fund was due to the fact that there were insufficient numbers of buyers
was not considered an adequate excuse by farmers who felt that they were owed compensation
for completed work within Scolel’ Te. For técnicos such as Sergio, the knowledge that the
responses provided by AMBIO for why those contributing to the contingency fund would could
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not be paid, and their assurances that payments would soon arrive for those not contributing to the
contingency fund motivated is the cause behind their persistence at the meetings in San Cristóbal
for a better means for ameliorating the concerns of fellow participants.
Threat to Prestige: Charges of Conspiracy and Corruption
The uncertainty discussed above is not unique to Scolel’ Te, but accompanies many development
projects, particularly surrounding payment processes. In many Chiapaneco communities, general
skepticism toward development programs combines with a lack of trust, information, and
certainty, provoking a strong cynicism defined by rumors and a fleeting faith in projects and
managers. In the context of Scolel’ Te, such rumors prove toxic to the image of técnicos
comunitarios who become inextricably linked to presumptions of corruption often associated with
development programs. This became clear in conversations with Alejandro, one participant in
Scolel’ Te. As we sat on the porch outside his home, he said:
“You know, when Ismael (the técnico comunitario) monitors Don Jorge’s plot
of land, he inflates the number of trees he has planted so that he can receive
more money. Either that, or he allows Don Jorge to plant his trees with less
spacing between each one so that he can plant more on each hectare of land.
That is the only explanation I have for why Don Jorge makes more money per
hectare than anyone else. I have done the calculations and it doesn’t make sense
in any other way. They work together, you know. Why do you think Ismael sits
in his home all day and never leaves his house? When he leaves, why does he
only go to Don Jorge’s home?”
According to Alejandro, this perceived violation, although lamentable, was reflective of broader
patterns among rural development within the state. He continued:
“Every year we are supposed to receive money from PROCAMPO. Every year
we are promised seed and fertilizer, and yet every year we either do not receive
it, or we receive it late after the planting season has already past. What good
does seed serve us if it arrives late? And what happens to all that money that
politicians promise for the Mexican countryside? Every year they promise
thousands of pesos for farmers, but where does that money go? I’ll tell you
where it goes, it stays in the hands of the municipal government, and we never
see it.”
For Alejandro, the situation was clear: corruption within rural development exists, and comprises
an unfortunate, yet normal element in such initiatives.
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Community impressions of técnicos comunitarios who find themselves caught between
AMBIO’s expectations and those of participating farmers are infused with cynical expectations
and assumptions of corruption that are as much a product of past experiences as current
perceptions of Scolel’ Te, particularly those tied to payment processes. Such scenarios provide
fodder for rumors, which in a community of 300-500 people, spread quickly, thus tainting the
image of the técnico comunitario in the eyes of some participants. Furthermore, once a rumor is
established, a person’s actions are perceived in ways that confirm it as truth. For instance,
Ismael’s choice to isolate himself from the continuous complaints and accusations tied to late
payments, although allowing him to find some respite, served only to confirm the suspicions of
others that he was in fact involved in wrongdoing.
While Cancian (1965) and others do not discuss the effects of lost prestige on individuals
and groups of people within rural Mexican communities, they do note the benefits of prestige
arising from one’s contribution to their community. Cancian notes, for instance, that farmers,
through their contribution to their community, are able to acquire greater respect from fellow
community members, greater access to resources, and mobility within their community – both in
terms of physical mobility and in terms of social status.

Ismael notes that these benefits

motivated his initial involvement in Scolel’ Te. “I saw that there was a need for a project of this
type in my community – to plant trees and obtain money – so I joined.” In doing so, he stood,
perhaps, to build on his prestige in the community – something that could have contributed to his
social status, access to resources, and even his standing within AMBIO. However, due to
existing attitudes within the community toward development projects and the uncertainty tied to
payment processes, the social implications of his work in Scolel’ Te were less than ideal.
Despite these challenges, Ismael did consider several aspects of his participation in
Scolel’ Te to be beneficial. He noted that meeting people from cities across Mexico and from
other countries, traveling to San Cristóbal de las Casas every six months for meetings with
AMBIO, attending lectures and learning were clear benefits to his work as técnico comunitario.
However, he suggested that the challenges he faced within the community were not necessarily a
fair trade for these benefits. “This will be my last year with the project,” he mentioned, citing the
frustration he felt from the implications of his work with the project on his social life and
standing within the community. “It just is not worth it,” he said. “We are cheap labor and only
get paid Ps $90/day when we are monitoring land parcels. 28 In the end, the social costs

28

Roughly USD $7/day
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experienced by Ismael did not justify the benefits tied to the physical, intellectual and emotional
labor of serving as a técnico comunitario. 29

Figure 4.6 Evening Gathering of Family and Neighbors in the Sierra Madre Region
Photo Credit: Author
Rumors, however, were not confined to Ismael. Rumors circulated continuously within
the two communities examined in this project (see Appendix A), regarding the health of the
project and others. Rumors spread regularly during the evening hours when families and friends
would gather to watch TV, play marbles and talk about family and community affairs.

Figure

4.6 is an example of gatherings among family and neighbors where discussions about community
affairs would take place. Others, such as Carlos, would complete chores around the house or
attend to hobbies such as training cocks for fighting. One evening as he lowered one bird into the
cage with another, inducing it to attack, he laughed as I asked about his experience with Scolel’
Te.
“I do not participate in that project. They [participants in Scolel’ Te] think that if
they put their land and time into this project that they will be paid. Don’t they
know that it won’t work? Don’t they know that it will never work? Why do they
think this project is any different than the other programs that we have?”

At the time of this research Ismael continued to work with Scolel’ Te. I do not know whether
he continues to work with AMBIO or not.
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He continued to chuckle as he trained the two birds. “It seems like a waste of time to me – I
don’t know why they do it.” Carlos’ comments highlighted the opinions of some who had chosen
not to participate in Scolel’ Te due to their skepticism that the project would not actually benefit
them or their community in a positive manner. When payments were delayed, assumptions of
project failure were confirmed, and those who chose not to participate felt vindicated in their
decision to abstain. Noting the negative perceptions of participants held by those who abstained
from the program, Don Jorge pointed out:
“They laugh at us when they see that we have not been paid. They say, ‘see we
told you not to participate.’ We told you that climate change is not real.’ Maybe
we should not have enrolled in the project, but it sounded like a good idea.”
Don Jorge’s comments and those of Alejandro regarding Don Jorge signal the fact that questions
of prestige emerging from participation in Scolel’ Te may extend beyond the técnico comunitario
to other participants in the program. As projects fail to deliver on their promises, those who
bought into the program are caste by skeptics to have been naïve in thinking the project would be
of benefit to them and their families.
Conclusion
Scolel’ Te offers participants the opportunity to build on their standing within their communities
by gaining new access to resources, opportunities and outside organizations. However, when
projects do not go according to plan, participation in a development project may have social
consequences that threaten to damage a person’s standing. Técnicos comunitarios are positioned
in such a way that they are uniquely exposed to praise when projects go well and to criticism
when projects do not go as planned – particularly as seen in the effects of the shifting supply and
demand dynamics within voluntary carbon markets presented in Chapter 3 and discussed in this
chapter. As liaisons between AMBIO and their communities they have opportunities to travel
and attend classes, and are elevated as relative authorities within the context of Scolel’ Te.
However, as monitors of the work carried out by fellow community members, they are exposed to
pressures by friends and family to unfairly support them, as well as to rumors by those who
perceive the project as functioning poorly or as corrupt – perceptions that are shaped, in part, by
farmers’ past experiences with development programs (see Chapters 1 and 2). In circumstances
such as these, técnicos comunitarios such as Ismael face the challenge of responding to threats to
their standing within their communities in the face of pressure by AMBIO to continue their
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participation. In the end, while non-ejidatarios turn to projects such as Scolel’ Te to build upon
their standing within their communities, opportunities to do so are severely limited by the lack of
security within the carbon market. Shifting market dynamics ultimately expose técnicos (and
other participants) to risk that limits and ultimately threatens their ability to achieve any kind of
social ascent within their communities.
By looking at Scolel’ Te from the perspective of broad intra-community social relations,
the social effects of carbon forestry appear in a much more dramatic manner than social capital
perspectives would have it. These impacts are not as conspicuous as the violent examples seen in
the highway project and other counter-insurgency-oriented development initiatives in the central
highlands and Lacandón region. However, social impacts discussed in this chapter are
nonetheless dramatic for participants hoping to improve their livelihoods through participation in
the project.
The issues raised in this chapter also highlight the challenges faced by AMBIO in
ensuring continued community support for Scolel’ Te. If farmers judge the payoff for their
participation to not be worth their time, then Scolel’ Te will not function. However, given
AMBIO’s limited resources, they are unable to respond to each of the challenges faced in
participating communities in addition to normal Scolel’ Te activities. Thus, AMBIO must turn to
mechanisms within Scolel’ Te in order to ensure long-term community commitment to the
project. In the next chapter, I examine efforts by AMBIO to achieve community buy-in through
participatory mapping and member education programs, suggesting that such practices ultimately
undermine the social relations of production – i.e. those between participating farmers and
AMBIO – by re-shaping farmer land-use patterns in ways that are insensitive to the multiple
factors that shape farmer land-use decisions.

Copyright @ Jonathan James Otto 2014
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CHAPTER 5: MANAGING LABOR AND GENERATING BUY-IN
Participatory Carbon Forestry in Chiapas, Mexico

Introduction
“There are many organizations that have done environmental work in Chiapas,
and many have not complied with their promises to complete the work. [With
Scolel’ Te] the most difficult aspect is that the producer [farmer] comes to trust
you, to trust that you are not going to cheat him. At first what the people assume
is that making a Plan Vivo [map] implies that we [AMBIO] are going to take
their land. The most difficult aspect of our work is to convince them otherwise –
to convince them that we are not going to take action, but that they will”
(AMBIO employee).
Given the failures highlighted in the previous chapter, AMBIO has had to create trust with project
participants – trust that, as became clear in Chapter 4, is a fluid and dynamic component of
development work. This chapter examines efforts by AMBIO to create farmer buy-in for Scolel’
Te through the use of participatory mapping exercises and member education programs.

I

suggest that these participatory exercises are designed to achieve community buy-in by inducing
enrolled farmers to believe in Scolel’ Te and to act in a manner consistent with the project’s longterm objectives.

I argue, however, that participatory activities are predicated on a limited

understanding of farmers and farmer land-use decision-making, and that as a result, they re-shape
farmer land-use patterns in ways that undermine the social relations of production between
farmers and AMBIO. In order to assess these issues, I analyze community participation from two
perspectives: 1) as a discourse, and 2) as a labor process. The first approach is essential to
clarifying how AMBIO thinks about farmer’s and who they may become through their
participation in Scolel’ Te – a project that AMBIO argues is ultimately beneficial for local
producers. The second optic is necessary for analyzing how farmers are expected to enact carbon
forestry within their communities, and why AMBIO needs to produce a certain pattern of activity
and relationship to the land among farmers – an arrangement that ultimately undermines the
social relations of production between farmers and AMBIO.
Farmer buy-in to Scolel’ Te and participatory activities are, according to AMBIO,
necessary for the long-term success of the program. On the one hand, farmers must begin to trust
AMBIO in a context where trust for outside organizations and development projects is not
automatic, and come to believe that their work will counteract the problem of climate change. On
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the other hand, AMBIO must mitigate risk by inducing farmers to alter land-use practices by
limiting fires and cattle grazing. In this sense, the use of participatory activities is designed to
alter farmer relationships to development organizations and to their land – to create, in essence, a
new relationship based in altered practices and beliefs. In doing so, AMBIO hopes that farmers
will not only trust AMBIO and the program’s ability to mitigate climate change, but also act in
ways that ensure its long-term success. Before assessing the specifics of participatory practices in
Scolel’ Te I highlight mainstream perspectives on participation, perspectives that are commonly
shared by organizations such as AMBIO. I then examine critical alternatives for analyzing
participation, drawing on political ecology work, critical development literature, social theory and
labor studies. In doing so, I set the scene for an in-depth discussion of how participation is
envisioned by AMBIO, and for clarifying the manner in which such activities undermine social
relations between AMBIO and farmers.
Mainstream and NGO Perspectives on Participation in Development
The problem of participation has long been of interest to multi-lateral development organizations,
governments, and NGOs such as AMBIO concerned with how control over a project is allocated
among various participants. These actors have associated participation with increased community
empowerment (Friedman, 1992; UNDP, 1993), with the democratization of development
(Mwanzia and Strathdee, 2010), and with the improved ability of practitioners to respond to the
needs of development’s intended beneficiaries (Willis, 2005). As Moore (2001) notes, local
participation was recognized as the counterweight to established hierarchies within development
practice. Moreover, local knowledge and experience emerged as a perceived silver bullet for
making development more relevant to its intended beneficiaries (Kothari, 2001), and took several
forms among organizations such as the World Bank, which began to utilize Participatory Rural
Appraisal, Beneficiary Assessment, and Social Analysis approaches in their work (Francis, 2001).
Moreover, as will be seen, local knowledge is understood by organizations such as AMBIO to be
useful for revealing hidden knowledge that may be productive of more effective development
practice. In short, participation signaled, for mainstream development, a progressive turn toward
inclusivity and empowerment within development work.
Participatory practice received strong emphasis first within the “Women in
Development” (WID) movement in the 1970s and its “Women and Development” (WAD) and
“Gender and Development” (GAD) successors, which sought to enhance women’s participation
in development, to provide alternatives to male-dominant approaches, and to critically analyze
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perspectives on gender within development practice (Schroeder, 1999). Moreover, the embrace
of participation within development coincided with a shifting development landscape beginning
in the 1980s when national governments sought to de-center development practice from macroeconomic initiatives, and charged local governments with the task of directly addressing the
‘basic needs’ of the populace (Willis, 2005). As Willis (2005) notes, however, development’s
decentralization also included the emergence of NGOs, whose proximity to local communities
was presumed to facilitate the incorporation of participatory methods in development practice.30
The use of participatory tools in development has most recently been discussed in
mainstream development literature in terms of stakeholder engagement, wherein stakeholders are
defined as those actors with a stake in the development project, and stakeholder engagement is
taken to be any effort to work directly with those actors (Brett, 2003; Forrester and Swartling et
al, 2008; Isham and Narayan et al, 1995). 31 Stakeholder engagement has, in turn, been linked to
the concept of social capital through discussions about how people act in relation to one another
such that they may contribute productively to the success of a development project (Woolcock
and Narayan, 2000). The goals of social capital, although not always identified as such, can be
found in the post-revolutionary attempts of the Mexican Federal Government to rearrange rural
social relations to form what have been termed Comunidades Revolucionarias Institucionales –
essentially organized communities of rural farmers designed to enhance the governance
objectives of the state (Rus, 1994).

In the end, participation, both in past examples and

contemporary thinking, came to be seen as an effective tool for enhancing the value of political
and development projects, by strategically rearranging social relations.
Decentralization reforms began in Mexico in the late-1980s and early-1990s, and featured the
direct involvement of local governments in the implementation of development projects (Fox and
Aranda, 1996; Otero, 1996; Teichman, 1996). This marked a strong contrast with traditional
centralized clientelistic and corporatist modes of operation favored by the Mexican Federal
Government since the 1910 Revolution. These decentralization efforts included state actors and
development NGOs who came to fill the void left by the hollowed-out Mexican neoliberal state
(Huerta Moreno, 2005; Otero, 1996; Walker and Roberts et al, 2008). However, despite this
trend, state-led development practice in southern Mexico continues to have a strong presence,
reflecting varying local socio-political and historical influences. Marcos (1994) notes that in
Chiapas, for example, the Mexican federal government continues to play a strong role in
development practice, where, he argues, such efforts comprise a key component of state-led
counter-insurgency and anti-Zapatista initiatives.
31
Definitions of stakeholders vary across the development industry, and in other arenas such as
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Definitions may be limited, including only those actors
who have a financial interest in a project (IFC, 2007). However, broader definitions tend to
include those actors with any stake – financial or otherwise – in the project in question. Given
that the participatory efforts studied in this paper often include actors with varying stakes in a
project, I take my cue from broader definitions of the term.
30
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For AMBIO, participation in education programs and Plan Vivo mapping is often
justified in terms of community empowerment. Such justifications may be useful for AMBIO in
terms of justifying Scolel’ Te to donors and outside organizations, although as it became clear in
Chapter 3, técnicos are often enrolled as cheap labor in an effort to overcome resource
limitations. Regardless, in this chapter, I make an effort to analyze the discursive components of
participation, while also assessing its significance as a unique labor process. In doing so, I make
it clear that participatory activities are predicated on a limited understanding of farmers and
farmer land-use decision-making, and that as a result, they re-shape farmer land-use patterns in
ways that undermine the social relations of production between farmers and AMBIO. However,
before discussing the participatory activities, I examine participation as it is discussed in critical
development studies, and link it to notions of community buy-in.
From Participation to Buy-in: Analyzing Participation as Discourse and Labor Process
Mainstream and NGO perspectives on participation revolve around questions of inclusivity and
empowerment within development work. In this chapter, I move beyond these discussions by
analyzing attempts by AMBIO to use participatory activities as a means to achieving community
buy-in. I do so by analyzing participation as both a discourse and a labor process. Viewing
participation as a discourse sheds light on AMBIO’s ideas about who farmers are and who they
can become – ideas that inform how and why they engage with local farmers in participatory
activities. Analyzing participation as a labor process, however, illustrates how AMBIO attempts
to produce a certain pattern of activity and relationship to the land among participating farmers in
Scolel’ Te. In this segment, I turn to critical development literature, social theory and labor
studies to analyze participation first as a discourse and second as a labor process through which
farmer buy-in is pursued. In the following section I then assess, in detail, AMBIO’s participatory
mapping exercises and member education programs, showing how, despite their attempts to
create trust and rearrange land-use activities in the labor process, they ultimately undermine the
social relations of production between AMBIO and farmers.
In order to assess below the underlying logics supporting AMBIO’s attempts to engage
farmers in participatory practice, it is necessary to first examine the role of discourse in
participatory development more broadly. The role of discourse within participatory development
must be analyzed in terms of power and knowledge (Crush, 2005; Escobar, 2005; Kothari, 2001).
Critical development studies illustrate the fact that within development practice, discourse is
powerful, particularly in its ability to produce specific ways of knowing (see especially Escobar,
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2005 and Esteva and Prakash, 1998). This work suggests that the types of things that come to be
known through development discourse include development practice as a-political (Ferguson,
1994) and as a vehicle for modernist projects (Ferguson, 1999; Scott, 1998). Moreover, this work
argues that the subjects of development emerge through the discursive creation of the ‘third
world’ (Escobar, 1995), or ‘impoverished women’ (Schroeder, 1999) upon which development
may be enacted. Ultimately, following Foucault (1990), this work argues that knowledge is
powerful, and that discourse, as a medium for knowledge production, becomes an ‘instrument’ of
that power.
Understanding the power of discourse is important for clarifying its role in development,
but so too is elucidating how discourses form within the context of development practice. In his
work, Bakhtin (1981) highlights the process through which diverse discursive elements come
together to form a powerful discourse. According to Bakhtin (1981), this process involves a
negotiation of meanings that is particularly complex. As he puts it:
“The way in which the word conceptualizes its object is a complex act – all
objects, open to dispute and overlain as they are with qualifications, are from one
side highlighted while from the other side dimmed by heteroglot social opinion,
by an alien word about them” (page 277).
Thus, for Bakhtin (1981), the negotiation of meanings through which objects are conceptualized
in discourse is complex, and is comprised of multiple possibilities for knowing. However, he also
argues that the manner in which such negotiations form coherent meanings is influenced by the
specific social and cultural context in which they occur. Thus, discourse is an instrument of
power that forms in a field of multiple possibilities of knowing. Moreover, its formation occurs
through a negotiation of meanings that is culturally and socially influenced. From this vantage
point, development discourse may be understood as a powerful mechanism through which
development and its subjects come to be known. Such knowledge is produced, moreover,
through negotiations in a field of multiple possible possibilities of knowing, and is influenced by
the context in which the negotiations occur.
Knowledge produced in development shapes how the subjects of development are
known, and has material effects in how development practice occurs.

In his analysis of

development programs in The Gambia, Schroeder (1999) analyzes the ways in which images of
women carrying large bundles of firewood on their heads, and in some cases a baby as well,
communicate the burdens experienced by women in responding to the needs of the family. He
notes, moreover, that such images convey a close connection of women to the natural
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environment, and suggest a selfless dedication on her behalf to the well being of the family.
Schroeder (1999) and O’Reilly (2006) note that constructs of this type form a significant and
powerful component of a participatory discourse, and that its effects are visible in efforts to
include the participation of women, who then come to be seen by project developers and
managers as victims, as having a close connection to the natural environment, and as being
selflessly dedicated to the well being of family and society. Moreover, they demonstrate that
such images play a key role in negotiations about the role of women within society, and justify
the pursuit of participatory development interventions.
Participatory discourse creates ways of knowing development’s subjects that justify the
use of participatory measures by managing organizations. However, in order to analyze why and
how AMBIO produces certain patterns of activity and relationships to the natural environment –
relationships that are different from existing human-environment relations – it is necessary to also
analyze participation as a labor processes.

Doing so illustrates how farmer land-use patters

become reworked in ways that cause farmers to question the project, ultimately undermining the
social relations of production between farmers and AMBIO. To do so, I make use of both AngloAmerican Marxist perspectives and Foucauldian optics in order to assess how workers become
enrolled in in the labor processes. The question of how farmers become enrolled in carbon
forestry through the labor process is important to consider given the disappointing and destructive
effects of carbon forestry as experienced by farmers looking to improve upon their marginal
livelihoods through participation in carbon forestry.
Foucauldian notions of the labor process examine the exercise of power through
management practices designed to align workers to manager’s objectives. In this literature,
employees are understood to oblige manager’s objectives in the labor process not because they
are forced to, but because, through their work, they have been transformed into subjects who
believe in management’s objectives. In such a scenario workers come to recognize themselves as
autonomous individuals whose sense of identity stems from participating in the labor processes
(Knights and Willmott, 1989). Elizabeth Dunn (2004) examines, for example, the manner in
which workers were taught in Poland to self-govern through the implementation of Total Quality
Management (TQM) practices designed to normalize worker behavior according to product
quality objectives at Gerber. She notes that power was not necessarily exercised through a visible
and domineering management style, but rather by inducing workers to buy-in to Gerber’s product
quality objectives. In a similar fashion, Robin Leidner (1993) examines the routinization of
service work in the insurance industry by training sales agents to engage processes of workplace
transformation in which they come to embody the routinized labor out of a desire to do so.
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Leidner’s (1993) study of the fast food industry is also instructive. Here, Leidner describes
McDonalds’ efforts to regulate labor and to preserve product homogeneity. She details the rules
and steps for each segment of the dissected food preparation process that were designed to
discipline workers to adhere to the “QSC” – quality, service, and cleanliness – credo.

Leidner

sees this type of detailed intervention in the labor process as a way to simultaneously discipline
workers and to ensure product quality – to make sure all hamburgers taste like the iconic
McDonalds hamburger. In these instances, power is exercised through worker participation in
ensuring product quality, and is designed to govern worker actions in the workplace by reshaping
their attitudes and actions such that they may reinforce their companies’ broader objectives.
While subject formation is one of the means through which people become enrolled in
labor processes, it is also important to consider how people become enrolled through incentives
and ‘game-playing.’ In his 1979 analysis, Burawoy discusses the process of ‘making out’ as a
means through which workers are able to flexibly negotiate the meaning and nature of work
within the confines of factory management. However, he notes that this process, although central
to getting ahead in the workplace, represents a commitment of workers to the rules of laboring in
the factory. In a related fashion, Braverman (1974) examines discipline in the workplace as a
means to extracting output from purchased labor, suggesting that worker autonomy is constrained
within management objectives. Finally, Mutersbaugh (2005) explores the manner in which the
‘harmonization’ of organic standards transforms rent relations, thus complicating farmer
participation in organic production.

Although power takes on a different form in Marxist

analyses of the labor process, this work is important for understanding the implications and
experience of participation in the labor process for workers.
Drawing on critical development literature, social theory and labor studies, I critically
reassess the nature of participatory development, suggesting that participation must be seen as
both a discourse and a labor process. I suggest that both modalities of participation feature the
negotiation of different types of meaning, and that both are central to achieving community buyin to Scolel’ Te. In the former manifestation, negotiations concern meanings about who farmers
are and who they can become as a result of their participation in Scolel’ Te, while in the latter,
negotiations pertain to the meaning of farmer relationships to development, to their land and to
capital. In this chapter I suggest that participatory exercises tied to Scolel’ Te must be seen first
as a discourse through which specific ways of knowing rural farmers in Chiapas emerge. It is a
discourse that re-produces a specific type of knowledge about farmers – a knowledge that is then
mobilized by AMBIO to justify participatory interventions in the form of mapmaking and
education programs. Importantly, the meanings negotiated through participatory activities in
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Scolel’ Te are negotiated within southern Mexico’s broader development landscape. Thus, the
ways of knowing that inform AMBIO’s work reflect broader attitudes and modes of thinking
common to development programs within the state.
In this chapter I suggest that the suite of participatory tools used by AMBIO is essential
to securing community buy-in to the project. It is, however, also important for securing the buyin of international funders. Given the popularity of participation in mainstream development
practice, the use of Plan Vivo mapping and member education programs demonstrates a
commitment to local empowerment by AMBIO, a fact that may be considered attractive by
potential funders.

Regarding the former, I argue that community buy-in consists of two

components: 1) the general acceptance of Scolel’ Te by participating communities; and 2) the
commitment of participating farmers to the future success of the project. The first component is
concerned with questions of trust between participating communities and AMBIO, while the
second is tied to the actions and beliefs of project participants over time. In the next section I
examine how AMBIO draws on Plan Vivo mapping and participant training exercises in order to
ensure community buy-in by forging trust between AMBIO and project participants, and by
beginning to reorganize farmer relationships to development, to their land, and to capital. I argue
that these efforts must be seen as a labor process and as a participatory discourse, and that they
find meaning in broader participatory development trends as well as the complex socio-political
context of Chiapas.
Securing the future of carbon development: AMBIO and the Plan Vivo Mapping
The participatory tools used by AMBIO originate in the Plan Vivo Standard under which Scolel’
Te’s activities are organized. While standards emphasize a variety of items across forest carbon
projects (e.g. the protection of biodiversity and the promotion of clean water sources), the Plan
Vivo Standard is recognized for privileging local participation in defining community
involvement in carbon forestry, particularly through activities such as Plan Vivo mapping. In this
section I argue that Plan Vivo mapping is a method of stakeholder engagement designed to
achieve community buy-in by re-shaping farmer relationships to AMBIO, to their land and to
capital. However, I argue that such efforts are justified through a participatory discourse that
presents farmers as in need of Scolel’ Te and as standing to benefit from their participation in the
program. It moreover reorganizes their relationships to their land in ways that are blind to the
many factors that shape farmer land-use patterns and resource management practices, thus
marginalizing farmer knowledge and threatening their long-term commitment to the project. This
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outcome ultimately undermines social relations of production between AMBIO and participating
farmers, thereby destabilizing relationships upon which project success depends.
Plan Vivo Mapping: Trust and the Farmer-Manager Relationship
AMBIO’s need to achieve community buy-in stems from the damaging effects of project
participation highlighted in Chapter 4, and from a general distrust by farming communities
toward development projects in the region.

In Chiapas, broad mistrust among farming

communities exists toward state- and non-state-led development projects. This mistrust stems, in
part, from the fact that since the 1994 Zapatista uprising, state-led development programs have
tended to marginalize pro-Zapatista communities who contend that such initiatives are designed
to contribute to the federal government’s counterinsurgency efforts (Romero, 2009). Meanwhile,
many non-Zapatista communities consider development to be ineffective, as state-led agricultural
support programs have been plagued by inefficiencies and corruption (Fox and Haight, 2010).
For both Zapatista-aligned and government-aligned communities this scenario is compounded by
the fact that the conditions of poverty they face are greater on average than those experienced by
rural communities in Mexico’s other regions.

Given these three factors, many farming

communities have come to question the intentions of government and non-government actors
proclaiming to have the best interests of farming communities in mind. Thus, AMBIO’s ability
to recruit farmers to participate in Scolel’ Te depends on their ability to alter the relationship of
participating communities to development organizations, including AMBIO, from one marked by
a disposition of mistrust to one defined by a shared belief in the potential success of Scolel’ Te
and the resultant well-being of participating communities.
Trust is central to recruitment in Scolel’ Te, but it is also a key component in AMBIO’s
management of the program. Project management in the Scolel’ Te program is complicated by
Chiapas’ rural and geographically diverse countryside, by the state’s poor communications
infrastructure, and by AMBIO’s limited personnel. Thus, the success of Scolel’ Te depends on
AMBIO’s ability to reduce farmer dependence on outside monitoring, and to induce farmers to
engage in Scolel’ Te not because a project manager is holding them accountable, but because they
wish to do so out of their own free will. It depends on what Leidner (1993) refers to as a
“routinization through transformation” in which workers learn to routinize their own labor by
learning to desire routinized work.

Remaking farmer subjectivities in this way, AMBIO

suggests, is only possible in a scenario where trust forms a significant portion of the
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organization’s relationship with participating farmers. Only in the presence of such trust, they
note, can Scolel’ Te to continue to operate despite scant resources.
For AMBIO, the work of building trust-based relationships that will allow for the
management of Scolel’ Te begins with Plan Vivo participatory mapping. AMBIO notes that local
participation in the mapping process allows farmers to outline the parameters of their
participation in Scolel’ Te, thus making them feel as though they have a stake in the project.
Mapping coordinators indicate, however, that an absence of local participation in the mapping
process threatens the long-term success of the project:
“If we [AMBIO employees] become impatient with the mapping, which can take
quite a long time, and decide to do the mapping ourselves, the entire planning
process becomes broken and the producer [participating farmer] loses his or her
identification with the project.”
This lack of identification, they advise, is especially visible in instances where farmers abandon
Scolel’ Te during the course of the project.
Issues of trust between AMBIO and participating communities surface early in the Plan
Vivo mapping process. During the initial phases of the exercise farmers are asked by AMBIO’s
mapping coordinators to begin to map their land parcels onto a blank sheet of paper (see Figure
5.1), a task, that for many farmers and for a variety of reasons, proves to be challenging. First,
given illiteracy rates in the state, many participating farmers do not know how to read and write.
Thus, as AMBIO notes, the task of using a marker to draw a map closely mimics writing, and is
challenging for farmers who fear embarrassment in the presence of fellow community members
and the visiting organization. Additionally, given the complex socio-political climate in Chiapas
since the Zapatista uprising, and the conflict surrounding mapping initiatives in the region, many
farmers fear that the produced map will further empower outside actors to dispossess them of
their land.32 Given these reservations, farmers are often advised by leaders in their communities
to provide only general information in the mapmaking process in an attempt to limit what is
shared with AMBIO. For farmers, it represents a means of ‘making out’ (see Burawoy, 1979) – a
means of providing strategically sufficient information so as to be able to participate in Scolel’ Te
without compromising their control over land resources. However, the mistrust faced by AMBIO
As noted in Chapter 1, the Zapatista uprising was followed by successive attempts by the
Mexican state to weaken pro-Zapatista communities – initiatives that have bred mistrust among
farming communities toward outside organizations. Additionally, the destabilization of rural land
tenure rights through the 1992 termination of the ejido land tenure system has led to relative land
insecurity among farmers.
32
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from the initial moments of its work with participating communities reflects broader misgivings
by rural communities toward working with development practitioners in the state.
In an effort to overcome these obstacles and to encourage farmer participation, AMBIO
suggests to participants that they begin by writing their name at the top of the piece of paper
where the map is to be drawn. AMBIO notes that despite high illiteracy, the majority of
participants are able to write their name, and that doing so instills a sense of confidence in their
ability to comply with the requirements of the mapping activity. Moreover, doing so provides
farmers with a small degree of familiarity with using the marker and paper in producing the map.
In initial phases of the mapping process AMBIO’s goal is to begin to build farmer trust that will
not only facilitate mapmaking, but also endure throughout the project. “While the mapmaking
process is essential to building trust, the Plan Vivo [map] is the producer’s trust solidified in a
document,” suggested one AMBIO employee. Thus, the initial phases of the mapping activity
represent the first steps in reorienting farmer relationships to AMBIO from one of doubt and
misgivings to one of trust.
Plan Vivo Mapping: Reshaping Farmer Relationships to Their Land
The long-term success of Scolel’ Te depends not only on trust, but also on AMBIO’s ability to
reconstitute farmer relationships to their land.

How this happens in practice is shaped by

AMBIO’s expectations of who farmers are as resource managers and who they might become
through their participation in Scolel’ Te. These expectations, what Ferguson (1994) refers to as
the expectations of development, are visible in AMBIO’s perceptions of rural smallholder work
ethic, land-use patterns and entrepreneurial ambition. Moreover, they are based in logics that
conform to project management objectives and marginalize the knowledges of participating
farmers. In Chiapas, farmer land-use practices relate to the production of corn, beans, coffee, and
cattle. For many farmers land is tied to survival through subsistence food production. How land
is used, though, is shaped by the complex interaction of a variety of factors within rural farming
communities. These factors are political in nature, and include land availability, access to inputs
such as seeds and fertilizer, shifting environmental patterns and soil conditions, and proximity to
protected areas such as the Reserva de la Biosfera la Sepultura, and the Reserva La Frailescana
(see Appendix A, Table 6A). These factors shift from year to year, thus, altering farmer land-use
patterns that may appear erratic or unplanned over time to outside organizations.
Protected areas such as the Biosfera La Sepultura and the Reserva La Frailescana shape
farming practices in several ways. First, since the creation of the reserves in 2007 and 2010,
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farmers report having been prohibited from hunting animals within the protected areas and from
harvesting trees so as to clear more land for planting. Moreover, through their work with the
Mexican National Commission for Protected Areas (CONANP) farmers have been discouraged
from using fire to clear and prepare land for annual planting. Of these changes, the latter has
proven to have the largest impact on agricultural practices. According to local farmers, fire not
only clears land, but also kills soil-based plagues and insects that threaten annual crops. Farmers
noted in interviews that by avoiding the use of fire, they had compromised production by
allowing plagues and insects to flourish in the soil.
A second political factor determining the quantity of crops planted in a given year relates
to government-led agricultural support programs relied on by farmers for seeds and fertilizer.
According to local producers in both communities, resources stemming from government
programs such as PROCAMPO are notoriously unpredictable in the sense that resources typically
arrive after planting in April or not at all. The unpredictability of funding from government
programs is often attributed to the corrupt practices of local politicians who present an obstacle to
the efficient distribution of funds. Fox and Haight (2010) note, for example, that PROCAMPO,
which was designed originally to mitigate the predicted impacts of trade liberalization on smallscale agricultural producers, has been marked by inefficiencies, unequal funding distribution and
fraud that have prevented the provisioning of resources to many poor farmers. They suggest that
this has increased insecurities among poor farmers who depend on government support for their
agricultural activities, thus leading to skepticism among producers toward such projects.
A third element shaping farmer land-use decisions includes land availability – a variable
that is determined by a variety of factors. First, as was discussed in Chapter 4, land availability is
often influenced by the standing of individual farmers within their community. Land ownership
within a community tends to be concentrated among ejidatarios with formal ejidal authority.
Those who do not have land are often forced to rent from family members or others within their
communities. These farmers often find themselves in a precarious situation defined by a greater
pressure to obtain the income needed to pay rent on their land.

Farmers with more land

ultimately have greater flexibility in determining which crops they are going to plant and where
they are going to plant them, while renters are limited to planting only as many crops as can be
supported by the rented land parcel – generally only enough to support their family and to pay
back the lender.
Finally, a fourth factor shaping land-planning decisions involves the type of soil available
to the individual farmer within their plot of land. According to farmers, beans tend to grow better
in less than fertile soil, due in part to their capacity to fix soil nitrogen. Moreover, farmers note
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that beans tend to grow better on slopes given that their short stature does not expose them to
damaging winds during the rainy season.33 Corn, which is planted at the beginning of the rainy
season and harvested just after the beginning of the dry season (December/January), is planted in
more fertile soils. Corn tends to be planted in flatter portions of land parcels where wind during
the rainy season will not damage the large stocks of the corn plant. Some farmers will intercrop
beans and corn, taking advantage of the bean’s ability to fix soil nitrogen and the corn plant’s
ability to support bean plants in order to achieve efficient production of both. Many farmers,
however, do not practice intercropping, arguing that doing so complicates harvesting processes.
Ultimately, land planning decisions are influenced by political factors, land availability,
soil conditions, and seasonality. Given that each of these factors varies from year to year, land
planning decisions change over time and are flexible, shifting in accordance with the changing
availability of land and resources needed to plant crops. Each of these factors shapes how
farmers view their land and its potential to produce the crops that are needed throughout the year.
These factors, although known by governmental and non-governmental organizations
working in Chiapas, are often invisible in the face of development objectives that warrant
alternative perspectives on natural resources and resource use.

Political ecology literature

addresses this conflict of perspectives in development work, highlighting the extent to which
farmer livelihoods involve the continual balancing of social, economic and environmental factors
(Bassett and Zuéli, 2003; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011; Hecht, 2004).
It demonstrates, moreover, that although these factors are prevalent in the lives of many living in
developing countries, they often go unseen by development practitioners whose objectives
privilege divergent considerations.
After nearly 17 years of work in Chiapas, AMBIO has become well aware of the many
factors shaping land-use patterns in farming communities, including the types of agricultural
activities pursued in the state. This is especially visible in the various flexible carbon forestry
systems designed by AMBIO to build on the many productive activities of participating farmers
(see Chapter 3). However, despite AMBIO’s sensitivity to participants’ productive activities,
they often view land-use decisions through a lens altogether different than that of project
Beans may be planted and harvested twice in a calendar year. The first planting is at the
beginning of the rainy season, and is harvested in August. Farmers noted in interviews that given
that the harvest of the first planting falls in the middle of the rainy season, few beans are planted
as wet soil conditions may complicate the harvest. Although harvests during these months may
be small, they are designed to serve as a backup to the second and larger bean crop, which is
harvested in December/January following the end of the rainy season. Because harvesting is less
complicated during this time, farmers plant significantly greater quantities of beans so as to
support the family over the next year.

33
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participants. For AMBIO, smallholder land is valuable not only because of its potential to
produce corn, beans, cattle and coffee, but also because of its potential to capture CO 2 and to
produce carbon credits. Moreover, land is seen by AMBIO to be a resource, that, when managed
in a specific fashion, could facilitate poverty alleviation by integrating farming communities into
global carbon markets. According to AMBIO, however, this potential is limited by the perceived
lack of entrepreneurial ambition held by smallholders in the state. As one AMBIO employee put
it:
“There does not exist [among farming communities] the initiative to determine
what they want. I mean, they are not proactive; they are static, waiting for
whatever comes their way.”
Ultimately, in AMBIO’s view, the perceived lack of initiative by smallholders in exploiting their
land to its commercial extent limits their capacity to reap its full potential.

Figure 5.1 Completed Plan Vivo Map
Photo Credit: Author
The non-entrepreneurial perspective assumed by AMBIO to be held by participating
communities is often generalized to suggest that farmers have no land-planning practices. Such
sentiments are common among policy makers and development practitioners in Mexican
governmental and non-governmental circles. In the case of Scolel’ Te such perspectives justify
land-use planning interventions such as Plan Vivo mapping in the perceived absence of pre-
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existing practices by local farmers. These attitudes and comments form a discourse that presents
farmers as unknowledgeable stewards of their natural resources, whose lack of ambition merits
the intervention by AMBIO with the use of Plan Vivo mapping (see Appendix A, Table 2A).
From this vantage point, Plan Vivo mapping must be understood as designed to introduce specific
land-use planning practices so as to encourage farmers to interact with their land in a manner
consistent with the objectives of Scolel’ Te. As one mapping coordinator suggested, “…what we
look for in the planning process is the permanence of the project within the community.” Thus,
the Plan Vivo mapping must be seen as a land-use planning activity designed to allow farmers to
begin to view their land as the raw material with which carbon credits may be produced, and to
encourage them to act in such a way that they may support the long-term production of carbon
credits and the success of Scolel’ Te.
Following the initial phases of Plan Vivo mapping, farmers are asked to begin to map
their land, a task that proves to be challenging for many participants. This stems from the fact
that many participants often find it difficult to imagine their communities and their land in ways
that make them amenable to mapping. “It is a psychological question to look at a blank piece of
paper and to ask, ‘where do I begin?’” admitted one mapping coordinator. In response, AMBIO
attempts to guide farmers in the mapping process, and in doing so to alter farmer imaginations of
their own land so that they may begin to interact with it in a manner consistent with the objectives
of Scolel’ Te. One mapping coordinator described this process, which involves several steps, in
the following manner:
“First we ask farmers to identify a location – a church, a school, or some other
landmark in their community and to mark it with a symbol – a circle, a star, or
even a tree. Next, we ask farmers to identify another nearby landmark, such as a
road, and to mark it on the map in relation to the first landmark. Finally, we ask
them to identify their house, and to mark it with a symbol on the map.”
It is in this process that the map starts to obtain meaning both for AMBIO’s mapping coordinators
and for the mappers. It is a moment in the mapping process that, as Herlihey (3003), Herlihey
and Knapp (2003) and Offen (2003) note, is transformative for both the mappers and the mapping
coordinators. “They provide us an up-to-date view of their community,” mentioned one mapping
coordinator. “It is much more accurate than we could hope to do ourselves without their
assistance”. At this point the produced map begins to acquire meaning for participatory mappers
as well. The mapping coordinator continued:
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“After farmers have identified their house, we ask them to locate their parcel of
land and to begin to draw it. We ask them to mark where they plant beans, and to
show where they graze cattle. Once they have finished this we ask them to
identify which [agroforestry] system they want to plant”.
AMBIO works with farmers in this manner to map their land parcels and to identify agroforestry
systems so as to change farmer relationships to their land – both in terms of how they understand
it and in terms of how they manage it. This, they argue, is essential to the long-term success of
Scolel’ Te. John Pickles (2004) suggests that territory comes into being through its mapping, and
that how people inhabit that territory is shaped, in part, by the produced map – a point
emphasized by Mutersbaugh (2014) in noting the role of mapping in portraying communal land in
Oaxaca as private property. 34 For Pickles, maps are responsible for the production of a new
spatial reality made visible by the produced map. In this light, AMBIO’s objective with the
mapping exercise must be seen as intricately tied to how carbon credit producers know and
interact within the carbon credit production space. In so doing, the mapping process and the
produced map become vehicles through which AMBIO may begin to assert project governance
among participants.

Within participatory mapping, both the mapping process and the produced map have been
critically assessed, particularly within the sphere of critical geography. Harley (1989) argues, for
example that maps are tools – sources of knowledge – that are laden with power. As tools, maps
permit the holders of the map to not only newly know a space, but also to use the knowledge
obtained through the map to act on that space in specific ways (Pickles, 2004). Given the power
of the map as a tool, they argue that it is necessary to understand the conditions of a map’s
production – i.e. who produced it and for what purposes – including how the map might be
employed in a manner alternative to that intended by its original producers.
The perspectives raised by critical mapping literature are important to this discussion,
particularly given two factors: 1) the highly conflictual and oft-critiqued México Indígena project
in Chiapas’ neighboring state, Oaxaca, which was part of the larger Bowman Expeditions and
funded by the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (see Bryan,
2010; Wainwright, 2012); and 2) the tense socio-political environment in Chiapas since the 1994
Zapatista uprising. The México Indígena project, which involved the use of participatory
mapping funded by the FMSO, has raised serious questions regarding the relationship between
political agendas, participatory mapping and power relations (Bryan, 2010). Such questions are
also relevant in the Chiapas context where, since 1994, military objectives and development have
formed an integral part of the Mexican state’s controversial and violent counterinsurgency
strategy. In this context the political life of maps is apparent. Thus, although participatory
mapping has been heralded as a progressive element in development practice, it is not always
politically and/or militarily neutral. Ultimately, it is a means through which much information
may be obtained about groups of people – information with which many goals may be pursued.
Plan Vivo mapping does not have the stigma of other mapping initiatives in Mexico, and has not
been linked with controversial activities such as the México Indígena project. However, Plan
Vivo maps are no less powerful, nor is the Plan Vivo mapping process.
34
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Figure 5.2 Plan Vivo Mapping with Community Mappers and Mapping Coordinators
Photo Credit: Author

While such work is justified by AMBIO according to their attempts to achieve project
permanence and to activate social capital, it is founded on assumptions about who farmers are as
farmers and resource managers that come into conflict with the perceptions and logics held by the
farmers themselves. While many farmers participate in the Plan Vivo mapping process, some
indicate a dissatisfaction with the manner in which they are asked to organize their land-planning
activities as a condition of their participation in the program. Speaking with one farmer, Don
Zacarías, in the Sierra Madre region about the Plan Vivo mapping, he responded curtly, and in a
frustrated manner, to my question regarding the assumption that farmers do not have defined
land-use planning practices:
“From the moment the farmer wants to plant corn, he already has a work plan.
From the moment the farmer wants [to build] a house, he already has a work
plan. From the moment a farmer wants [to build] a table, he already has a work
plan. From the moment a farmer wants [to build] a chair, he already has a work
plan… what material he is going to use, how much it will cost… this is his work
plan. It is nothing else… just different. There in AMBIO it [the planning
process] is different because it is letters, books, forms and journals. Here no.
Here it is the farm. It is practice. The farmer does not write it down, but he
remembers. Everyone has a plan… everything has to be planned, that’ s just the
way it is.”
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The frustration inherent in this quote was motivated, in part, by what seemed like childish
questions by someone who clearly had no idea how agricultural production is achieved. On the
other hand, however, it reflected a chorus of comments and attitudes among others within the
region who inferred that farmers have planning processes that are influenced by multiple factors
(see Appendix A, Table 6A). In response to questions about planting decisions, one farmer
responded in an exasperated manner, “The decision is easy… do we have the money to do it
[plant] or not. If we do not have the money, we do nothing.” In the end, farmers indicated that
they no longer wished to commit to a project that forced them to engage with their land in ways
that they did not find beneficial or commensurate with their needs. “I must use fire to clear my
land”, suggested one farmer, Carlos, who noted its ability to adequately and effectively prepare
land for planting.
Plan Vivo Mapping: Shifting Farmer Relationships to Carbon Capital
Plan Vivo mapping is designed not only to alter farmer relationships to AMBIO and their land,
but also to capital. Through their integration into carbon markets farmers enter into relation with
several forms of capital that drive carbon markets, particularly investment capital designated for
new project development, including project expansion, and revenue that results from the sale of
carbon credits. On one hand, capital designated for new project development confronts farming
communities in the form of project implementation and project expansion. On the other hand,
revenue related to the sale of carbon credits confronts farmers in the form of payments for work
in promoting carbon capture by establishing and maintaining agroforestry systems. While both
forms of capital stem from distinct actions, they are alike in that their presence depends on the
continued success of forest carbon projects. Efforts to ensure continued investment in project
growth and to safeguard revenue generation from the sale of carbon credits are visible in risk
mitigation. In the context of Scolel’ Te, risk mitigation involves pro-actively addressing, to the
extent possible, all factors that may threaten the release of CO2 into the atmosphere. These
factors contribute to the risk of reversal – i.e. the risk of emitting CO2 rather than contributing to
its sequestration – and include the destruction of planted trees by variables such as neglect and
fire, and land-use activities such as cattle grazing (Galik and Jackson, 2009).35

Those factors that are outside the control of project managers – known as force majeure – are
often accounted for in complex clauses within the purchase agreements developed between
carbon credit sellers and buyers (Hawkins and Nowlin et al, 2010).

35
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One element of Plan Vivo mapping is designed to organize farmer land-use activities
such that their actions result in risk mitigation rather than risk proliferation, thereby safeguarding
investments in project development and ensuring the continued flow of revenue from carbon
credit sales. Once maps have been produced and the agroforestry systems have been selected,
AMBIO works with farmers to identify key risks to carbon credit production. For many farmers,
one key land-use activity involves the application of fire to prepare land for planting. However,
despite the efficiency of such fires in clearing brush and killing plagues, AMBIO notes that it
represents a risk to agroforestry systems. Thus, AMBIO begins by asking farmers to indicate on
the Plan Vivo map where fire is used on their land parcel. Additionally, farmers are asked to
identify whether their neighbors use fire so as to locate external fire-related threats. Next,
working with the map, coordinators demonstrate to farmers how to strategically place fire line
trenches so as to control burning fires, and begin to discuss alternatives to using fire for land
clearing and preparation. The purpose of this exercise is to develop methods for controlling and
limiting the use of fire so as to minimize its threat to established agroforestry systems.
An equally destructive force to newly planted trees is grazing cattle, which often leads to
the destruction of saplings, thus reducing the tree’s ability to grow over time. During the Plan
Vivo mapping, farmers are asked to identify areas of their land parcels where grazing cattle may
threaten tree plantings. Farmers are then asked to protect new plantings by identifying areas
where they can move cattle so as to isolate them from the planted trees. Thus, Plan Vivo
mapping is designed, in part, to minimize risk in the carbon credit production process,
particularly those risks associated with the use of fire in agricultural activities and by grazing
cattle. In doing so AMBIO hopes to not only safeguard revenue generation tied to the sale of
carbon credits, but also to demonstrate to potential investors in project expansion that Scolel’ Te
is able to provide a positive return on investments in project development. This is illustrated by
Figure 5.3, which shows how two subsistence activities – the use of fire for land preparation and
cattle grazing – present risks that may prevent future investment in Scolel’ Te by international
project funders and international carbon credit buyers.
In the end, Plan Vivo mapping is strongly influenced and shaped by AMBIO. AMBIO
not only aids local participants in overcoming their reservations with regard to the mapping
process, but also inserts itself into the activity. From the start, AMBIO dictates what types of
knowledge and information will be reproduced in the Plan Vivo map. Given AMBIO’s influence
in the production of Plan Vivos, it is clear that Plan Vivo mapping is not designed to utilize local
frames of reference in the implementation of Scolel’ Te, but about reinterpreting local knowledge
within external frames of understanding – frames which reflect the ideals and goals of AMBIO
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about climate change mitigation and rural poverty alleviation. Within the mapping process,
visible power dynamics between coordinators and mappers shape how participation is managed,
what is included in the map, and for which purposes. These accounts demonstrate the extent to
which participation is limited by power relations within development projects (see Mutersbaugh,
1998; O’Reilly, 2006), and the manner in which those activities, which claim to be participatory,
are designed to implement governance within project management.

Figure 5.3 Carbon Capital and Risk Mitigation in Scolel’ Te

Participant Training
While Plan Vivo mapping is central to achieving community buy-in, particularly by encouraging
farmers to come to see Scolel’ Te as their own, it is not the only means through which AMBIO
attempts to engage participants and to solidify farmer dedication to Scolel’ Te. In addition to the
Plan Vivo mapping AMBIO draws on a multi-pronged education program through which it
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attempts to enhance farmer awareness on issues regarding climate change and the potential for
PES projects to address such concerns. It is, as Tania Li (2007: 5) says, an effort to “educate
desires” and “configure habits, aspirations and beliefs.” In other words, the education program is
designed to change what farmers believe to be true about the natural environment and natural
resources, and to educate new desires and aspirations that are in-line with those new beliefs.
More specifically, AMBIO wants farmers to come to understand the issue of climate change as a
concept and a problem, to value forests as a means to mitigating climate change, and to want to
mitigate it by participating in PES projects, particularly Scolel’ Te.

In other words, it is

concerned with inducing farmers to accept a discursive construct that runs counter to their manner
of framing climatic changes in the natural environment - a construct that also displaces the issue
of climate changes from the problem of overconsumption to its symptomatic greenhouse gases.
AMBIO’s education program consists of three mediums: pamphlets, videos and
workshops (which are held within participating communities and in San Cristóbal de las Casas).
In the Sierra Madre region of Chiapas, are designed for both adults and children, and tend to take
place 2-3 times per year, although communities reported a declining number of workshops as of
2012.36 The pamphlet and video, on the other hand, were produced by AMBIO with support from
various organizations, including Conservation International (CI), the local college, El Colegio
Ecológico de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR), and government organizations such as the Ministry of
the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT). These materials are distributed to the
técnicos comunitarios (discussed in Chapter 4) to share with their communities. AMBIO’s goal
is to draw on these three mediums in order to provide multiple means through which to engage
farmers, participating communities and project managers so that they may learn about climate
change, learn to value forests in their relation to climate change, and to become involved in
payment for ecosystem services projects such as Scolel’ Te.
Educating Desires, Configuring Habits and Beliefs
One key goal for AMBIO is to induce farmers to care and worry about climate change and to
want to work to mitigate its advance. For this reason, AMBIO engages rural communities in
classes, and distributes pamphlets and videos to Scolel’ Te participants. These three mediums
attempt to achieve this goal in several ways: 1) they present the issue of climate change,
suggesting that it is a threat to the well being of the natural environment and to rural communities
This was not verified by AMBIO. However, given the challenges faced by AMBIO as
described in Chapter 3, a decline in education programs would not be altogether surprising.

36
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in Mexico; 2) they present forests as valuable – both in a scientific context and a more culturallyspecific manner, demonstrating that they should be protected and enhanced; and 3) they present
PES projects as the answer to mitigating climate change and protecting valuable forests. In this
segment I analyze the manner in which each medium addresses climate change, forests and PES
programs as a means to inducing farmers to conceptualize their participation in Scolel’ Te in new
ways.
Climate change is a term that is used pervasively by governments and development
organizations to justify the establishment and management of PES projects. However, in many
rural communities in the Sierra Madre of Chiapas, ‘climate change’ – cambio climático – is not a
term that is commonly used. While farmers may discuss shifts in the rainy and dry seasons,
greater intensity in rainfall and hotter dry seasons, such discussions are often linked to personal
localized experiences rather than to the abstract globally-applicable term of climate change. This
became clear in conversations with farmers who would employ the term ‘climate change’ to
describe entirely different processes. “Climate change means that the weather is getting better,”
suggested one farmer. “Before we started this project [Scolel’ Te] the climate was very hot. But
because we are planting trees and taking care of the forests, the climate is now changing and
becoming cooler.” As this farmer’s comments illustrate, although climatic changes are perceived
and experienced by farmers, such shifts are not necessarily known as ‘climate change.’
Given AMBIO’s position within global voluntary carbon markets, its relationship to
organizations such as the World Bank who funds its activities, and the positionality of its
members who have been educated at universities and colleges across Mexico and abroad, the use
of ‘climate change’ as a term describing human-induced climate change is not surprising. In the
video, which was disseminated by AMBIO to the técnicos comunitarios, ‘climate change’ is
described as human-induced (i.e. the result of forest loss, land-use change and excessive fossil
fuel use), and is presented as a threat to society and the natural environment. Interestingly, in the
pamphlet, which was also distributed to the técnicos comunitarios to share with farmers working
in Scolel’ Te, the effects of climate change are also described, although the term is not used as a
referent. Here, the causes and effects pertain more closely to the reality of rural life in farming
communities in the Sierra Madre Region.

The causes mentioned include the use of fire to

prepare land for farming and the clearing of trees along river banks, while the effects described
include an increased incidence in hurricanes, stronger rains and swollen rivers, and the need to
look increasingly further from the community for firewood and water.
Although the treatment of climate change is different in the video and the pamphlet, the
purpose is shared. In each case, climate change is framed as a concept ready for participant
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consumption – even if the word is not directly used – so that farmers may come to think about the
natural environment as troubled and as in need of a committed response. “We want farmers to
participate [in Scolel’ Te] because they care about the natural environment and want to fight
climate change, not because they are being supervised by us,” mentioned one employee with
AMBIO. Thus, the idea is to create the problem for the farmer – the reason (beyond monetary
gain) for their participation in Scolel’ Te.
In addition to creating the problem of climate change, the pamphlet and the community
workshops take steps to induce farmers to value their forests as they pertain to PES projects. In
the pamphlet, forests are considered valuable according to both scientific and locally specific
rationale.

On the one hand forests are discussed in terms of their ability to regulate water and

carbon cycles, while on the other hand they are discussed in terms of their importance to families
and communities. In the pamphlet forests are referred to as “a piece of paradise” (un pedacito de
paraíso), where families and communities can escape the heat and enjoy the company of one
another. The “piece of paradise” is presented as a diminishing resource that all communities once
had, but which is now held only by a few.
Courses carried out by AMBIO in participating communities share this sentiment, placing
value on forests and the natural environment more generally. As the mother of two girls who had
attended the classes suggested:
“In the classes our children were given two maps: one that showed the Mother
Earth smiling and another that showed the Mother Earth crying. The kids were
told that Mother Earth was happy when she was taken care of, but cried when we
threw trash on the ground or killed animals. They were then asked which Mother
Earth they preferred, the happy Mother Earth or the sad Mother Earth. They
were told that when we cut down trees Mother Earth is sad because it is as if we
are pulling out her hair.”
Here, children are presented an anthropomorphized version of the natural environment with
which they are able to develop either nurturing or harmful relationships.

By linking

environmentally friendly actions to emotions of happiness, and environmentally harmful actions
to sadness, children are taught to value the natural environment as something that should be cared
for.
Finally, the pamphlet combines the issue of climate change and the value of forests and
the natural environment within PES projects. Here PES projects are presented in terms of their
potential to respond to climate change while preserving the valuable forests in the region.
Moreover, farmers are told in the pamphlet that for their efforts in preserving and expanding
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existing forests, they will be reimbursed monetarily. The pamphlet addresses common concerns
held by farmers, such as why they should have to work to mitigate the problems caused by people
living in other countries, or insecurities regarding what might happen to their land and forests
once they decide to participate – i.e. whether they will they be sold and who will have control
over them. Farmers are told that PES projects depend on cooperation among communities
wherein in ne must play their part to fight climate change, including women who have a right to
participate.
Ultimately, AMBIO wants participating communities to work in Scolel’ Te because they
care about the natural environment and want to bring an end to human-induced climate change.
This is important given AMBIO’s limited resources. In addition to Plan Vivo mapping, AMBIO
relies on three aspects of an education program to do this: a pamphlet, a video and classes for
participating communities. Together, the three mediums attempt to do several things: 1) frame
and present the problem of climate change to participating communities; 2) induce farmers to
value forests and the natural environment as keys to mitigating climate change; and 3) to promote
PES projects such as Scolel’ Te as a means to protect forests and respond to climate change. As
such, they are designed to create a multi-media means to reconfiguring farmer beliefs, attitudes
and desires regarding Scolel’ Te, the natural environment and their relationship to it.
In the end, despite AMBIO’s efforts, the education program is limited by several factors.
To begin, some técnicos comunitarios do not share the videos and pamphlets provided to them
with their communities. Técnicos comunitarios are not paid for this work and many do not want
to take the time to distribute the materials. Additionally, farmers whose relationship to their
community has been strained by their work with Scolel’ Te (see Chapter 4) are hesitant to
enthusiastically share this information with fellow participants in their communities. In some
cases the materials provided by AMBIO stay in the home of the técnico comunitario and are
never shared with fellow participants. In instances where técnicos comunitarios are willing to
share the materials, dispersion of the information is challenged by the fact that many farmers are
illiterate and unable to read the text in the pamphlet. Moreover, many people do not have access
to a DVD player with which they may watch the video. Thus, although the educational training
carried-out by AMBIO involves several mediums, its dissemination to project participants has
been limited in some cases.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I draw on critical development literature, social theory, political ecology and labor
process theory, in order to examine community participation in Scolel’ as a discourse and as a
labor practice designed to assist AMBIO in its efforts to achieve community buy-in. I make use
of both Anglo-American Marxist perspectives and Foucauldian optics as a means to assessing the
ways in which workers are enrolled in labor processes by the remaking of the subject and the
incentives forms and ‘game-playing.’ Such enrollment methods are important to consider given
the mistrust of development organizations in the Sierra Madre region, and the disappointing and
destructive effects of carbon forestry as experienced by farmers looking to improve upon
marginal livelihoods through participation in carbon forestry.
In this chapter I argue that participatory practices are motivated by a discourse about
farmers with regard to who they are and who they may become as a result of their participation in
Scolel’ Te. These assumptions about who farmers are as resource managers come into conflict
with the perceptions and logics held by the farmers themselves. Moreover, the land planning
practices encouraged by AMBIO through the Plan Vivo mapping are blind to the many factors
that shape farmer land-use decisions. Despite AMBIO’s sensitivity to participants’ productive
activities, they often view land-use decisions through a lens altogether different than that of
project participants. For AMBIO, smallholder land is valuable not only because of its potential to
produce corn, beans, cattle and coffee, but also because of its potential to capture CO 2 and to
produce carbon credits. Moreover, land is seen by AMBIO to be a resource, that, when managed
in a specific fashion, could facilitate poverty alleviation by integrating farming communities into
global carbon markets. However, these narrow perspectives motivate the pursuit of participatory
activities that ultimately undermine the social relations of production between AMBIO and
participating farmers.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation I examine a carbon forestry project, which, despite an outward appearance of
success, generated negative social consequences that belie its stated objectives. The case of the
Scolel’ Te carbon forestry project managed by AMBIO, despite its positive image and the sincere
efforts of its many project officers, unfortunately undertakes a variety of actions that degrade the
social contracts and labor relations upon which their conservation efforts depend. I make the
case, moreover, that social relations are undermined in three particular respects: 1) by enrolling
farmers in unequal labor arrangements that disenfranchise participants; 2) by threatening the
standing of participating farmers within their communities; and 3) by altering farmer relationships
to their land in a manner that is blind to the many factors that shape farmer land-use patterns and
resource management practices. Such outcomes are damaging to farmer livelihoods and are
detrimental to carbon forestry initiatives as they erode the diverse social relations upon which
farmer livelihoods and project success depend.
In this dissertation, I combine critical labor studies, commodity chains, and political
ecology approaches, showing how carbon market dynamics and existing inequalities combine to
undermine social relations and alienate labor arrangements within rural farming communities.
These social effects threaten the long-term success of carbon forestry. However, despite their
implications, they often go unnoticed by practitioners and researchers who privilege social capital
and transactions costs approaches that are blind to the broader social relations in which farmers
interact, and the implications of their work in carbon forestry within that broader social setting.
By contextualizing farmers and their work within broader intra-community social relations I show
how participation in development does not automatically equate empowerment as some
practitioners would have it, but that empowerment must be considered within the context of
development and the broader social relations that form part of a person’s life. Transactions cost
and social capital perspectives are also blind to inequalities in the carbon credit commodity chain
– inequalities that emerge from the efforts of AMBIO to overcome ‘buyer flight’ and project
costs through exploitative labor arrangements. In this dissertation, I show how attempts by
AMBIO to overcome these factors by turning to cheap técnico labor effectively undermines
farmers who feel marginalized within the project. Finally, I show how participatory mapping
exercises and member education programs designed to achieve community buy-in contradict
farmer land-planning and resource management practices, thereby paradoxically undermining
their willingness to participate in Scolel’ Te.
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In Chapter 2 I turn to Marcos’ impassioned critique of Chiapas’ development history,
arguing that carbon forestry represents a continuation of a trend of destructive development in the
state. I argue, moreover, that the nature of carbon forestry and similar development projects is
not arbitrary, but rather, emerges within established relations of exploitation and domination,
thereby leading to trends in project design and project outcomes that are often predictably
destructive. In order to analyze how this occurs, I examine how environmental conservation – a
key tenet of carbon forestry – came to be defined by the commoditization and marketing of
environmental qualities, thereby obtaining many of the same characteristics of past market-based
development projects. I then assess the nature of broader carbon markets in which AMBIO sells
carbon credits produced in Chiapas. These markets are necessary to understand for clarifying in
Chapter 3 how shifting market conditions impact project participants on the ground. Finally, I
examine the regional and historical dimensions of development in Chiapas and the Sierra Madre
more specifically, underscoring several ways in which carbon forestry is linked to this history.
The first manner in which carbon forestry is linked to Chiapas’ development history is
through the diverse actors on which project success depends – actors that are intimately
connected to broader patterns of social life, including past development initiatives within the
state. Second, Scolel’ Te exhibits several elements of past development practice in Chiapas. On
one hand, processes of carbon credit production tied to Scolel’ Te in the Sierra Madre region hint
at the longstanding relationship of the region as defined by the production and export of
agriculture-based products such as coffee for consumption in the global north. On the other hand,
fluctuating carbon markets stand to impact producers in a manner not altogether different than the
boom and bust cycles associated with colonial and post-colonial markets for fine wood and
contemporary global markets for corn, coffee and cacao. Finally, the interactions between
AMBIO and participating communities reflect tensions, concerns and conflicts related to the past
experiences of AMBIO and participating communities with development in the state.
In Chapter 3 I build on the discussion of the broader carbon market elucidated in Chapter
2. I note that as AMBIO expands Scolel’ Te into the Sierra Madre region, the project becomes
exposed to market risk and rising transactions and production costs that restrict AMBIO’s ability
to expand the Scolel’ Te program. I draw on transactions cost, global commodity chains, and
political ecology perspectives, along with critical labor studies to examine AMBIO’s efforts to
overcome these challenges and to continue with expansion into the Sierra Madre region. I argue
that AMBIO’s efforts to do so resulted in a horizontal swelling of the carbon credit commodity
chain that included the incorporation of pre-production and auxiliary labor into existing practices
– work that was carried out by actors who were deeply implicated in Chiapas’ broader
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development landscape and the region’s development history. I argue, however, that these labor
arrangements are disenfranchising for farmers who feel exploited within Scolel’ Te.
Técnicos comunitarios are paid for only a portion of the labor they carry out, and in the
face of diminishing salaries for monitoring work, some have discussed abandoning the project.
Ultimately, this scenario demonstrates the capacity of those in relative positions of power to shift
the consequences of limited resources and market fluctuations onto those with no ability to
influence budgeting and management decisions.

Such labor arrangements create tensions

between técnicos comunitarios and AMBIO, many of which feel that their work is underpaid and
unjust. As técnicos threatened to leave the project, social relations between técnicos and the
managing NGO became weak, threatening the program’s long-term success. The marketization
of carbon credits, although seemingly different than other commodities traditionally extracted
from Chiapas, depends on similar exploitative labor arrangements within the commodity chain.
AMBIO’s efforts to overcome shifting market conditions and prohibitive production and
transactions costs also involved the enrollment of other actors and organizations into the carbon
credit production process. AMBIO relied on an extended division of labor that involved a variety
of actors in addition to técnicos comunitarios, including NGOs, governmental ministries and
international organizations.

The enrollment of these actors in the carbon credit production

process amounted to an extension of the carbon credit commodity chain, and involved efforts to
continue carbon credit production in participating communities while enhancing the value of Plan
Vivo Certificates by measuring the social and environmental effects of the Scolel’ Te program.
However, as became clear in the work of técnicos comunitarios, inequalities persist within the
carbon credit commodity chain as some actors are disproportionately exposed to risk and asked to
bear the brunt of prohibitive project costs.
Social relations, however, are not only undermined through unequal labor arrangements,
but also by the loss of social status by técnicos comunitarios within their communities. Farmers
participating in Scolel’ Te enroll for a variety of reasons, one of which revolves around the
opportunity to enhance their standing within their respective communities. Social standing is an
important component of rural community life in Mexico that shapes one’s access to resources and
access to opportunities within and outside their community. Social standing is important to take
into consideration because for many, the consequences of improving upon their status, or
conversely, of diminishing it, may become materially and emotionally manifest in damaged
relationships, reduced mobility within a community, and limited access to resources and
opportunities. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I argue that prestige may be earned through
participation in Scolel’ Te, thereby constituting an important factor for why those with relatively
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little prestige in a community may choose to participate. However, looking at the case of técnicos
comunitarios, it becomes clear that involvement in Scolel’ Te may also threaten a person’s
standing, thereby undermining their status within the community, an effect that although unseen
by AMBIO, has significant implications for project participants.
Senior members of AMBIO discuss the work of the técnicos comunitarios in terms of
participation and empowerment, a perspective that stems, in part, from their concerns to
democratize development. Moreover, such language conveniently builds on AMBIO’s broader
efforts to demonstrate the participatory credentials of Scolel’ Te to project funders and potential
carbon credit buyers.

However, as liaisons between AMBIO and their fellow community

members, técnicos comunitarios are at once asked to respond to the needs of AMBIO, while
fulfilling the expectations of their fellow community members. Moreover, they are uniquely
exposed to criticism when projects go against participant expectations. These pressures create
tensions that, for técnicos comunitarios, alter their standing within their communities and
transform their relationships with fellow community members, effects that are visible in the
concerns addressed by técnicos in meetings, the comments made by técnicos in interviews and
informal discussions, and by the manner in which some técnicos’ movements within their
communities are restricted out of a desire to avoid what they consider to be inevitable conflict
with fellow community members.
Finally, social relations within communities are undermined through Scolel’ Te through
the use of participatory exercises that alter farmer relationships to their land in a manner that is
blind to the many factors that shape farmer land-use patterns and resource management practices.
This is especially visible in Plan Vivo participatory mapping.

The persistent failure of

development projects in southern Mexico has fomented feelings of resentment and mistrust
among farming communities that have come to question the ability of projects to adequately
respond to their needs. Thus, AMBIO spends significant time and energy working to create trust
with project participants in the form of buy-in to Scolel’ Te. I argue that participatory exercises
in Scolel’ Te must be assessed from two perspectives: 1) as a discourse, and 2) as a labor process.
The first approach is essential to clarifying how AMBIO thinks about farmers and who they may
become through their participation in Scolel’ Te, while the second allows for analyzing how
farmers are expected to enact carbon forestry within their communities, and why AMBIO needs
to produce a certain pattern of activity and relationship to the land among farmers.
While community buy-in is a central component of AMBIO’s operations, it how this buyin is perceived and the underlying logics that inform the participatory activities used to pursue
buy-in that are of interest in this study. In Chapter 5 I argue that AMBIO’s efforts to achieve
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buy-in through mapping exercises are founded on assumptions of who farmers are as resource
managers and who they might become through their participation in Scolel’ Te.

These

expectations are visible in AMBIO’s perceptions of rural smallholder work ethic, land-use
patterns and entrepreneurial ambition. Although AMBIO has significant experience working in
Chiapas, its understanding of farmer land-use and resource management practices is confined
narrowly to the issue of carbon credit production. Given this narrow approach, AMBIO is often
blind to the fact that land-use decisions made by rural farmers are influenced by a variety of
political, social and environmental factors that are invisible when considered in the context of
AMBIO’s carbon credit producing objectives which privilege divergent considerations regarding
resource management.

In the context of Scolel’ Te, the motivations behind participatory

activities are often incommensurate with participant land-use decisions, which marginalize farmer
knowledge and threaten their long-term commitment to the project. Social relations between
AMBIO and participating farmers are thus undermined as farmers become frustrated with having
to adopt land-use practices that run counter to the reality of farming in the Sierra Madre region.
In the end, carbon forestry, although a novel form of environmental conservation and
rural development based in the production and sale of carbon credits, takes on many of the same
characteristics of development projects in region, past and present. First, it undermines social
relations that not only threaten the future success of the project, but which also damage the
relationships that are central to rural livelihoods. In this way, carbon forestry, although having
the appearance of success and gaining momentum through continued investment in REDD+
initiatives, replicates many destructive trends in the region, albeit in a more subtle fashion than
the highway and cacao projects.

Social relations are undermined through inequalities in

commodity chains that Marcos alludes to at the beginning of Chapter 2. Moreover, social
relations are undermined by participatory activities that are incommensurate with the land-use
practices of participating farmers.

Finally, social relations are undermined in participating

communities as farmers become the subject of rumors and trust is eroded. In the end, it becomes
clear that the social effects of carbon forestry may only be seen once such projects have been
situated within broader intra-community relations. Moreover, this dissertation makes clear that
meaningful empowerment does not emerge simply through participation in a project, but is
influenced by a broader set of social relations that extend beyond the realm of that project.
Future research on carbon forestry must proceed as it continues to gain steam,
particularly within emerging REDD+ projects. Future research, however, must make a stronger
effort to decenter the analysis from the experience of the male farmer, focusing additionally on
the extent to which such projects impact women’s livelihoods in rural Mexico.
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Studies of

participation must not be confined to the experience of male participatory labor, but must also ask
why more women are not included in project design. Access to participation in development
projects is not limited only to non-ejidatario men. As indicated in Chapter 4, such limitations are
every more real for women who must navigate what is largely a paternalistic development
industry in southern Mexico. Such analyses are essential to beginning to understand more fully
the social implications of carbon forestry, and development more generally, in Mexico.
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Appendix A: Dissertation Research Methods
In this appendix I outline the multiple methodological and data analysis techniques employed in
this study. Moreover, I identify the people who collaborated with me in this work and the places
in which the collaboration occurred. Specifically, I examine the multiple ethnographic methods
employed, including participant observation, semi-structured interviews and data analysis from
NGO videos and documents, and outline coded terms and phrases extracted from field notes.
Semi-Structured Interviews
One key method employed in this dissertation involved semi-structured interviews, which were
conducted with AMBIO employees and farmers participating in Scolel’ Te. In total, 80 semistructured interviews were conducted – 20 with AMBIO, 55 spread across two communities in
the Sierra Madre region of Chiapas, and 5 more in a third community in the same region.
Interviews with AMBIO employees were conducted while visiting communities in the
Sierra Madre region, and a limited number were carried out in San Cristóbal de las Casas. In
Table 1A I provide the names and educational backgrounds of those AMBIO employees
interviewed for this study, and highlight their positions within the organization (please note that
the names provided in this dissertation have been changed in order to protect the identities of
project participants). The people interviewed from AMBIO included three of six total full-time
employees. Additionally, four técnicos regionales who are paid to carry out significant work in
participating communities and in AMBIO’s offices were interviewed for this study. These
contacts were recommended by Enrique who first provided me with permission to conduct
research with the organization. However, each interviewed employee was necessary to the
project given their leadership positions within AMBIO and their long-term experience working
with Scolel’ Te.
Interviews with AMBIO employees were designed to determine project management
strategies, challenges associated with project management, and the logics and modes of thinking
that motivated such activities. One half of the interviews were recorded using an audio recorder,
while the other half were recorded via note taking due to the impromptu nature of the interviews.
The audio-recorded interviews, once finished, were transcribed in Spanish.

Afterward,

transcribed interview notes and additional notes taken during unrecorded interviews were
subjected to thematic coding during which key terms and phrases were identified in an effort to
identify patterns in how interviewees spoke about the program and their work more generally.
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Table 1A Interviewees from AMBIO
Name

Education

Position in AMBIO

Enrique

Engineer in Agricultural and plant sciences

Partner

Pilar

Engineer in Agroecology sciences

Partner

Lorena

N/A

Partner

Efraín

B.S. in Biology

Técnico Regional

Fausto

N/A

Técnico Regional

Eloy

N/A

Técnico Regional

Edmundo

N/A

Técnico Regional

The key words and phrases used in the coding process were those that emerged in the interviews
with AMBIO employees. The key words and phrases identified in interviews with AMBIO are
highlighted in Table 2A and are related to Plan Vivo mapping, its role in Scolel’ Te, and the
justifications for employing the activity as a means for securing community buy-in. Interviews
conducted with AMBIO employees proved to be essential to understanding project management
strategies and activities, and the logics motivating them. However, when conducting these
interviews I was often faced with the challenges posed by time shortages on the part of the
interviewees whose schedules did not permit longer than an hour.

Additionally, some

interviewees were hesitant to conduct interviews, referring me instead to AMBIO’s website for
generic information regarding the participatory mapping exercises.
Table 2A Coded Words and Phrases from Interviews with AMBIO Regarding Plan Vivo
Mapping, its Role in Scolel’ Te, and Justifications for Using it to Secure Community Buy-in
Key words and phrases indicating justification for the use of Plan Vivo mapping in
Scolel’ Te
Lack of Planning
“no tienen una planeación”
“buscamos la planeación”
“Mira para nosotros es este… es el principio del planeación comunitario. O la planeación del
territorio”
“El Plan Vivo es la planeación de ellos”
“ pueden generar una esquema de planeación”
“La primera acción es la planeación.”
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Table 2A (continued)
Need for Land Arrangement
“ordenamiento del uso de sus tierras”
To support long-term success of Scolel’ Te
“damos permanencia a las actividades”
Key words and phrases indicating relevance of Plan Vivo mapping to community buy-in
Importance of Participation
“es importante que la gente participa”
“ellos participan las definiciones del uso de suelo”
“El proceso de planeación rompe sin participación”
Creates Trust
“Que ellas tengan la confianza”
“que la gente empieza tener confianza.
“Plan Vivo es ya la confianza plasmada en tu documento”
“ellos empiezan dibujar y perder ese miedo y empiecen ellos a tener mas confianza entre ellos y
trabajar juntos”
Creates Sense of Ownership
“va a sentirse parte de proyecto”

However, despite these hesitations on the part of AMBIO’s employees, over half agreed to
participate in interviews. As will become clear below, participant observation provided an
important addition to the interviews as other data became available in the context of less formal
interactions.
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with farmers participating in Scolel’ Te
in three different communities in Chiapas’ Sierra Madre region. The majority was concentrated
in two communities located in two different municipalities, while the third community was
located in a third municipality. Ultimately, I chose not to conduct extensive fieldwork in the third
community given the financial costs and time demands doing so would have required. However,
it was necessary to conduct fieldwork in at least two communities so as to diversify the
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information received regarding rural livelihoods and Scolel’ Te. The two communities studied in
this dissertation were chosen based on several criteria:
1. Their location in the Sierra Madre region: past studies of Scolel’ Te and on community life in
Chiapas in general have tended to be concentrated in the central highlands and Lacandón
regions of Chiapas. Given the cultural, ecological and political variability across Chiapas’
multiple regions (see Rus and Castillo et al, 2003), it was necessary to understand how
AMBIO operated in the Sierra Madre region – a region into which it had only recently begun
to expand.
2. The past experience of each community with development programs more generally: one of
the two communities studied in this project was often described by AMBIO as a “model
community” for development projects and as a community that had traditionally enjoyed
significant experience with a variety of development programs. The second community,
however, had relatively limited experience in government- and NGO-led development
projects. By working with both communities I was able to learn about the implications of
Scolel’ Te for those communities for whom work in development programs is the norm and
for those communities for whom access to participation has been relatively limited.
3. The experience of each community with Scolel’ Te: the community identified by AMBIO as
a “model community” was considered by AMBIO to be an ideal case for project
implementation and management.

AMBIO noted high degrees of participation among

community members and an overall interest in pursuing carbon forestry.

The other

community, however, was often described by AMBIO as lacking the interest, motivation and
community organization needed to successfully recruit participation and implement and
manage Scolel’ Te at a large scale. By working with both communities I was able to learn
about attitudes toward Scolel’ Te within communities experiencing diverse degrees of
success within the project, and was able to learn about project management strategies pursued
by AMBIO in diverse contexts.
The purpose of the interviews with farmers was to clarify their perceptions of Scolel’ Te and
development programs more generally, and to learn about the implications of their participation
in these programs for their everyday lives. More specifically, they were designed to obtain data
regarding farmer land-use patterns and decision-making strategies surrounding farming practices.
Interviews were conducted largely with male farmers participating in Scolel’ Te so as to obtain
data regarding the program within the community. However, it was not uncommon for additional
family members – spouses, in particular – to be located in the area of the interview, and to
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contribute opinions and comments as questions were asked. Interviews were especially useful
during the early stages of the fieldwork process for establishing familiarity with community
members, and for obtaining general information about each of the communities and their
experiences in Scolel’ Te. In tables 3A, 4A, and 5A, I highlight the people I spoke with in the
three communities, the estimated level of education attained by each person, their position within
Scolel’ Te and their approximate ages.

I also indicate primary sources of income and/or

employment, almost all of which involved selling limited agricultural commodities in nearby
cities and other goods informally within the community. Levels of education are estimated based
on each person’s approximate age. Older community members (ages 30 and older) generally
reported having attended school to the level of the primaria (elementary school). Although
secondary schools have been built in the two communities collaborating in this project, teachers
assigned to work in the two communities are often absent, leaving children with intermittent
educational training.
The majority of the interviews conducted with farmers were audio-recorded and were
transcribed in Spanish. Afterward, transcribed interview notes and additional notes taken during
unrecorded interviews were subjected to thematic coding during which key terms and phrases
were identified in an effort to uncover patterns in how interviewees spoke about land-use
planning, farming practices, reasons for participating in Scolel’ Te, and their perceptions of
various components of the project. Tables 6A and 7A illustrate the key words and phrases
associated with farmer land-use activities and farmer perceptions of key concepts related to
Scolel’ Te and carbon markets more generally. Table 8A shows key words and phrases used by
farmers indicating their attitudes toward Scolel’ Te in the context of late and unrealized
compensation for participation. However, despite the useful nature of semi-structured interviews
for this research, this method was limited by one key factor: interviews were largely conducted
with men participating directly in Scolel’ Te. This was due, in part, to the fact that I actively
sought out male participation in interviews, and to the fact that women were hesitant to be
interviewed about Scolel’ Te, often advising that I speak with their husbands or sons instead.
Given the fact that interviews were conducted largely with male participants in Scolel’ Te, future
research must more actively include the voices and experiences of women in interview processes.
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Table 3A Interviewees from One Community Participating in Scolel’ Te in the Sierra
Madre Region
Name/
Ejidal
Authority

Education
Attained

Rufino

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Renato

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Don Zacarías

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Hernán

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Horacio

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Jaime

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Ismael

Limited Middle
School
(Secundaria)

Don Jorge

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Alejandro
Comisariado
Ejidal

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Jacinto

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Pedro

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Employment/
Income Source
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
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Position
within Scolel’
Te

Approx.
Age

Participant

50-60

Participant

50-60

Participant

50-50

Participant

40-50

Participant

40-50

Participant

30-40

Técnico
Comunitario

25-35

Participant

50-60

Participant

40-50

Participant

50-60

Participant

50-60

Table 3A (continued)

Bautista

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Carlos

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community

Participant

30-40

Participant

30-40

Table 4A Interviewees from a Second Community Participating in Scolel’ Te in the Sierra
Madre Region
Name/
Ejidal
Authority

Education
Attained

Heberto

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Roberto

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Rosalba

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Bernardo

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Benito

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Cesar

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Eusebio

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Employment/
Income Source
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Works
outside community in a
nearby poultry processing
plant
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Works
outside community as
contract worker with
construction crew
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
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Position
within Scolel’
Te

Approx.
Age

Participant

30-40

Participant

30-40

N/A

30-40

Participant

30-40

Participant

30-40

Participant

50-60

Participant
(Conditional
Status)

30-40

Table 4A (continued)
Felipe

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Estaban

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Guillermo

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Chus

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Javier
Comisariado
Ejidal

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Rosario

Limited Middle
School
(Secundaria)

Rafael

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Porfirio

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Raúl

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Rubén

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Sergio

Limited Middle
School
(Primaria)

Vicente

Elementary
School (Primaria)

Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community
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Participant

50-60

Participant

40-50

Participant

30-40

Participant

30-40

Participant

40-50

Técnico
Comunitario

20-30

Participant

40-50

Participant

30-40

Participant

30-40

Participant

30-40

Técnico
Comunitario

15-25

Participant

30-40

Table 5A The Single Interviewee from a Third Community in the Sierra Madre Region
Name/
Ejidal
Authority

Education
Attained

Employment/
Income Source

Don Sebastián

Elementary School
(Secundaria)

Sells limited agricultural
commodities; Family
sells goods informally
within community

Position
within Scolel’
Te

Approx.
Age

Técnico
comunitario

50-60

Table 6A Coded Words and Phrases from Interviews with Farmers in Two Communities
Regarding Land-Use Decisions and the Factors Shaping Decision-Making Processes
Land-Use Planning Process Exists in Communities
“Hago un plan de trabajo… que voy a sembrar… cantidad y lugar”
“Cada uno tiene un plan de trabajo – que materiales va a usar”
“Allí (en AMBIO) es teórico porque es letras, libros, formatos, cuadernos, y aquí no. Aquí es
campo, practica”
Land-Use Decisions Made in Relation to Resource Availability
“Somos gente de poco recurso… sembramos lo que podemos”
“Hago mi plan de trabajo según el dinero que tengo…”
“muchos ya no siembran tanto maíz por el costo de la semilla y los fertilizantes…”
“Bueno la decisión es fácil hacerlo – si tenemos el dinero para hacerlo o no tenemos el dinero
para hacerlo… Si no hay dinero, no hace nada”
“no tenemos en donde sembrar… que opción tenemos?”
Government Resources are Unreliable
“Dice el gobierno que va a invertir en el campo pero no llegan los recursos”
“recursos del gobierno se quedan en el municipio y no llegan a nosotros…”
Land-use Decisions Related to Environmental Factors
“El maíz requiere suelo duro y poco pedregoso y no muy pendiente..”
“para café, pendiente o plano – con cubierto de vegetal. “
“frijol que sembramos en mayo es ‘frijol venturero’ – sembramos poco dado las lluvias que
complican la cosecha”
“sembramos lo que se llama ‘frijol del norte’ en septiembre – de este sembramos bastante, 3 o 4
costales”
“hay que sembrar maíz en los terrenos planos y el frijol está bien en los lugares pendientes”
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Table 7A Coded Words and Phrases from Interviews with Farmers in Two Communities
Regarding Climate Change, the Relationship of Scolel’ Te to Climate Change, and Their
Motivations for Participating in Carbon Forestry
Defining Climate Change in Communities
“ya no viene el calor… ya no quemamos los arboles”
“es mejor conservar la reserve… está mas fresco… este es el cambio climático”
“Ya hay menos calor y hay mas frescura porque estamos sembrando estos arboles“
“llovía mucho cuando nosotros lleguemos aquí… ahorita no llueve tanto como antes”
“no se mucho del cambio climático… solo lo que observo… allá abajo pega el sol, pero aquí en
las montanas está mas fresco”
Defining Importance of Reforestation
“si no sembramos los arboles, no cae el agua”
“estamos reforestando y cuidando los arboles. Está regresando la lluvia de antes.”
“tenemos que sembrar arboles para que se normaliza la temperatura”
“los arboles jalan lo malo”
Motivations for Participating in Scolel’ Te
“nos dan un pequeño apoyo”
“aquí no hay trabajo… es la única oportunidad que tenemos”

Table 8A Coded Words and Phrases from Interviews with Farmers in Two Communities
Indicating Farmer Attitudes Toward Scolel’ Te
Perceptions of Unrealized Payments
“Se pone triste pues, porque hay una esperanza que cae para comprar azúcar, algo para la casa.”
“No hay nada pues. Y eso es lo mas triste porque trabaja uno y hay paga.”
“se desespera la gente”
Reactions to Late Payments
“piensan que el proyecto no va a seguir
“tal vez nos abandonaron… saber si existe el proyecto todavía”
“ya desatienden sus plantas… Ya no quieren seguir. Son muy tardados los pagos.”

In the end, semi-structured interviews conducted with AMBIO and with members of two
communities participating in Scolel’ Te proved useful for obtaining information regarding project
management strategies, challenges associated with project management, and the logics motivating
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such activities. Moreover, they were essential for uncovering farmer perceptions of Scolel’ Te,
and for obtaining data regarding farmer land-use patterns and decision-making strategies.
Participant Observation
In addition to semi-structured interviews, I conducted participant observation with AMBIO and in
two participating communities, with limited engagement in a third community.

Participant

observation with AMBIO was designed to obtain data by observing the many issues discussed in
interviews as they unfolded in the course of daily practice. These included project management,
participant training workshops and meetings with collaborating organizations such as
Conservation International.

Moreover, participant observation conducted with participating

communities was designed to observe the everyday actions and activities that give meaning to
certain behaviors and beliefs (Bogdewic, 1999), and to learn about the experiences of people in
particular settings (Watson and Till, 2010). More specifically, my goal was to obtain insight into
what it means to live in the rural Sierra Madre region of Chiapas, and thus, what it means to
participate in development projects, including Scolel’ Te.

In this segment I first outline

participant observation as it pertained to AMBIO, and then I discuss participant observation in
relation to participating communities.
Participant observation with AMBIO involved accompanying employees through several
facets of project management. These included técnico training workshops at AMBIO’s offices in
San Cristóbal de las Casas, meetings with community members in the region to attend to general
administrative affairs, and to conduct Plan Vivo participatory mapping exercises in communities
across the Sierra Madre region.

The técnico training workshops, referred to as reuniones

semestrales, were held in AMBIO’s offices in San Cristobal de las Casas, and were notoriously
long, lasting from around 9:00am until around 6:00pm. For these meetings, técnicos regionales
and técnicos comunitarios travelled from their communities across the state to attend. For many,
the trip was long, and implied a significant sacrifice in order to attend. Those travelling, for
instance, from the municipality of Ocosingo near the Lacandón region, faced travel times ranging
from 5-7 hours. Other técnicos from the Lacandón were forced, due to unreliable transportation
means, to make the trip in two days. This, however, was not the case for técnicos from the Sierra
Madre region who were able to make the trip on the same day as the meetings, leaving their
homes as early as 3am in order to arrive to San Cristobal at the start of the meeting.
The time-consuming nature of such trips stems from the fact that transportation in the
state is often unreliable, and in order to travel from a rural community to San Cristobal, one must
use several modes of transportation. Participant observation for this dissertation involved using
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these travel networks to travel regularly from communities to San Cristobal de las Casas. In
Table 9A I illustrate the modes of transportation required to travel from a rural community in the
Sierra Madre region to AMBIO’s offices in San Cristóbal de las Casas, and the times required to
travel from one place to the next. While each of the travel times would appear to be fairly
straightforward, the experience is complicated by several variables at each point along the way.

Table 9A Modes of Transportation and Travel Times Required to Travel from
Communities in the Sierra Madre Region to AMBIO’s Offices in San Cristobal de las
Casas, Chiapas
Location

Mode of Transportation

Time

Community to Municipal Seat

Bus or Van

2 hours

Municipal Seat to Tuxtla
Gutierrez

Bus or Van

2 hours

Bus Station to Bus Station

Taxi

20 minutes

Tuxtla Gutierrez to San
Cristóbal

Bus or Van

1 hour

First, transportation from a community to the municipal seat is only available on select days, in
some cases leaving the community on a daily basis, and in other instances, leaving only two or
three days each week. Additionally, despite the efforts of drivers to maintain a regular schedule,
automobile malfunction, washed-out roads and swollen rivers often make travel impossible,
thereby restricting transportation opportunities and complicating the plans of community
members to travel to the municipal seat. In such instances, people must either postpone travel
plans for another day, or hike from the community to the nearest road where they may hitchhike
to the municipal seat – a hike that may take up to three hours. Once arriving at the municipal
seat, técnicos must make a three-kilometer walk to the bus station where buses and vans depart
for the state capital.

Buses and vans depart on a regular schedule from these state-run

transportation centers. However, trips are at times slowed-down by the breakdown of a vehicle or
by accidents on the poorly maintained roads. Once arriving in Tuxtla Gutierrez, técnicos take a
taxi from the bus station to a second bus station in order to travel to San Cristobal de las Casas.
Traveling with técnicos to San Cristóbal de las Casas provided unique opportunities to not only
experience first-hand the sacrifices associated with working in Scolel’ Te, but also provided
opportunities for candid discussion about the program.
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Inconsistent transportation methods not only complicated my ability to carry-out
fieldwork for this project, but also severely complicate the efforts of técnicos to attend meetings
in AMBIO’s offices in San Cristóbal de las Casas. On one occasion, after receiving last-minute
word of a meeting at AMBIO’s offices, one técnico comunitario and I departed for San Cristóbal
the following day. However, owing to the fact that the meeting started at 9:00am we could not
afford to wait for public transportation to leave from the community for the municipal seat. Thus,
we left his home at 3:00am, hiking in the dark for three hours to the nearest community that
would afford us transportation to the municipal seat, and from there to Tuxtla Gutierrez and San
Cristóbal. We were tired as we arrived to San Cristóbal at 9:00am for the meeting with AMBIO,
but were not alone given that others had also sacrificed their time and their sleep to make the trip.
While AMBIO reimbursed travel expenses made by técnicos, the physical burden of travel for the
técnicos comunitarios was undeniable.
Meetings were designed to train técnicos in their work in Scolel’ Te, but also provided a
problem-solving opportunity in which técnicos could share complaints, problems and other issues
related to Scolel’ Te’s management in their communities to AMBIO. These meetings were
especially useful for obtaining information about the experiences of técnicos and communities
across Chiapas as they relate to Scolel’ Te. Field notes taken during and immediately following
these meetings and while travelling with técnicos from the Sierra Madre revealed, through
thematic coding, the opinions of many toward the program, and shed light on their experience of
the project as it relates to their work in the project. Representative key words and phrases
emerging in these notes are detailed in Table 10.0. These phrases and comments are commonly
expressed among técnicos from various regions of the state, indicating similar attitudes and
experiences throughout Chiapas. They indicate, not only community responses to the project
management, particularly related to late payments, but also indicate ruptured relationships
between técnicos comunitarios and disillusioned participants in Scolel’ Te.
In addition to conducting participant observation with AMBIO and técnicos comunitarios
in the context of training workshops, I also accompanied AMBIO on project management trips to
participating communities. In one particular occasion we travelled to four communities in the
Sierra Madre region over the course of three days where AMBIO employees carried out Plan
Vivo mapping and met with community leaders and técnicos comunitarios to address concerns
related to project management and the monitoring of agroforestry systems. We travelled in one
of AMBIO’s vehicles, a marked difference from the complicated travel logistics faced by most
técnicos comunitarios. This trip provided a unique opportunity to observe the use of participatory
activities such as Plan Vivo mapping in project management and to speak with AMBIO
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employees in the context of their direct work with participating communities. Key words and
phrases obtained through field notes about AMBIO’s attitudes about the value of participatory
activities such as Plan Vivo mapping may be found in Table 2A.

Table 10A Coded Words and Phrases from Field Notes from Participant Observation with
Técnicos Comunitarios While Travelling to San Cristóbal, While Participating in Reuniones
Semestrales, and While Living in Their Respective Communities
Payments and Community Discontent
“no llegan los pagos y se desespera la gente… se enoja…”
“la gente se enoja por lo de los pagos… ya no quiere limpiar sus parcelas… quieren sus pagos”
“algunos se abandonaron el proyecto por lo de los pagos…”
“se enojó mi suegro porque los que entraron después de 2011 no han recibido nada”
Community Discontent and Técnico Unease
“ya no queremos volver a hacer los monitoreos… se enoja la gente”
“siempre nos preguntan de los pagos… se desespera la gente”
“no quiero salir de mi casa… nos acusan de haber robado el dinero”
Técnico Unease and Project Perceptions
“AMBIO paga muy barato… es muy barato”
“A mi no me conviene trabajar así…”
“trabajo tanto pero no nos están pagando muy poco”

Finally participant observation with AMBIO also took place in the context of meetings
with Conservation International. AMBIO invited me to attend two meetings with Conservation
International in which efforts to increase the value of Plan Vivo certificates through additional
certifications were discussed. The meetings were held in AMBIO’s offices in San Cristóbal, and
were followed by field visits to participating communities.

I was only able to attend the

meetings, but found them useful for learning about the challenges faced by AMBIO with regard
to balancing trends in international carbon markets with the on-the-ground challenges associated
with project implementation and management. AMBIO’s efforts to overcome these challenges
through certification emerged as a key strategy for responding to shifting supply and demand
dynamics. Participation in these meetings was essential to understanding issues associated with
preserving the future of Scolel’ Te in the face of growing market uncertainty.
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For this project I also conducted participant observation with non-técnico farmers
participating in Scolel’ Te. Participant observation was designed to obtain information regarding
land-use decisions and practices among farmers, to understand farmer work in Scolel’ Te and to
clarify the implications of development programs more generally for farmers in the region. To
this end, I accompanied técnicos comunitarios in two communities as they monitored the
agroforestry plantings of fellow community members participating in Scolel’ Te. As we hiked
for up to four hours per day, it became clear that the energy expended in carrying-out monitoring
activities is significant, and that a large gap in technical knowledge exists between técnicos
comunitarios and the farmers whose agroforestry plantings were being monitored. At times this
knowledge gap led to questions regarding why some trees were discounted from total tallies –
tallies upon which reimbursement decisions were made.

Such questions often manifested

themselves in the debates about community discontent alluded to by técnicos comunitarios across
the state at the reunions semestrales in AMBIO’s offices.
Additionally, I accompanied farmers to their fields, planting and harvesting beans, corn
and coffee, and joined them on trips to sell agricultural products to buyers in nearby cities.
Farmers, for instance, showed me land parcels where corn was planted, showing how land-use
decisions shifted from past years depending on the price of corn and availability of resources
from government programs. Another farmer, for instance, highlighted segments of his land that
had been recently dedicated to cattle grazing activities – a conversion that was motivated by the
fact that inputs for corn production had increased at the same time government subsidies for cattle
grazing increased. This work demonstrated that land-use decisions are based on a variety of
factors, and that development programs shape how farmers interact with their land in complex
ways. In the context of Scolel’ Te, it showed that conceptualizing land in terms of its capacity to
produce carbon credits comes into conflict with other land-use practices such as grazing cattle,
which threatens the long-term health of young tree saplings.
Finally, I joined community members in community celebrations of religious holidays
such as Easter, weddings, and annual community festivities. These occasions were held in
private homes, in public spaces such as the community basketball park and the casa ejidal, and in
the community’s Catholic church. In the case of weddings, extended families and friends would
gather to celebrate, while religious holidays and community festivals involved broader
community participation. Such occasions provided valuable opportunities for learning about how
people interact with one another, who attends the events and who chooses to stay home.
Moreover, as people interacted (or did not interact) with one another in these events, how people
felt toward one another began to emerge. Figure 1A shows a cockfight that took place as part of a
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community celebration in the Sierra Madre. Such events provided an important opportunity for
viewing how people interact in within the context of the broader community.
Such attitudes also became apparent in nightly conversations with friends. Evenings
were largely spent socializing or watching telenovelas. During this time, families and neighbors
discussed a variety of themes regarding life and ongoing events in the community. Topics ranged
from migrating family members and rumors about family disputes and crop success (or failure),
to gossip about new marriages, and other family and community affairs. These gatherings usually
involved extended family with all eating crackers or tortillas and drinking sweetened coffee. This
time allowed for the candid and willing sharing of rumors and gossip within the community.
These experiences were central to building trust with farmers and with the community more
generally, and provided a unique opportunity for candid discussion about the realities of social
life in their communities. Participant observation provided an important addition to the semistructured interviews, but was also complemented by data analysis of NGO videos and
documents.

Figure 1A Cockfight in the Sierra Madre Region
Photo Credit: Author

While participant observation provided a key component of this research, it was limited
by the fact that outside of community events, and evening socializing, the majority of my time
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was spent with the farmers and families most closely tied to Scolel’ Te. More work is needed to
understand how those not participating in Scolel’ Te view the project, why they do not
participate, and their engagement with development programs more generally within the
community.
Data Analysis from NGO Videos and Documents
In addition to semi-structured interviews and participant observation, I also conducted data
analysis from NGO videos and documents. The resources analyzed included a training video
produced to explain to farmers the problem of climate change, the importance of Scolel’ Te as a
means to responding to climate change, and how to participate in Scolel’ Te by planting trees and
caring for them by pruning and by clearing land parcels of unwanted vegetation. The video was
provided to técnicos comunitarios to share with fellow participants in their respective
communities. The booklet analyzed was titled, Guía Didáctica para la Participación Local en
Programas de Servicios Ambientales.

The booklet, which was co-produced by AMBIO,

Conservation International and other organizations, explained the problem of climate change
using stories designed to relate the issue to local values and concerns.

Table 11A Key Words and Phrases from Analyzed Documents Illustrating the Logics and
Modes of Thinking AMBIO Sought to Diffuse to Participating Communities Through
Member Education Programs
Presenting the Climate Change Threat
“viene otro huracán… con este tiempo tan loco uno ya no sabe cuando nos tocara a nosotros”
“hay muy pocas comunidades con un lugar así… antes todas lo tenían…”
Images: Climate change as threat to family
Climate change as threat to livelihoods
Presenting Payment for Ecosystem Services Projects
“es un programa que beneficia al bosque pero también a la comunidad…”
“podemos cuidar el pedacito de paraíso”
Images: By safeguarding the natural environment, family and livelihoods may also be
safeguarded
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Moreover, it explained how monitoring activities might be carried out within payment for
ecosystem services programs as a means to mitigating global climate change. Like the video, this
book was given to técnicos comunitarios to share with fellow project participants as a means to
generating awareness about the problem of climate change and to motivate farmers to become
dedicated to their work in Scolel’ Te.
These forms of media represent one component of AMBIO’s participatory efforts to
achieve community buy-in to Scolel’ Te. I analyzed this video and document for the logics
underpinning their creation – those ways of thinking that AMBIO wanted participating farmers to
adopt through their diffusion. Both forms of media included images and text, while the video
also included spoken text. The key words and phrases identified in these forms of media are
outlined in Table 11A.
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